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PREFACE 
The idea that unfettered markets are necessary for efficient 
selection, production, and distribution of goods is as common to most 
economists as it is foreign to others. Most people believe in a fair price, 
fixed by the moral laws of nature, ungoverned by the revealed preferences of 
men. Many are convinced that the items they own are underpriced, while the 
opposite is true of the items they desire. Many believe that the ill effects 
of market restrictions are small and temporary, for free markets do not 
trumpet their beneficence any more than do electrons proclaim their 
existence. The benefits of free markets are buried from plain sight, are 
only with difficulty uncovered. The consequences of interference with 
them, as of with electrons, can sometimes be devastating. 
That we do not more often abandon free markets is more remarkable 
than the enumeration of their restriction. Perhaps an untapped approach to 
the biography of mankind might concentrate on the episodic establishment 
and disestablishment of free markets; on the factors that have lead to the 
emplacement of restrictions on markets, given the ever present desire to do 
so; and on the principles that have allowed the relaxation of those 
restrictions. For the birth of market restrictions is rare enough to be 
newsworthy, while the brevity of their existence allows convenient study. 
The historical record with regard to free markets is that we cannot be long 
without them. In light of the services they render, this is of no small 
comfort. 
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The report that follows attempts to measure the degree to which 
three futures markets approach pricing perfection. Such measurement is 
possible because futures are entirely derivative assets, being only rights to 
buy or sell an underlying asset during a specific interval of time. Of all 
possible alternatives, it is easiest to identify the proper price of 
derivatives. Even here, it is not a trivial enterprise. The right to buy an 
asset is not exactly equivalent to the actual purchase of an asset, and a 
composite asset having most of the characteristics as another asset is not 
the other asset. The only perfect equivalent to a can of peas is another can 
of peas, of the same brand, of the same age, on the same shelf, at the same 
store, at the same time. All else is substitution. But within very small 
tolerances, the markets studied in this investigation perfectly price their 
commodities. 
The implications of the Efficient Markets Hypothesis are extremely 
important, although too numerous to begin to recount here, bearing on 
questions from macroeconomic policy to securities regulation to investment 
counsel. Also numerous are the people who helped form and stimulate my 
interest in markets. Some of them are many years departed: Diocletian, 
with his edicts to control prices (he failed, or course); Adam Smith, with 
his Laffer curves; Maynard Keynes, with his elegant prose and imaginative 
analysis; Don Pat ink in, with his elegant analysis and imaginative prose; 
Richard Nixon and Jimmy Carter, with their phases and entitlements to 
control prices (they failed, of course). 
No one can name those to whom he is intellectually indebted. To try 
is at once exhausting in scope and humbling in contemplation. But I would 
like to at least thank those of most recent recall: 
iv 
First, and paramount, my parents, Ralph C. Gamble, and Eloise Gamble, 
for their gentle encouragement, stimulating conversation, and 
demonstration in so many ways that devotion to duty is the primary 
attribute of humanity, and the requisite of love; 
my very dear wife, Loretta, and daughter, Adria, for their forbearance 
of an absent husband and father, lost again in economic abstraction, who 
my collegues in the Economics and Finance department at Fort Hays 
State University, Preston Gilson, Len Martien, Carl Parker, Bill Rickman, Dan 
Rupp, and Jack McCullick (still at heart an economist), for their fellowship 
and fraternity, and for their demonstration that diversity is strength; 
my professors at Oklahoma State University, Janice and Joe Jadlow, 
Richard Leftwich, Michael Edgmand, Kent Olson, Ron Moomaw, Rudolf 
Trenton, Gerald Lage, and John Rea, for many hours of classroom delight; 
my dissertation committee, Mary Gade, Ed Price, and John Wingender, 
for their efforts on my behalf; 
and my dissertation committee chairman, Frank Steindl, who most 
cheerfully gave so generously of his time and insight in order to bring this 
project to fruition. His care and clear vision have imbued this work with 
any quality it may contain. To him I dedicate this work. May his desk ever 
be cluttered with effusions of praise from grateful students; 
To these and more- my sincere thanks and appreciation. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The existence of informational efficiency In financial markets Is an 
Important issue. If financial futures markets are efficient, then there Is 
Jtttle need to worry about the degree of regulation they enjoy. The effect of 
over-regulation is to make the market over-safe, with returns efficiently 
skewed toward the over-volatne investments that remain. If financial 
markets are efficient, then the activities of arbitrageurs yteld the socia11y 
convenient virtue of providing liquidity to the market. If financial markets 
are efficient, then Investors can economize on their purchases of special 
information, forecasts, techniques, tips, reports, and services in efforts to 
earn greater than normal rates of return at lower risk than that required by 
such return. If financial markets are efficient, then we need not fear the 
consequences of the Introduction of new financial Instruments, different 
systems of dispensing financial lntennedlatlon, new participants in 
financial markets, but can welcome them. 
Tests of the efficiency of financial futures markets may provide 
some evidence on the efficiency of financial markets in general. Certainly, 
if some participants tn financial futures wi11ingly provide liquidity services 
to others by buying some of the rtsk Inherent In Investing, one or both 
parties is better off. This is an inescapable conclusion of voluntary 
exchange. If, however, financial futures markets Increase the level of risk 
1n the process of allocat1ng that rtsk, tt 1s posstble that greater regulat1on 
m1ght result 1n h1gher overall welfare. 
2 
With regard to Treasury b1ll futures, the market Is efficient, 
according to some studies, since no arbttragable profits exist. For Instance, 
Poole ( 1978), Dale and Workman< 1981 >, and Dale< 1981) find the b111 
futures market to be efficient. According to others, the market Is only 
quasl-eff1clent, since portfolio returns can be enhanced by the use of the 
bill futures market. even though transactions costs make arbitrage 
unprofitable. Studies by Rendleman and carablnl < 1979) and cornell < 1981) 
find this type of partial efficiency. Still others maintain the Inefficiency 
of the market, since profits available through arbitrage extst for an 
appreciable ttme, and are not quickly eliminated. Examples of studies that 
purport to show the Inefficiency of the market are those by Puglisi < 1978), 
Capozza and Cornell < 1978), Lang and Rasche< 1978), VIgnola and Dale 
< 1979), Elton, Gruber and Rentzler < 1984), and Monroe and Cohn< 1986). 
However, none of these studies has properly accounted for a risk 
differential Inherent In ownership of a b111-futures combination. The ttme 
path of actual returns from the combination has a different distribution 
than that or the bill Itself. This risk differential has not been accounted for 
by any previous test methodology employed on the financial futures markets. 
The differential In the returns dlstrlbutton ts able to explatn a good deal or 
the apparent arb1trage profit that the market does not qutcl<ly eliminate. 
This means that what appears to be uncaptured arbitrage profit may be 
entirely due to the r1sl< premium pa1d to owners or the more variable 
Instrument. In other words. all previous studies which have round the 
Treasury bll1 futures market to be Inefficient are at best Inconclusive, and 
at worst Incorrect. 
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What 1s true for the b111 futures market Is more forcefully so for the 
Treasury note and Treasury bond futures markets. However, there have been 
few attempts to test for the efflc1ency of these markets, for two reasons. 
First, 1t 1s more nearly obvious In the bond and note complexes that the 
arbitrage involves Instruments having different characteristics. Second, 
the bond and note futures contracts do not require the delivery of a unique 
Instrument. Unlike the bill futures contract, which requires the delivery of 
a specific b11lin contract fulfillment, the bond contract allows the de11very 
of n Treasury bond having at least 15 years remaining to maturity or 
ear11est call. The note contract allows the de11very of any Treasury note 
having 6 1/2 to 1 o years remaining to maturity or call. Since an arb1trage 
requires the sale of an asset 1n one market and its offsett1ng purchase In 
another, the bond and note contracts do not fac111tate arbitrage. 
The purpose of th1s study 1s to exam1ne properly the hypothests of 
financial market efficiency, concentrating on three f1nanclal futures 
markets; the Treasury bill futures contract of the Ch1cago Mercant11e 
Exchange, and the Treasury note and Treasury bond futures contracts of the 
Chicago Board of Trade. Chapter II presents the theory of Interest rate 
arbitrage, as app11ed to the futures markets. The results from the 
literature are summarized In Chapter Ill. Chapter IV 1s a presentation of 
empirical findings. Chapter v 1s a summary. 
CHAPTER II 
THEORY OF EFFICIENT 
MARKETS 
Informational Efftctency 
The notion of market efficiency is closely related to the concept of 
rational expectations, although somewhat easier to describe than to specify. 
In general, a market is efficient in pricing an item if currently available 
information cannot be used to gain larger than normal profits from future 
prices of the item. Clearly, the operative words in the definition are 
adjectives/ not nouns~ hence the difficulty in specification. 
AbnormalJy large profits occur when the rate of return exceeds the 
opportunity cost of the capital at risk. This concept is indistinguishable 
from that of economic profit. In terms of investments/ the opportunity cost 
of capital at risk depends on the characteristics of the investment. To the 
extent that those characteristics are identifiable by theoreticians and 
testable by econometricians, they are based on the maximization of 
expected ut111ty given the expected distribution of retums.1 The attributes 
that are assumed to matter to investors are expected return and absence of 
risk. 
1 see H1rseh1e1fer ( 1961) for the clessic article using 1ndifference curves. and Friedman-SaY~ 
( 1948) using total ut t11ty curves. 
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R1sk 
According to Robichek ( 1969; 5 13-514) r1sk "relates to the 
posstb111ty that actual returns may vary from expected returns." There are 
numerous reasons for this, ranging from war, lightning, flood, and 
pestilence downward in severity and upward in likelihood. Intuition might 
indicate that investors are concerned only when actual returns turn out to 
be lower than expected returns. But in investment theory, risk is typically 
modelled in the Hterature as the variance.l 
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That this is so can be seen from the capital asset pricing model 
[CAPM] developed by Sharpe, Markowitz, Lintner, Fama and others. In Sharpe 
(1964), the underlying uttUty function is given as 
u = t(Ew, Bw), 
where Ew Is the expected value of future wealth, and Bw ts the predicted 
standard deviation of the possible divergence of actual future wealth from 
Ew. Utiltty is assumed to Increase wtth greater Ew and decrease with 
greater Bw. In CAPM, thts proxy for rtsk is used tn the sense of total risk, 
since Investors are able, through dtverstftcatton, to combine 1ndtvtdua11y 
risky securities whose variances are at least somewhat unrelated to that of 
other securities to decrease the total variance of the portfolto. The set of 
efficient portfo11os ts that set of portfolios which offer the least var1at1on. 
1 Markowitz for one has rteQ901zed the dichotomy of Investor concern with regard to actual outcomes 
versus expected rebnls, suggesting the semi-va-lance as the proper meastre or riskiness. See Sharpe 
( 1964; 427). There was quite altwly debate as to the statistical meare of the appropriate proxy for 
risk. According to fama (1968; 30), Tobin (1958) showed that ·the mean-standard deviation framework 
is appropriate whenever distributions of returns on all assets and portfolios are of the same type and can 
be fully described by two parameters.· But fama was concerned that Investment rettrns seemed to be 
distributed as members of the stable Paretian class, of which the only one with nnite variance is the 
normal. The argument turned out a sterile victory for f ama - the slandrd deviation still models risk 
today. 
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given expected return, and/or maximum return, given expected var1at1on.2 
Efficient portfolios are, in addition, perfectly correlated and perfect 
subst1tutes.3 According to CAPM, the existence of a riskless 
lending/borrowing opportunity, together with the set of efficient 
portfolios, Implies that, in equihbrium, the expected return of a risky asset 
1, E(Ril, as a member of the market portfolio (M) of all existing securities 
wn1 be 
E(Rj) = RF + ~ cov(Rt,RM), 
where RF Is the rlsk-rree return rate, RM Is the return rate on the market 
portfo11o In equllfbrlum4, and~ Is 
[E(RM)- RF][ 1 /132(RM)), 
where 132(RM> Is the variance or the market portfolio Itself. 
This Is the basic equation ror the testing or hypotheses regarding 
efficient markets. Since, In a market portfolio of many assets, the term~ 
does not depend more than trivially on asset I,~ can be considered Invariant 
with respect to E<RO. The equatton Is often put In terms of a risk premium 
equation: 
E<Rt) - RF = ~ cov(Rt,RM), 
In order to show that the differences In r1sk premia ror various assets, 
when held In equilibrium, depend only on their covarlatton wtth the market 
portfolio. According to Fama, "The coefficient~ can be thought or as the 
2 Here the word ·efficient• Is used In the sense of performance; an efficient portfolio yields best return 
performance given risk, and vice vers~. 
3 See Fama ( 1968: 33-35). The word ·efficient· is here used In the sense of fulfilling the booodary 
condition. The marginal rate of transformation of risk for expected return required for asset substitution 
is equal to the marginal rate of substitution along (homogeneous) investors' indifference ctrWS. 
4 If the market Is efficient, then It will be In equilibrium at all times, excepting the time taken for the 
receipt of unexpected information to be absorbed. 
market price per un1t of risk so that the appropr1ate measure of the r1sk of 
asset 11s cov<Ri,RM).MS 
Jensen < 1969), by Introducing the relative risk concept, 1s able to 
show that his famous "beta", 
Bj = [cov (Rj ,RM)]/[J32(RM>t 
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Is the proper benchmark ror the performance of portfolios, since It 
Indicates the riskiness of portroltos relative to the (efficient> market 
portfolio. If the portfolio Is the market portfolio of all existing securities, 
then 
BM = [cov (RM,RM)]/[J32(RM)] = [J32(RM)]/[J32(RM)] a I. 
Jensen·s Insight allows the expected return formulation or Sharpe-untner 
to be rewrt t ten as 
E(Rj) = RF + Bj [E(RM) - RF], 
or In an ex postsense, to measure the performance of portfolio j by whether 
or not the actual return Is significantly above Its expected value, 
E(Rj) = RF + Bj[RM- RFl 
It Is therefore Immediately apparent that traders and portfolio 
managers ought to be able to earn greater positive returns than the value-
weighted average or positive returns (the market return, RM> by choostng 
portro11os or greater total risk than that of the market portfolio. But It Is 
just as apparent that those more volatile portfolios will have lower 
negative returns when RM happens to be negative. It Is the return on the 
asset or portfolfo after adjustment for rtsk that properly measures 
perr ormance. 
5 Fama (1968; 35). 
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Can traders and portfo11o managers earn greater than normal returns, 
g1Ven the r1sl<1ness of the1r select tons, by buy1ng and se111ng, or d1vers1fy1ng 
and leveragtng, and thus varytng the r1sl<1ness of the1r portfo11os at the 
"rtght" t1mes? Not 1f the market eff1c1ently processes new 1nformat1on. 
wh1ch 1s to say, tf prtces 1ncorporate new knowledge concern1ng the relattve 
r1sl<1ness of assets. Mandelbrot and Samuelson, says Jensen, have 
"r1gorously demonstrated that prtces 1n such a market w111 follow a 
submart1ngale."6 
This means that an efficient market so Incorporates past Information 
tn present pr1ces that no useful clue rematns to suggest the course of pr1ces 
yet to come. The best estimate of future prtces Is today·s price plus any 
prospecttve normal return. In terms of cond1tlonal expectat1on, 
H[P(t+t') lt(t)] • §6(,.) P(tt 
where H[P(t..,.)J 1s the expected value of the future prtce of the asset at t1me 
t+f', P(t) ts the prtce today. §6(,.) 1s a growth functton. and t(t) ts the set of 
tnformatton known at ttme t.7 If t(t) tncludes only the ser1es of past pr1ces 
of the asset, the eff1c1ency hypothes1s 1s known as the weal< form; tf t(t) 
1ncludes all pub11c 1nformat1on d1sclosed up to t1me t. the hypothes1s ts 
sem1-strong; and 1f t(t) 1nc1udes al11nformatton extant at t1me t, the 
hypothes1s ts known as the strong form of the eff1ctent market hypothes1s.8 
Obv1ous1y, the strong rorm or the eff1c1ent market hypothests ts not 
testable. 
6 See Jensen (1969; 168). 
7 See Jensen ( 1969; 169). In the special c"' where,.(.-) .. 0, JIP(t.+t-)) is a random walk with no drln. 
8 Again, see Jensen ( 1969; 170). Jensen is usually credited with the weak and strong efficient market 
dichotomy; but Jensen credits "Harry Roberts, who used It in an unpc.d)llshed speech entitled 'Clinical vs. 
Statistical Forecasts of Security Prices,' given at the Seminar on the Analysis of Security Prices 
sponsored by the Center for Research In Security Prices at the University of Chicago, May, J 96 7: See 
Jensen (1969; 170, footnote). 
From the above d1scuss1on, 1t 1s apparent that any emp1r1cal 
1nvest1gat1on wh1ch merely demonstrates the ex1stence of a prof1table 
albe1t r1sky 1nvestment strategy fatls to adequately test the Eff1c1ent 
Markets Hypothesis. Emplr1cal work must always take toto account any 
d1fference to rtsk, for what may appear to be prof1t from an 1nvestment 
strategy, trad1ng rule, or 1nformat1on acqu1s1t1on may 1n fact be a prem1um 
due to extraordinary r1sk. 
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The same ts true for a Treasury Instrument futures marl<et. If returns 
from a "security" composed of a futures position to combination with a 
Treasury Instrument are more variable than those from tts real equivalent, 
then a premium for differential risk ts In order. If we let the return on the 
arttftctaltnstrument, BA, be equal to the return on Jensen's asset J, and that 
of the market portfolio the real equivalent, then 
BA = [cov (RA,RR)]/[B2(RR)], 
and 
E<RA> = RF + BA[E(RR) - RF ], 
where BA ts the relative rtsk "beta" of the arttf1ctallnstrument, B2(RR) Is 
the variance of the real equivalent, E<RA> 1s the expected or ex ante rate of 
return on the artificial b11J, and RF ts the rate or return on the rtsk free 
alternative of the Sharpe-Ltntner model. 
Interest Rate Arb1 trage 
Treasury Bills 
A lender can provide short term funds to the federal Treasury tn 
several different ways. One of them Is to purchase a Treasury bllJ, hold it 
10 
unt11 matur1ty or ear11er, and rece1ve cash upon 1ts matur1ty or sale. 
Barring default by the Treasury, a spec1f1c return 1s guaranteed only at 
matur1ty. If the b1111s sold before matur1ty, short term 1nterest rates may 
have rtsen, and the pr1ce w111 be lower than expected. The result w111 be a 
low or perhaps negat1ve rea11zed y1eld. 
For example, 1f the short-term 1nterest rate 1s 7~, a one m1111on 
dollar 91-day b111 may be purchased for $982,305.56, but w111 fetch only 
$982,250.00 twenty days hence 1f, 1n the 1nter1m, the short-term Interest 
rate has risen to 9".9 on the other hand, 1f the short-term rate has fallen 
1nstead of r1sen, the b111 w111 actually yteld more than expected. In the 
1nstance above, 1f twenty days has seen a fall of so basts po1nts, then the 
b111 can be sold for $987,180.56, for an actual y1eld or 9. "'annually over 
the twenty day per1od. 
The analysts appltes to all Instruments outstanding; an Investor may 
as easily lend for 20 days by holding a 20-day Instrument until maturity, a 
90-day Instrument for 20 days, or an 7-year Instrument for 20 days. Only 
the former guarantees the Investor a certain yield, and only then If the 
Investor does not require cash prior to maturity. However, this Is true only 
because the selling price of the Instrument Is fixed. By virtue of Its 
maturity, It returns exactly S 1,000,000. Were the sel11ng price of another 
Instrument to be f1xed at some future date, then Its yield would also be 
certain on that date. In effect, a Treasury 1nstrument futures contract 
9 The price (P) of a $1 million Treasury bill Is: 
P • $1 ,000,000( I - (dt/360)) 
where d = the bankers· discount yield, or rate of discount, and 
t • the number of days to maturity. 
It c.-. be seen by Inspection that P remains the same If the percentage-change In d and I re equal In value 
and of opposite sign. See Stlgum ( 1961; 28). 
performs the function of f1x1ng the future pr1ce of a particular instrument 
at a date prtor to 1ts matur1ty. 
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A long pos1t1on 1n a Treasury b111 futures contract 1s a prom1se to 
purchase, at the exptration of the contract, a$ t m1111on bill of 9 t -day 
maturity. The value of the contract is the prtce of the b111, discounted at 
the current bankers· d1scount yield. Were the d1scount yteld to be h1gher 
Clower> at contract expiratton, the b111's price would be lower (h1gher>, and 
so would the value of the contract, by the same dollar amount. Thus a long 
pos1t1on guarantees the future purchase pr1ce of the b111 to be de11vered at a 
prtce determined today. Wh11e 1t is common to refer to a long futures 
pos1t1on as guaranteeing a spec1f1c yteld to future investors, 1t does not. 
Only an 1nvestor hold1ng the purchased 1nstrument to maturity 1s guaranteed 
a spectftc y1eld. 
A short position In a Treasury b111 futures contract Is a promise to 
sell, at the expiration of the contract, a $1 million bfl1 of 91-day maturity. 
The value of the contract Is the price of the biiJ, discounted at the current 
bankers· discount yield. Were the discount yield to be hfgher (lower) at 
contract expiration, the bill's price would be lower (higher), and so would 
the value of the contract, by the same dollar amount. Thus a short pos1t1on 
guarantees the future sale of the bill to be deltvered at a price determined 
today. In other words, the short side of the futures contract, by f1x1ng the 
sale price of the for-delivery Instrument, guarantees a spectflc yteld- for 
current owners of the Instrument who do not requtre cash prior to contract 
exptratton. And by a s1mu1taneous purchase of a ror-de11very instrument and 
futures contract short, an arttf1c1a11nstrument 1s created that "matures" 
w1th certa1n yteld at contract expiration. 
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For example. suppose a Treasury b111 futures contract exptres tn 22 
days. and that a Treasury b111 exists whtch matures 1n 113 days. Th1s 1s the 
de11very b111 for a Treasury b111 futures contract. S1nce the b111 dtscount ts 
fixed by virtue of the hedge, so Is the yield on the 113-day bl 11 held for 22 
days. An Instrument consisting or the 113-day bill and a short futures 
posit ton taken on the same day therefore has 22 days to maturity. 
Suppose another Treasury bill exists which matures In 22 days. An 
Investor taktng a long futures position and simultaneously buying the 22-
day b111 would have created an arttftclallnstrument having 1 t 3 days to 
maturtty.1o 
Thus an Investor can be certatn or a spectftc 22-day yield In two 
ways; by purchasing the 22-day b111 and holding It to maturity, or by 
purchasing the 113-day btll and enter1ng a short futures posttlon. An 
1nvestor can also be certain of a specific 113-day yield In two ways; by 
purchastng the 113-day b111 and holding 1t to maturity, or by purchastng the 
22-day bill and entering a long futures posttlon. 
In general, If X ts the number of days unt11 maturtty of an Instrument 
or unt11 the exptrat1on of a futures contract requtr1ng the delivery or 
acceptance of anN per1od Instrument. the positions and durattons of the real 
and arttftclallnstruments are as shown 1n Table 1. where the equ1valent 
strategy tnvolvtng the creation of an art1f1clal b1111s noted .. A'". 
10 In brokers· l*'lance. this Is a "strip;· the previous Instrument- short positioning a bill ror delivery-
is a ·strap: 
Strategy 
I 
lA 
II 
IIA 
TABLE 1 
COMPOSITION AND TIME TO 
MATURITY OF TREASURY 
BILL STRATEGIES 
Position 
Long an X day Instrument 
Long an X+N day instrument and 
Short a futures contract 
Long an X+N day instrument 
Long an X day Instrument, and 
Long a futures contract 
Maturity 
X days 
X days 
X+N days 
X+N days 
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Since the artificial instrument and the real Instrument both return 
f1xed dollar amounts on the same day, and are held for the same interval, 
their after-transactions-costs yields should also be equal. Thts Is the basis 
for an arbitrage in Treasury bl11s. If the real instrument yield exceeds that 
of the artificial instrument (after transactions costs), then it can be 
purchased, and the artificial Instrument simultaneously sold, for a profit. 
On the other hand, If the artificial instrument yield (after transactions 
costs) exceeds that of the real instrument, then simultaneous artificial 
Instrument purchase and real instrument sale results In a profit. The 
capture of arbitrage profits removes any difference between the real 
instrument yield and the artificial instrument yield. By the Law of One 
Price, then, the two yields must be equal. If they are not, then arbitrage 
profits remain uncaptured, and the market is presumed inefficient. This is 
the basis of previous investigations of the efficiency of the Treasury bill 
futures market. 
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However, arbitrage tests are va11d only ff the Instruments are 
tdenttcal, or else perfect substttutes. They are not, or course, tdenttcal 
stnce one or them contatns a futures posttton, wh11e the other does not. 
Whether or not they are practtcal eQuivalents ts an emptrtcal tssue. The 
degree of substttutton cannot be settled on a priori grounds. It ts therefore 
fallactous ftrst to assume perfect substttutab111ty, predtct eQual ytelds, 
demonstrate noneQua1fty of ytelds, and thereby tnfer tnerrtctent markets. 
In terms or the strategtes of Table 1, tf the market is perfectly 
errtctent, and tf rtsk ts eQuivalent vts-a-vts the two eQutvalent strategtes, 
then the yteld from lendtng vta Strategy I wtll be set eQual to that from 
strategy lA, and the yteld rrom lendtng vta strategy II eQual to that from 
Strategy IIA If the ytelds are momentarfly not eQual, then prortt can be 
earned by stmultaneously buytng the strategy with the htgher yteld Clower 
prtce) and selltng the strategy with the lower yteld Chtgher prtce). The 
proftt wtll be realfzed when and tr the ytelds Cprtces) agatn become eQuaL 
As an example, assume that X ts 80 days. A $1 m1111on face value 
Treasury b111 w11l, 80 days hence, pay the holder $1 m1111on. The buyer w111 
pay the asked prtce, whtch ts face value less dtscount. The b111's dtscount 
from face value w111 be calculated by the following method: II 
Dtscount(l) = (80/360) ($1 ,000,000) (asked-dtscount-yteld). 
The prtce or the b111, and thus the pr1ce or S 1,000,000 to be deltvered 80 
days hence by strategy I Is: 
Prtce(l) = $1,000,000- D1scount(l). 
Us1ng Strategy lA, a lender may also buy dollars to be rece1ved 80 
days hence. Assume that a contract ex1sts that exp1res 1n 80 days w1th the 
11 See Sligwn (1981; 27-32) fOf' yield end pricing formulas on discount sec~rities. 
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de11very of a 91-day b111. If the de11verable b111 ex1sts, then today 1ts t1me 
rematntng unt11 maturtty w111 be (80 + 91) = 171 days, and 1ts dtscount and 
prtce w111 be: 
Discount< lA b111) = ( 171 /360)($ 1,000,000) <asked-discount-yield), 
and 
Prlce(l A b11D = $1,000,000 - Discount(! A btl D. 
To this Is added the round-turn contract commission, $60, and the margin 
requirement, $1,500. The prtce of the strategy 1s: 
Pr1ce(IA) = PrtceOA b11D + $1,560. 
Let F be today·s futures contract dtscount. Etghty days hence, when 
the b1111s de11vered, Strategy lA w111 return 
Cash(IA) = $1,500 + [$ 1,000,000- F(91 /360)($ 1,000,000)], 
because In 80 days the lender using Strategy lA receives the deposited 
margin In addition to the cash Invoiced from the delivery of the bill. If In 
the Interim there have been changes In discount yields, there are gains <or 
losses> posted to the lender's margin account. These are offset by losses or 
gains In the Invoiced value of the bill when deltvered. 
The 80 day <unannualtzed) yields from the two strategies are: 
Yte1d(l) = {[($1,000,000 I Prlce<DJ- 1)} 
Yleld(IA) = ([(Cash(IA) I Prtce(IA))- 1 H. 
If the two yields are not equal, then under the assumption stated 
above - that the risks Inherent In the two strategies are equal - the 
efftctent market should~ them equal. Suppose that momentartly the 
yteld on Strategy I exceeds the yield on Strategy lA Potent tal lenders 
would then prefer Strategy 1 to lA At the marg1n, would-be-purchasers and 
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current owners of the near b111 w111 be driving its price up, and its d1scount 
down. Meanwh11e, current and would-be-owners of the deHverable b111 w111 
be driving Its price down and Its discount up. In the futures market~ 
contractors Increase the price of a contract; the futures discount F falls. 
These movements continue as long as the yields on the two strategies 
differ. The movements are equtllbratlng: the Increase In the near b111's price 
lowers the yield on Strategy I; the fall In the price or the far b111 and the 
Increase tn the futures discount serve to Increase the yield on Strategy lA, 
both by decreasing the prtce of the strategy and by Increasing the amount 
received from the deltvery of the b111. 
In addlt1on~ another factor might serve to bring the yields to equaJtty 
- arbitrage. For example, If Yield( I) exceeds Yield( lA), the profitable 
arbttrage would be to borrow and sell 171 day bills~ use the proceeds to buy 
80 day btl Is, and sell futures contracts. 12 In effect, the trader ts sellfng 
Strategy lA and buying Strategy I, and this will tend to move the yields 
toward equality. 
In a similar fashion, tt can be shown that under the assumpt1on of like 
risk, the market should equalfze the yields from Strategies II and IIA 
Suppose that X Is 80 days, that a deliverable bill exists, and that the risks 
or non-fulfillment accrue equal1y to the Instruments underlying Strategies 
II and I lA. 
12 Properly speaking the trade Is not a ptre arbitrage. but a spread. The trader earns pront tr the 
expectation Is correct that, just prior to expiration, the rubre's price will become equal to the deliwry 
bill's price. It would be a pure arbitrage 1r. ror Instance, the trader bought bills In Chicago and 
simultaneously sold Ulem In New York. In ract, unless the market is efficient, and unless the posiUon Is 
maintained until explraUon or the rutures contract. there Is no guarantee that the arbitrage will be 
profitable. 
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Strategy II reQu1res the purchase and hold1ng to matur1ty of a b1ll of 
t1me to matur1ty of ex+ N) or 171 days, wh1ch returns S 1,000,000. The 
b111's pr1ce and 171 day y1eld are: 
Pr1ce(lt) = $1,000,000 [( 1-( 171 1360)(Asked Discount)], 
and 
Y1eld(JI) = [$I,OOO,OOOIPrlce(l Dl- 1. 
Strategy 11 A reQuires the purchase of an 80 day bill and a futures 
contract. When the near bill matures, the trader will use the proceeds to 
buy the delivered bill, which will be matured. There will be money left 
over, which will be re-Invested at concurrent yteld. Alternat1vely, the 
Investor may be assumed to purchase the reQuired rractlon or an 80 day bill 
to return at maturity the funds needed to buy the de11vered bill. The runds 
needed to buy the delivered bill, 80 days hence, will be: 
Funds( ItA) = $1,500 + $60 + ($1,000,000 [ 1 - 91 1360(Futures Discount>]). 
Since a bill returns $1,000,000, the fraction to be bought today to 
return FundsCIIA) 80 days hence 1s: 
Fractlon(ttA) = FundsOIA) 1$1,000,000. 
The price of Strategy IIA 1s therefore: 
Prlce<IIA) = l<Fractlon<IIA))($1,000,000)( 1 - 801360(Asked Discount))]. 
E1ghty days hence, the Investor w111 accept delivery of the contracted 
bills, pay ror them, and have no cash 1ert over. After another 91 days, the 
delivered b111 will mature, and margin w111 be returned, bringing In: 
Cash( I I A)= S 1,000,000 + S 1,500. 
So the 171 day yleld for Strategy IIA is: 
Yield( I lA) = [$1,00 1,500 I Price( II A)]- 1. 
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If the y1eld from Strategy II 1s not eQual to the y1eld from Strategy 
II A, and If the r1sks and QUa11ty are 1dent1cal, then market part1c1pants 
would buy only the strategy offering the greater y1eld. As 1n the prevtous 
example, arbitrageurs would enter postt1ons. Suppose that momentar11y the 
yield from Strategy IIA exceeds the yteld from Strategy II. There 1s prof1t 
to be earned by borrowing and se111ng a de11verable b111, us1ng the proceeds 
to buy an X day b111, and entertng 1nto a long contract pos1t1on. These 
act tons would help to lower the prtce and ra1se the yield of Strategy II, 
wh11e the 1ncreased demand for the near b111 would ratse 1ts price and thus 
the cost of Strategy IIA The Increased demand for long futures pos1t1ons 
would raise the futures Index and thus the prtce of the de11vered b111. Th1s 
would also serve to lower the y1eld from Strategy IIA But agatn, prof1t can 
be assured only 1f the pos1t1on ts held unt11 futures exptratton, and only 1f 
the pr1ces of the two strategtes do In fact converge near exp1rat1on. 
Under the assumptions stated above, namely, that the var1ous 
strategies enta11 eQual r1sk, 1t would seem that to be eff1c1ent, the market 
must set Yield( I) eQual to Y1eld(IA), and Yleld(ID eQual to Yleld(IIA). Almost 
all previous stud1es have based their emptrlcal conclusions on the presence 
or absence of th1s eQuality. 
For example, Poole< 1978, p. 18), using the first eight Treasury biH 
contracts to be traded, shows "that the Treasury-btl I futures market 1s 
closely 11nked to the spot market In Treasury bills. Unexplolted arbitrage 
opportunities between the two markets rarely exist." 
Capozza and Cornell < 1978, p. 513) maintain that "Since arbttrage Is 
possible between the spot and futures markets, appropriately defined 
returns tn both markets should be Identical." They then show that after-
transactions returns are not tdent1cal. However, they recogntze that the 
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difference may be caused by short1ng costs and/or inst1tutional constraints, 
and so do not conclude that the market 1s 1nerf1c1ent. 
Rendleman and carab1n1 (1979, p. 912) included the shorting costs 
mentioned by Capozza and Corne11, and show that "no pure arbitrage 
opportunities were ava11able tn the market during the sample 
period ... Thererore, the Treasury b111 futures market appears to have been 
highly efficient. .. ) 
Pug11sl ( 1978, p. 66) shows that the " ... returns on the biBs-only 
strategy are less than those on the bl11s-rutures strategies" and concludes 
"that the T-b111 futures market Is Inefficient." VIgnola and Dale (1979, p. 
78), applytng Pug11s1's means tests to da11y returns, claim that " ... although 
the mean dlfference between these returns on average are small and their 
standard deviations large, there are distinct arbitrage returns from using 
the futures market. Moreover, these returns may be substantial on a gtven 
day, even though the mean return for all days of a parttcular contract is 
zero."t3 They conclude that "the futures market has remained 1neff1c1ent." 
Other examples could perhaps be presented. However, all previous 
studies are based on the prior assumption of the perfect subst1tutabUtty of 
the spot Instrument with tts futures equivalent. They are Incomplete tests 
If the prtor assumption Is incorrect, and their conclusions are, though 
111umlnatlng, Irrelevant. If the Instruments are not perfect substitutes 
then, ustng the criterion of equivalence In yields or the real b111 and the 
artificial biJJ, a test of the efficiency of the market is specious. 
131f some dally returns are substantial, yet the mean return Is zero, do not some days necessarily offer 
negative returns? VIgnola and Dale offer no clue as to the determfnaUon of tomorrow's return. however, 
and do not recognize that the distribuUon of reb.rns may be quite different. 
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Default Rtsk. In ne1ther case are the two strategtes equtvalent wtth 
regard to rtsk, here constdered as capttal rtsk, or the uncertatnty as to 
prtnctpal return, or rtsk of default. There ts clearly less rtsk of default 
inherent tn ownershtp of an X day Treasury tnstrument- guaranteed by the 
Treasury- than In ownershtp or the combtnatton of an X+N day Treasury 
tnstrument and a pr1vate agreement to sell It tn X days. Although no 
ftnanctal futures contract has yet been proh1b1ted from tradtng, other 
contracts (for instance, Matne potatoes) have. Although Treasury contracts 
have not prectpttated large margtn calls, s11ver futures and stock market 
tndex futures have. Although Treasury contracts are tnsured by adequate 
collateral and re-collatera11zed da11y,14 and may be tn practtce as sure of 
rulf111ment as the Treasury 1s sure to pay cash, there w111 ex1st a 
d1fferent1a11n the mtnds of tnvestors, as long as contract fulf111ment 1s not 
guaranteed by the Treasury. 
Furthermore, the two ~trategles Involving Instruments and futures 
(lA and II A) are asymmetric with regard to possible loss In eamtngs from 
default. If Strategy lA ts followed, and the futures contract defaults. the 
Investor owns an X+ N period Instrument that must be sold at the market 
price then prevailing, and not at the price guaranteed by the futures 
contract. The return may be greater or less than ant1ctpated as money rates 
have fallen or increased tn the Interim. The return may be less than zero; 
and 1f rates rtse, the 1nvestor wt11 not have the amount of cash at maturtty 
14 Perhaps ·almost every day· might be more accll'ale language. There is not yet good lnformaUon 
available as to the number of firms driven Into technical insolvency by margin requirements on index 
futures losses In the October 1987 crash. Many firms' long Index fulll'es position losses were fully 
hedged by offsetting profits on their put options baskets that, however large. were not obtainable by 
means other than liquidation. See the Wall Street .Jotrnal: November 11. 1988; page C 1. 
that was planned. The arttf1cta11nstrument owner ts vulnerable to an 
tncrease 1n Interest rates. 
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The lender using Strategy IIA races a different problem upon default; 
the lnab1llty to take del1very of the contracted Instrument. The Investor 
must Instead purchase an Instrument In the open market. If rates have 
fallen during the time the contract Is owned, the Investor wl11 pay more 
than ant lclpated for the Instrument, more than w111 be received from the 
sale of the X period Instrument. The Investor Is therefore vulnerable to a 
decrease In Interest rates. 
However, there are still N periods In which to acquire the extra cash 
the Investor anticipates needing. Principal cannot be lost, since the long 
posttton tn the near Instrument Is guaranteed by the Treasury. The sttuauon 
at default Is certainly not as Immediate as In the case or default to an 
Investor using Strategy lA, and clearly not as serious. 
One would expect an efficient market to compensate for this 
asymmetry wfth a yield on Strategy lA greater than the Implicit forward 
rate, and a yield on Strategy IIA lower than the tmpl1clt forward rate. Since 
the lender by Strategy lA sells contracts. wh11e the lender by Strategy I lA 
buys contracts, compensation requires that the futures price be higher (the 
contract discount lower> than that which would prevail were futures rates 
equal to 1mp11c1t forward rates. 
Early Settlement. Another risk differential exists and should be 
accounted for. A lender may have a firmly held expectation about the time 
during which cash will not be required. However, that expectat1on may not 
be correct. The X period lender may need to convert to cash before maturity, 
or the lender may find that cash Is not needed after all at maturity. In the 
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latter event, no harm ts done; the lender simply rolls over, although at an 
uncertain rate. But tr cash ts needed prior to maturtty, a realtnstruments 
strategy ts supertor to an arttrtcialtnstruments strategy. At the short 
maturtttes to whtch money market rates apply, bills certainly are unl1kely 
to sell for less than that for which they were bought, unless settlement is 
required very soon after thetr purchase. But the same cannot be said or an 
artificial bl11 strategy. Futures rates often move anomalously with respect 
to their underlying Instruments; they are stochastic. Only at contract 
expiration Is unwinding a position sure to return the cash for which the 
strategy was purchased. Prior to exptratton, the artificial Instrument 
strategy can produce a low return or even a Joss or prtnctpal, which may be 
sizable. For example, on September 27, 1978, a profitable arbitrage existed 
In Treasury bi1Js, which required purchasing a bill or maturtty or March 22, 
1979~ and selling a December 1979 contract and biJ1.15 If an arbitrageur 
unwound 20 days later, on October 17~ the arbitrage would have lost $2,018, 
since on that date the bt 11 futures discount was almost so basts potnts 
below that of the lowest profitable arbttrage. Using the March, 1981 
contract, tr an arbttrage was entered at the ftrst profitable opportuntty and 
unwound In 138 days, the loss would have been $9,302. To the extent that a 
lender 1s aware or a potential distribution or cash need outcomes prior to 
maturtty, and dependtng on the averston to risk, compensation is 11kely to be 
required for lendtng via the art lf1cla1 Instrument strategy that 1s not 
required of the strategy Involving only real instruments. The effect of this 
differential in risk ts to raise the Strategy lA yield above that of Strategy I. 
15 Equivalent to simultaneously buying Strategy lA and selling Strategy I. 
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For an X+N pertod lender, early need or desire for cash tnvolves 
different considerations. The lender via Strategy II holds an X+N period 
Instrument, which, tn the event of a requirement for cash, must be sold or 
used as collateral for a loan at market rates. But the lender via Strategy 
IIA holds only an X period bl11 and a contract which requires the purchase an 
N period instrument. cash will be received at contract expiration, which, if 
t is the number of days after positioning, occurs in X-t days. Cash can be 
acquired ear11er by selling the contract and the X day bill. Gtven the 
uncertainties of the future course of rates in general, Strategy IIA Involves 
less risk of loss from unexpected early settlement than Strategy II, and the 
market should compensate by setttng the Strategy I lA yteld lower than that 
or strategy 11. 
The posslb1llty of early settlement may render the Instruments 
Imperfect substitutes. If cash Is required prior to maturity, then the 
Investor holding the nearer-to-maturity Instrument Is less likely to suffer 
low or negative yield. Given Identical near term yields, the near term 
Investor prefers the real Instrument to the artificial Instrument. Given 
Identical longer term yields, the longer term Investor prefers the artificial 
Instrument to the real Instrument. 
These asymmetrical preferences result In a higher (lower> yield for 
the near term (longer term> artificial Instrument compared to Its real 
counterpart. The near term artificial Instrument Involves a future sale; 
thus the higher yield occurs as the future sale prfce Is higher, or the futures 
contract discount Is lower, than that of equivalence. The longer term 
artificial Instrument Involves a future purchase; thus the lower yield occurs 
as the future sale price Is higher, or the futures contract discount Is agatn 
lower, than that of equivalence. A Prlort then, the futures contract 
discount yield Is expected to be lower than the lmp11clt forward rate-
perhaps low enough so that observers report lnefflc1ency when It Is not 
1mp11ed. 
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vartattltty or Interest Rates. Another reason exists for exercising 
caution to tnterprettng the equivalence of yield as indicating efficiency. 
The preference for holding the near term bill would disappear 1f, all else 
constant, interest rates were Invariant, or amenable to forecasting with 
zero error, or tf the probab111ty of requiring cash prior to maturity were 
zero. It follows then that the futures discount yield would approach the 
Implicit forward rate. Put another way. the more var1able or unpred1ctab1e 
are interest rates, and the higher the probab111ty of prior-to-maturity cash 
requ1rements. the more the futures discount yield w111 d1verge- downward 
-from the 1mp11c1t forward rate. 
The Investor holding the (hedged) longer term Instrument owns an 
asset whose price varies more than that of the shorter term Instrument. If 
the expected variability of Interest rates increases, an efficient market 
compensates with a relative Increase to expected returns for those 
Investors. This requires a higher futures price, or a lower discount yield. 
s1oce the Investment Involves selling the longer term Instrument by means 
of the futures contract. 
If short-term rates were expected to fall tn the near future, however, 
the effect would be lessened; perhaps reversed. Given a decrease In money 
market rates. the longer term bill would appreciate to price more than the 
near term b111. If money market Investors expect a fall to money market 
rates. then, the longer term bill would become more attractive. The 
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asymmetry tn preferences noted above would dimfn1sh, tending to brfng the 
futures d1scount more 1n 11ne w1th the 1mp11c1t forward rate. 
lnflattonary Expectattons. An Increase tn the expected .mJ. of 
inflation Induces marginal Investors to seek htgher nomtnal ytelds, and 
lenders to offer It - the well known tnflatlon premtum In the Fisher 
equatton. By tncreastng the probabtltty of early cash requirement, 1t may 
also IndUce a further negative divergence in the futures dtscount yteld. 
Also, given a constant standard error of expectations, higher levels of 
tnterest rates tnvolve greater absolute vartatton In those rates. For these 
reasonst6 one expects higher Inflation rates to be negatively correlated 
with the divergence of the futures discount yield from the lmp11clt forward 
rate, other things equal. This Is essentially a static consideration. 
But one state does not Instantly become another. Higher levels of 
inflationary expectations sooner or later translate Into higher overatJ 
nominal yields. Ftrst though, expectations of future Inflation generate 
movements toward nearer term Instruments, and away from those of longer 
duratton, wtth a concomitant decrease In nearer term rates and a more 
positively lnc11ned yield curve. 
In addition. It Is difficult to successfully model expectations of 
future Inflation rates. Commonly, Information Imbedded In past Inflationary 
rates Is used to extrapolate forward In time- expectations are adaptive or 
ARIMA processes. But If investors are rational, they consider all relevant 
predictive information. or at least information whose expected marginal 
cost of acquisition is not greater than the expected gain of its inclusion. 
16 And many others. The skittishness of the financial mriets Is a commonplace. Probably any new 
Information casting doubt on old expectations quickly affects premia through a widening or the confidence 
bands or forecasts. 
26 
Monetary Reglme. Prlor to October 6, 1979. the Open Market 
Comm1ttee announced no target 1ntent1ons wtth regard to monetary 
aggregates; but after that date, target ranges forM 1-3 have been announced 
-and often mlssed- as the Federal Reserve sh1fted from a federal funds to 
a nonborrowed reserves operat tog procedure. 
In October. 1982 the Fed replaced the nonborrowed reserves 
procedure wtth a borrowed reserves procedure. February. 1982 saw the 
adoption of (almost) contemporaneous reserve requirements. Probably the 
most important differences in these regimes occurred as the Fed shifted 
from Interest rate to aggregate targeting. although other effects from 
changes in operating procedures cannot be ruled out. There ts no certainty 
as to the weights placed by the Fed on the various aggregates and Interest 
rates during the post-1979 reglme. Investors must form some expectation. 
however uncertain, or the Intentions or the Fed. It may be that changing 
perceptions of the Fed's Intentions influence the divergence of the futures 
yield from the tmp1tclt forward rate. 
For example, suppose the expected Increase is less than the actual 
Increase in Ml. If an easter-money regime ts ahead. near term yields wtll 
dec11ne. and there will be less reason to rear losses if early settlement is 
requtred. The dtvergence of the futures yield from the tmpJtctt forward rate 
becomes smaller in absolute value. which means Jess negative. or perhaps 
even positive. Therefore. If the difference between the actual increase in 
M 1 and the expected Increase rises. and induces expectations of "easter" 
money ahead, the divergence or the futures yield from the tmplfcit forward 
rate -normally negative - should increase. 
This effect may be vtewed to terms of an equat ton, 
[F - (U+U/2] = f[6M 1 - E(6M 1 ), Z], 
where F ts the actual futures yteld, u ts the htghest futures yteld 
conststent wtth unprofttable arbttrage, L ts the lowest futures yteld 
conststent wtth unprofttable arbttrage, 6M1 1s the actual change 1n M1, 
E(6M 1 > ts the expected change tn M 1, and Z 1s a vector of other relevant 
factors. The bracketed term on the left-hand stde, 
D = [F - (U+U/2], 
ts the dtvergence (D) of the futures contract dtscount yteld from the 
m1dpo1nt, or average, of the arbttrage bounds. Stnce the average of the 
arb1trage bounds, 
(U+U/2, 
ts that futures dtscount y1eld that would result 1n unprof1table arbttrage 
under the assumptton of zero transact tons cost, tt ts also the 1mpl1c1t 
forward rate. 
The ftrst bracketed term tn the function, 
S = [6M 1 - E(6M 1)], 
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1s the d1vergence (5) of the actual growth of M 1 from the expected growth 
of M t. The part tal der1vat1ve of D wtth respect to s w111 tend to be pos1t1ve 
1f greater than expected money growth stgnals htgher rates of money growth 
ahead. 
However, 1 f greater than expected money growth Indicates a 
correction 11es ahead, and If E(6M 1) 1n1t1a11y Incorporates perceptions of the 
Fed's operative targets, then f 1 wt11 tend to be negative. For trAM 1 > 
E(6M1 ), future correct ton Involves a slowtng of reserve growth, and h1gher 
near-term rates. If early settlement ts requtred17 at hfgher near-term 
17Jt may be that the likelihood of early seWement requirements Is Itself posiUvely related to futAre 
Ughtenlng. 
rates, loss is more 11kely if the near term b111is not held, and in 
compensation F is lowered further below the implicit forward rate. 
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A priori,· 1t is not possible to pred1ct the sign of f 1, since the s1gn 
depends on the magn1tude of the correction expectation <negative tendency> 
relat1ve to the faster-growth expectat1on Cpos1t1ve tendency>. But s1nce the 
s1gn of f 1 depends on the relative magnitudes of the two effects, if f 1 ts 
pos1t1ve, then the faster-growth expectatton has more 1mpact than the 
correction expectat1on; whereas iff 1 is negattve, the correction 
expectation has more 1mpact than the raster-growth expectation. It ts 
entirely possible that f 1 is posftive under one monetary regime, and 
negat 1ve under another. 
Transact tons Costs. An tostrumeots-ooly strategy requtres very low 
postttootog costs. 18 But an Instruments-futures strategy requires at least 
a round tum commission on the futures contract and at least one more 
commission on the Instruments than the instruments only strategy. For the 
X period lender in Treasury b111s using Strategy lA. the lender incurs a buy 
comm1ssioo on the X+N period b111, a $60 round turn comm1ss1oo on the 
futures contract trade, and a sell comm1ss1on after X days, when the b111is 
sold. In addition. margin may be required, or securities posted to the 
trad1og account, to which case the services rendered by the cash at margin 
or the secur1t1es posted are lost. Even to the case where the trading entity 
ts a bond dealer. the 1mp11c1t cost of commtsstoo remains. for a dealer 
makes a market in instruments which, if posted, are no longer available by 
which to earn. 
18 In the case of a lender buying Treasury instruments at auction, zero nominal costs. 
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When the lender wtshes to lend for an expected X+N pertods, the 
tnstruments-futures strategy ts potent tally more costly. The lender buys an 
X-day b111 and a contract, takes de11very or the N-pertod 1nstrument, and 
holds 1t to maturtty. Stnce the long futures pos1tton ts not covered by a 
matchtng securtty, margtn ts 111<e1y to be requtred; at least more 11kely than 
w1th Strategy lA These dtfferences are small; they amount to only a few 
basts points at most, and can have only a mtnor role tn expla1n1ng the 
dtvergence of futures rates from 1mp11ctt forward rates. 
Tax Differences. After 1978. a long futures postttoo was treated by 
the IRS as a long term capttal posttton 1f held stx months or longer, wh11e a 
short futures position was treated as a short term capital posit too no 
matter what the holding period. Prtor to a tax rultng to November 1978, 
both short and long futures posttioos were treated the same by the IRS; they 
were undefined. Lenders could not know what the tax treatment would be 
prtor to the November 1978 IRS rultng. 
However. the interest earned on Treasury instruments themselves ts 
taxed as ordinary income. 19 so that a lender who maximizes the risk-return 
LaGrangtao and whose utt11ty ts based on after tax returns should requtre a 
htgher margtoal return on instruments-only strategies than on strategies 
1nvo1vtng both tostrumeots and futures. Thts could be a factor to the note 
and bond complexes. but not 1n btlls, stnce no arbttragable tnstrumeots of 
longer maturtty than stx months have extsted stnce the incept ton of the 
Treasury bt 11 futures market. 
19 See Cornell (1981) and Interest Rate Fut.lres Contracts: Federal Income Tax lmollcattons. 1 
customer's brochure published by the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. 
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Treasury Bonds 
It Is possible to lend to the U.S. Treasury for a long period of time in 
two equ11avent ways. First, the lender may purchase a long term Treasury 
bond, at issue or on the open market. Second, the lender may purchase a 
combination, consisting of a Treasury bill and a Treasury bond futures 
contract, taking de11very of the contracted bond and making payment with 
the proceeds from the maturation of the Treasury b11 J. The purchased bl ll 
can be chosen from existing bills so that it matures in the same week that 
the bond contract expires, so that cash is ava1Jable with which to purchase 
the contracted bond. In this way, an artificial bond Is created. The 
arttflclal bond has approximately the same ttme to maturity as the real 
bond. Chicago Board of Trade (CBT) Treasury bond contracts allow the 
delivery of many different bonds In fulfillment of contract ob11gat1ons, and 
the choice of which bond to deliver Is up to the owner of the short contract 
position. The party owning the long futures contract position must accept 
any bond offered, as long as it fulfills the contract specifications, which 
require only that the Treasury bond have longer than fifteen years to 
maturity or ear11est call. Still, as long as the lender does not care which 
bond Is received, an approximately equivalent method exists by which cash 
can be foregone to the Treasury, long term. And If they are equivalents, 
their ytelds should be equal. 
In the same manner, a lender may consider two methods of lending 
cash to the Treasury for a short t1me period; one of them involves a bond 
future contract position. First, a lender may purchase a Treasury bill and 
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hold tt to maturtty. Second, the lender may purchase a Treasury bond, and 
stmultaneously enter a CBT bond contract tn order to deltver the bond tn the 
same week that the btll matures. The two methods may therefore be 
constdered eQutvalents, tf thetr holdtng pertods and ytelds are eQual. 
The ronowtng asstgnments w111 be helpfu11n keeptng track or the 
opt tons open to the lender. Strategy I 1nd1cates the purchase of a Treasury 
b111 at ttme CO whtch matures at t1me Ct + n>. so that the number of days to 
maturtty ts Ct + n>- t = n. Its eQutvalent, Strategy lA, 1nd1cates the 
purchase of a de11verable Treasury bond and opentng of a short bond futures 
posttton, both at ttme CO. The exptratton of the bond contract occurs at 
ttme Ct + n>. so that the matur1ty of the combtnatton ts also n days. 
Strategy II w111 refer to the outrtght purchase or a Treasury bond at t1me t. 
The bond matures tn y years. Strategy IIA w111 refer to the stmultaneous 
purchase of a Treasury b111 and opentng of a Clong> futures posttton at ttme 
CO. The maturtty of the b111 w111 co1nc1de w1th the exp1rat1on of the futures 
contract, at ttme Ct + n). At that ttme, a Treasury bond w111 be de11vered 
agatnst the long posttton. The bond matures 1n z years. 
These strategtes are summartzed tn Table 2. 
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TABLE 2 
COMPOSITION AND TIME TO 
MATURITY OF TREASURY 
BOND STRATEGIES 
Strategy Position Maturity 
Long ann day Treasury bill ndays 
lA long a Treasury bond, and 
Short a Treasury bond contract ndays 
II long a Treasury bond y years 
IIA Long ann day Treasury biJJ, and 
long a futures contract z years 
The strategies are simtJar to the equivalent biJJ strategies in the 
preceding section, but some ·important differences exist. In Treasury bi11 
contracts, only one particular btJl extsts that fulff1Js the deJivery 
conditions of the contract; that biJJ having 91 days to maturity upon 
contract expiration. No other bilJ may be delivered. The conditions of the 
bond contract aJJows the short- the holder of the right to make delivery-
to select the bond for delivery among all U.S. Treasury bond which have a 
time to maturity or earnest call greater than 15 years. Many deliverable 
bonds exist for each bond contract, with ttme to maturities from 15 to 30 
years, and coupon rates that vary w1de1y. Although the CBT bond contract 
invoicing methodology employs a conversion factor to adjust bond prices for 
the differences in coupon rate and time-to-maturity, the (converted) 
contract price most closely reflects the price of a single security. That 
security 1s the bond which can be purchased most cheaply by the short tn 
order to deltver 1n contract fulfillment to the long. The bond 1s termed tn 
the 11terature the "cheapest-to-deltver". It follows, then, that all other 
deliverable bonds can be sold more dearly on the spot market than vta 
futures contract de livery. 
33 
A long pos1tton in a Treasury bond futures contract Is a promise to 
purchase, at the expiration of the contract, a $100,000 bond of no less than 
15 years to maturity or, If callable, to ear11est call date. The value of the 
contract Is the prtce of a theorettcaJ bond of 8" coupon, priced to yteld the 
contract yield, net of accumulated interest. Were the yield to be higher 
(lower> at contract expiration, the theoretical bond's price would be lower 
(higher), and so would the value of the contract, by the same dollar amount. 
Thus a long position guarantees the yield or the theoretical bond that w111 
be received at contract exptratton.2o 
The theoretical bond, of 8" coupon, dtd not exist after August 15, 
1981. After that date, the 8" August 15, 1996-2001 Treasury bond had Jess 
than 15 years to ear11est call. CBT contract rules specify a converston 
factor for dtfferent coupons and ttmes to maturity or ear11est call. By 
multtplytng the converston factor for a particular bond by the contract 
price, the prtnclpalinvoice price Is attatned. Accrued interest since last 
coupon ts added, and the result Is the dollar amount payable to the short by 
the long.21 
20 This statement is true if the theoretical bond Is the only bond. or If It is cheapest-to-deliver for the 
life of the contract. 
21 The Invoicing methods and pricing may be obtained from various Chicago Board of Trade publications. 
Of particular relevance to the present point, see Interest Rate Futures for Institutions (Undated), and 
CBOT Financial Instruments Guide ( 1987). 
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Since the short chooses the bond for de11very, the long cannot know 
the amount of cash required for settlement, ex ante The long must be 
prepared to accept any Treasury bond that ex1sts, of any ex1st1ng coupon, 
and having any time-to-matur1ty greater than 15 years. Depend1ng on the 
bond de11vered, and therefore on the convers1on factor and accured 1nterest, 
and the current y1eld, the long may be Hable for as much as $200,000 per 
contract or as 11ttle as $50,000. Th1s 1s 111ustrated in CBT's own 11terature, 
In fact. In the publication Interest Rate Futures for lnst1tut1onal Investors, 
the f1rst of the two examples on page 12 g1ves a pr1nc1pa11nvo1ce pr1ce of 
$1 02, 912.00; the second, a pr1nc1pal 1nvotce price of $61 ,824.00. Other 
examples could eas11y be constructed to 111ustrate much w1der ranges. The 
sa11ent po1nt rema1ns, however, that the long cannot know to adVance what 
amount of cash w111 be required for settlement, what the delivered bond's 
actual maturity will be, nor what the de11vered bond's coupon rate w111 be. 
All those factors are determined by the short. 
A short position In a Treasury bond futures contract Is a promise to 
deltver, at the explratton of the contract, a $100,000 face value Treasury 
bond having at least 15 years unttl maturity or earl1est call. The value of 
the contract, after multtpltcatton by the converston factor for the 
particular bond owned by the short, ts the prtce the short w111 recetve, net 
of accumulated Interest. Were the yteld to be higher <lower> at contract 
exptratlon, the bond's price would be lower (htgher>, and so would the value 
of the contract, by approximately the same dollar amount.22 Thus a short 
position guarantees the yield of the Treasury bond that Is held during the 
ltfe of the contract. The short side of the futures contract, by fixing the 
22 Only If the short's bond Is the cheapest-to-deliver. or If the short's bond correlates perfectly with the 
cheapest-to-deliver bond. will the magnitude of the dollar changes be exacUy offset. 
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sale pr1ce of the for-de11very 1nstrument, guarantees a specif1c y1eld- for 
current owners of the 1nstrument who do not require cash pr1or to contract 
exp1rat1on. By a simultaneous purchase of a Treasury bond for de11very and 
sale of a futures contract, an art1ficial bond is created that "matures" w1th 
certa1n yield at contract exp1rat1on. 
Of course, that yield may not be the greatest obtainable, either at the 
Initiation nor the expiration of the contract, from an Investment In Treasury 
bonds. The short may decide to hold the bond past contract expiration, 
buying a cheaper bond to deliver agatnst the contract. The short Is also free 
to se11 the ortgtnal bond any ttme a deltverable bond becomes cheaper than 
the or1glnal, In effect pocketing as profit the difference In dollar amounts. 
This freedom of decision belongs to the short by virtue of the difference In 
kind between Treasury b1Jl and Treasury bond futures, In that the former 
requires one specific Instrument for de11very, wh11e the latter does not. 
Now such freedom of decision cannot be conveyed costlessly, If 
markets eff1c1ently pr1ce asset claims. The freedom to choose the bond to 
be del1vered 1s a potentially valuable right, for which shorts should be 
willing and able to pay. From another perspectfve, the uncertainty about 
which bond will be de11vered Is a risk of being long, to be compensated by 
market part1c1pants. 
A s1m11ar1ty to the b111 contract should be mentioned here. The 
posslbl11ty of early settlement would leave the long, after contract 
11qu1datlon, the owner of a Treasury b111. Early settlement would leave the 
short, after contract liquidation, the owner of a Treasury bond. At first 
glance, It would appear that, 11ke the early settlement In the bl11 complex, 
the long In the bond complex would be better off than the short, having only 
a Treasury b111 to dispose of - but this Is not so. Early settlement would 
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mean a prof1t or loss on the bond contract approx1mately equal to the prof1t 
or loss on the bond the short owns. The short tn effect has hedged the 
ownershtp or the bond the short plans to de11ver. The long ts not covered by 
the offsetttng bond ownershtp, havtng planned to str1p the yteld on the btll 
and take de11very of the offered bond, whatever tt may be. The long owns 
only a Treasury btll. Any prof1t or loss on the bond contract at early 
settlement wtll not 11ke1y to be offset by any change tn the bt11's pr1ce. 
because the dtfference between long term tnterest rates and short term 
rates- the yteld curve- ts not ltkely to be perfectly tmmobtle. Thts 
asymmetry 1s due to the dtfferences 1n the matur1t1es of the 1nstruments 
underlytng the two positions. It is a comparison or short term investment 
goals with long term investment goals, both of which are unfulfilled, and is 
not a va11d comparison. 
A few examples of an actual trades are valuable at this potnt, both to 
demonstrate the calculations and 111ustrate the variab11ity or actual 
returns. The formula for bond 1nvoice pr1ce calculatton can be expressed as 
v = P + Cc/2)(d/n), 
where v ts the tnvotce prtce per S 1 oo face value of the bond, P ts the asked-
prtce of the bond, c 1s the coupon rate expressed as a percent. d 1s the 
number of days stnce last Csemt-annuan coupon payment. and n ts the 
number or days tn a Treasury halr-year.23 on June 7, 1979, the prtce of the 
8" Treasury bond of 2001 was 91 30/32 asked. On that date, there had been 
112 days stnce last coupon, so the cost of buytng S 100,000 face value of the 
bond would have been $91,938 plus approxtmately ($8,000/2) times 
< 112/182.5) tn accrued 1nterest, or $94,393. If an tnvestor had on that date 
23 See Stlgum (1981) Chapter 8, especially pages 87-92. 
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approx1mately equal, s1nce per1od y w111 not 1n general exactly equal period 
z. In th1s sense Strategy IIA Is less desirable than Strategy II. The long 
term 1nvestor ustng Strategy 11 can choose the coupon and maturtty destred; 
the Strategy IIA Investor must accept the coupon and maturtty of the bond 
deltvered. Strategy IIA should therefore carry a htgher y1e1d than Strategy 
II, due to the additional uncertainty inherent In Strategy IIA However, the 
Strategy IIA 1nvestor who must settle early owns a Treasury b111 to dispose 
or, after profit or loss from closing the futures contract are tabulated. The 
Strategy II Investor owns a Treasury bond, wh1ch must be sold In the spot 
market upon early settlement requ1rement. The var1ab11tty tn actual return 
rates 1s 11ke1y to be very large, tn both cases. It 1s an emptr1cal quest ton 
whether or not early settlement of Strategy II 1nvestment 1s more or less 
var1able than that of Strategy II A, but a ftrst guess mtght be that Strategy 
IIA 1s the more var1ab1e. The bond futures price 1s most closely tied to the 
bond that Is cheapest-to-de11ver, wh1ch 1s ltkely to be a d1fferent bond at 
different interest rates. The bond futures price therefore varies as interest 
rates change, and more than that of any parttcular bond, stnce there 1s 
add1tional variation 1n futures price due to the changing identity of the 
tracked Ccheapest-to-deltver> bond. However, there ts probably a measure 
of pos1t1ve covar1at1on 1n the combinat1on of a b111 and a long bond future 
posttton that lessens the vartat1on of the comb1nat1on. It ts therefore not 
clearly evident that Strategy IIA Is the more variable of the two. 
Inasmuch as the pleasures of symmetry demand It, one Is tempted to 
argue in the same manner for short term Investments. It Is difficult to 
make similar argument concerning Strategies 1 and lA, however. The short 
term Investor using Strategy 1 owns a Treasury bill. The short term 
Investor using Strategy lA buys a Treasury bond, and opens an offsetting 
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bond contract short position. He may, If early settlement demands tt, sell 
the bond and close the bond contract. If the price of the bond owned Is 
always perfectly and negatively correlated with the price of the bond 
contract, then the da11y variation In the value of the combination will be 
low. This 1s not the case, since the bond owned 1s not tn general cheapest-
to-deliver both at purchase and at sale. In the short term, reaJtzed y1e1d 
from early settlement of Strategy lA ts much more variable than that of 
Strategy 1 -so much more variable that there Is some doubt as to whether 
Strategy lA Is even a viable Investment option, except for the bond that Is 
cheapest- to-de liver. 
In the case or Treasury bills <see Table 1 >the bill owned tn Strategy 1 
Is~ deliverable Instrument. At contract expiration, the closing contract 
price wtll be, through arbitrage, the very same as that unique bill. In the 
case of Treasury bonds, the bond owned In Strategy I Is one of many 
deliverable Instruments. At contract expiration, the closing contract price 
will be, through arbitrage, the same as that deliverable bond that Is 
cheapest-to-deliver at that time. Only If the yield to maturity or the bond 
held and the cheapest-to-deliver bond were always Identical would Strategy 
lA be viable, since Strategy lA requires the deJtvery or the bond. Since the 
bond Is purchased spot and sold In de11very against the contract at the 
contract price, a Joss Is virtually guaranteed. 
The mechanism that ties contract prices to the underlying security Is 
the potential for arbitrage In the final few days prior to contract expiration. 
In the case of Treasury btll contracts, the underlying security Is the 
deliverable bill. If the bill can be purchased at spot and sold more dearly at 
future settlement, then arbitrage will occur, lowering the future price to 
equivalence. If the bill can be sold at spot and bought more cheaply at 
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future settlement, then the oppos1te arbitrage w111 occur, ra1s1ng the future 
prtce to eQuivalence. 
In the case or Treasury bond contracts, the underlying security Is that 
single de11verable bond which can be purchased most cheaply at spot and 
sold most dearly at future settlement. If any bond can be purchased at spot 
and sold more dearly at future settlement, arbitrage will occur, lowering 
the future price to eQuivalence. If, a few days later, another bond can be 
purchased at spot and sold more dearly at future settlement, more arbitrage 
w111 occur, lowering the future price further, to a new eQuivalence. 
However, If It should occur that a particular bond can be sold at spot more 
dearly than the future price would seem to allow Its purchase, DQ arbitrage 
will take place to raise the future price. In order for arbitrage to occur, the 
antlctpated future bond del1very must be the parttcular bond sold short at 
spot, and there ts no reason for this particular bond to be delivered. In fact 
there Is every reason not to expect Its de11very, since ft Is not cheapest-to-
deliver. 
This one-sided arbitrage, tn the last few days of contract existence, 
puts an upper 11m1t on bond futures contract prices. The future contract 
price could conceivably be lower than that of the cheapest-to-de11ver bond. 
Presumably, the lack of supply of short-stde contract participants would 
bring It up to eQutvalence. There might also be speculators who would 
wager that a futures purchase and spot sale of any bond, perhaps even the 
cheapest-to-de11ver, might result In a profitable outcome. However, the 
fact remains that the purchase of a bond and Its prospective future sale ts 
not and cannot be perfectly hedged, because Its price Is not tied through 
arbitrage to the contract price. 
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Treasury Notes 
The preceding arguments apply w1th equal validity to the market for 
Treasury note futures, since the delivery requirements are the same, with 
one exception: there is both a lower and upper limit to the time unt11 
maturity or earliest call allowed to deliverable instruments. Any note 
which has at least six and one-half years but less than ten years until 
maturity or earliest call may be delivered in fulfillment of a Treasury note 
contract. The calculations for settlement and conversion factors are the 
same for both contracts. The note future settlement price is tied through 
one-way arb1trage to the price of the cheapest-to-deliver note, but not to 
other notes, although, as in the case of bonds, its correlation may be qutte 
high w1th respect to most notes. Two medium term Investment options are 
open to the investor, and two non-equivalent short term options, as in bond 
market. Table 3 summarizes those options. 
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TABLE 3 
COMPOSITION AND TIME TO 
MATURITY OF TREASURY 
NOTE STRATEGIES 
Strategy Position Maturity 
I Long an n day Treasury bt 11 n days 
lA Long a Treasury note, and 
Short a Treasury note contract n days 
II Long a Treasury note s years 
IIA Long ann day Treasury bill, and 
Long a Treasury note contract t ~ears 
As in the case of Treasury bonds, an investor sensitive only to yield 
may acquire a Treasury note through Strategy II outright, or through 
Strategy II A. However, since there Is no way to guarantee the note owned 
wt11 be cheapest-to-deliver both at purchase and at sale, Strategy lA ts not 
a viable alternative to Strategy I for participants Interested to short term 
lending. As to the case of Treasury bonds, the posslbtlity of the deltverance 
of many different notes makes efficiency tests difficult to Interpret In this 
market. 
Summary 
Previous efforts to ascertain the efficiency of the financial futures 
markets have recognized that the Instruments entail different transactions 
costs. Poole ( 1978) was the first to Incorporate those different 
transactions costs to efficiency tests of the Treasury b111 futures market. 
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and studies after Poole's have invariably done so. Cornell ( 1981) recognized 
the d1fferential effects of taxation, and Included that difference In testtng 
for efficiency tn ftnanctal futures. The d1fferent1al taxatton effect was not 
found to be Important. As will be shown In Chapter Ill, many tactics- some 
qutte Ingenious- have been employed In testing for the existence of prtctng 
efficiency of financial markets. However, all are based on the same general 
approach. 
First, the underlying Instrument and Its hedged equ11avent are 
assumed to be perfect substitutes. Second, account Is taken of the 
difference In transactions costs. Third, observations are made on the 
charactertsttcs of the dtstrtbutlons of the underlytng instrument and tts 
hedged equtvalent. Finally, tf the dtstrtbuttons are s1gnlf1cantly different, 
either In yield or In variability (the first or second moments), the market Is 
declared Inefficient, at the customary confidence level. 
One could with equal validity view an Identical empirical process, but 
with the assumption and the conclusion reversed. First, the market would 
be assumed perfectly efficient. Second, different transactions costs would 
be Incorporated. Third, observatlons would be collected. Finally, If 
distributions were significantly different, the Instrument and Its hedged 
equivalent would be declared Imperfect substitutes. The latter process Is, 
of course, logically circular; but so Is the former. 
Stated In this way, It becomes obvious that a11 of the previous 
studies which have a prton· assumed perfect substltutabl llty of the 
underlying Instrument for Its hedged equivalent have not correctly examined 
the efficient markets hypothesls.24 A proper examination of the hypothesis 
24 Actually. this statement Is a bit too strong. In the event that the underlying instrument and Its hedged 
equivalent are in fact perfect substitutes. the standard methodology is a correct proceckre. Bul the 
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would tnvolve an add1ttona1 stage, wheretn the impact of the different 
d1str1button of returns of the hedged equ1va1ent- 1ts dtfferenttal rtsk- on 
1ts apparent rate or return would be taken 1nto account. That 1s the purpose 
or the present work. 
It ts the return on assets after adjustment for risk that properly 
measures performance. In reference to Tables 1-3 above. lenders ustng 
Strategy 1 and Strategy IIA both hold near term instruments, and race 
different prtce rtsk than lenders using Strategtes lA and II. The posstb11tty 
of default or early settlement exposes these lenders to differences in 
expected outcomes which result tn higher expected ytelds for Strategies lA 
and II, and lower the futures rate below the impltcit forward rate. Factors 
which affect the probabflities or default or early settlement, or whtch alter 
the expected outcomes tn the event of either, change the expected 
distributions of returns, and thereby affect the divergence of the futures 
rate from the 1mp11ctt forward rate. 
reader will soon discover that the distributions .. e so different that the assumption of perfect 
substitutability is extremely unlikely. 
CHAPTER Ill 
PREVIOUS TESTS OF EFFICIENCY 
IN FINANCIAL FUTURES 
MARKETS 
The investigation of the Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH) has taken 
many specific forms, and involved many different markets, although the 
basic approach for a11 of the studies surveyed is identical. Hardly a market 
where data have been obtainable has been disregarded, and work continues 
to go on apace in many areas, from markets in commodlt ies to those in 
thirty year bonds. In this survey, attention is restricted in general to 
markets for financial instruments, although the reader may question 
whether or not foreign exchange is in fact a financial instrument. Also 
included is a recent study of the Rotterdam oil market, for reasons that will 
be evident. As to categorization ... 
There are three levels of abstraction 1 with regard to the efficiency 
of markets, financial or otherwise, in processing information. First, a 
market is weakly efficient if observations of past occurrences in the 
market alone hold no unexplotted clue to its future behavior. Most of the 
1 See Fame ( 1970) and Jensen ( 1969). Jensen is often credited with the original division of 
efftclency Into Its three parts. However, Jensen credits Harry Roberts wtth the OOscr'lptton. See 
Jensen ( 1969; 170; footnote). 
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empirical work. 1n the area of the Efficient Markets Hypothesis [EMH] 1s 
performed on the level of weak-form testing. 
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second, a market is strongly efric1ent 1f observattons of past 
occurrences 1n an¥ market or forum hold no unexplo1ted clue to 1ts future 
behavior. No effort by any f1nite-11ved researcher can prove the strong-
form hypothesis. However, the hypothesis is often sa1d to be disproved tf a 
non-spurious correlation 1s shown between any information set and future 
market behavior. The va11dity of this approach 1s open to some Question. In 
an inf1nite set of time sertes processes, an tnflnlte subset of process 
rea11zations w111 exh1b1t significant correlation w1th any one particular 
process rea11zatlon over an Infinite subset or f1nlte tntervals. Most market 
observers recognize this Intuitively, and put Jtttle value In hem11ne 
Indicators, or NFL Indicators, or tipsters or Insiders, no matter how strong 
the apparent correlation.• 
Third, a market Is semi-strong form efficient If no publicly available 
Information a11ows the future behavior of the market to be predicted. This 
approach encompasses the remaining portion of the emp1r1cal tests. Results 
must be examined· carefully, w1th regard to the fact that information, 
although pub11c, 1s never free. Even cost less information must be read, 
heard, or seen. As the ava11ab11ity of cost less information proliferates, an 
Increasing amount of the tnvestor·s time 1s consumed In its asslm11ation, 
and there is some point at which the further asstm11ation of such 
Information by IndiVIdual Investors Is Jess than beneflctaJ.2 
1 A rise in women's hemlines, it is said, presages a rise In share prices. A victory by the National 
Footballleaoue's representative to the Superbowl. It is claimed, will be followed by a higher closino 
average share price at year's end. 
2 In other words, the ulilily of coslless information Is strictly concaw. 
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In the stud1es that are summarized below, three major methods of 
test1ng for efffcfent markets are 1dent1f1able. F1rst, the absence of 
prof1tat>le trading rules Is employed as an 1nd1cat1on or weak-rorm 
eff1c1ency. To be adequate tests, however, such methodologies must f1rst 
recognize the cost of capital employed, and the remuneration of risky 
exposure to capital loss undertaken in trading postttons. Some studfes 
attempt to do so; many do not. Further, there is some quest ton as to 
whether tradfng rules which may yield paper prof1ts in one period m1ght not 
y1eld greater than normal losses fn another. 
Second, some tests attempt to show the existence or slgnlrtcant 
serial crosscorrelatton <semt-strong> and autocorrelation <weak-form> and 
thereby expose tnformatlonally tnerrlclent markets. such tests are valtd 
for time series processes that are essentially random walks, or 
martingales. Care must be taken to recognize that such tests are joint 
tests of market efficiency and the valtdlty of the martingale modeL 
A third methodology Involves testing the variance of the process 
against the variance that should result If the process Is In fact generated t>y 
the hypothesized (efficient> model. The warning here Is essentially the 
same as that above. In fact a genus caveat us should be applied, that an 
tests of EMH are tn fact joint tests of EMH and the hypothesized market 
model, whether such models are expJtcttly stated or not. 
This survey Is organized In the following manner. First, all empirical 
tests of EMH as applted to Treasury b111 futures and Treasury note futures 
markets are summarized. Next, theoretical arguments as to the 
app11cab111ty or the three types of tests are summarized. In the following 
sections, representative tests Involving markets for ftxed coupon 
investments, short term interest rates, common stock, foreign exchange, 
and spot gas o11, respect1vely. 
Studtes of the Efficiency of the 
Treasury B111 Futures 
Market 
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Pug11si ( 1978) found the futures market to be ineff1c1ent. Margin 
costs were tgnored, round-turn commtss1on assumed to be $60, and da11y 
clostng pr1ces on both b11ls and futures were gathered from the wan Street 
Journal. Pug11s1 used only asked-prtces to determtne hts arbttrage 11mtts, 
so h1s results dtffer a small amount from that of the present study. The 
study encompasses the ftrst s1x contract months, and a stgns test ts 
employed to show that b111s-futures strategtes return a h1gher y1eld than 
b111s-only strategies. He recognizes that early settlement can be costly 
(page 67) but states that "As long as there are portfo11os that have the 
capacity to ma1ntain a posit ton to expiratton, however, such an argument 
lacks suff1c1ent merit to support continued ineff1c1enc1es 1n the market." If 
Pugltst's statement ts true, then 11Qu1d1ty has no value, and there ts no 
posstb111ty of futures contract default. Arbitrage prof1t, or h1gher yield 
from b1Jls-rutures strategtes can only be certainly realtzed near the 
exp1rat1on of the contract. 
Capozza and Cornell ( 1978) report on the ffrst thfrty months of 
tradtng 1n the CME futures market. The authors used weekly data 
(Wednesdays> collected from the Wall Street Journal, and averaged the btd 
and asked quotes. They also used only b1d prices but found no difference 
<see thetr note 5, page 515). lmp11cft forward rates ustng spot Instruments 
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and futures were calculated and compared. Rates were 1ncluded when actual 
de11very b111s d1d not exist. The authors found lneff1c1ency but most was 
expla1ned by the costs of borrowing b111s for shorting. An interesting 
pattern emerged from the ttme series of devlat1ons presented 1n the paper. 
For longer time periods, when the arb1tragabte b111 d1d not exist, the futures 
rate exceeded the lmp11c1t forward rate. But the deviation decllned w1th 
time, and for time periods when the actual bill did exist, the deviation was 
negative. The futures rates became less than the lmp11c1t forward rate. 
Poole ( 1978) round that futures rates do tn fact reflect tmpltctt 
forward rates, and that "unexp1o1ted arb1trage opportun1t1es rarely exist" (p. 
1 0). Poole used the rtrst s1x futures contracts, begtnntng w1th March, 1976, 
and ending w1th the June, 1977 contract. Data were collected from the Yla.l.l 
Street JournaL and Included datly b1d and asked b1J1 quotes and datly futures 
closing quotes. Poole presents at-test of the proposition that futures rates 
are depressed below the tmplfctt forward rates. The test ts stgnlf1cant for 
all contracts save June, 1977. However, the depressed futures rates are 
Insufficient to allow profitable arbitrage, because of the existence of 
margin costs and commissions on contracts, and bid/asked spreads on bills. 
Of the stx contracts Poole examined, only three show periods when the 
futures rate Is above or below the arbitrage 11m Its: January, In the March, 
1976 contract; September to October, 1n the December, 1977 contract; and 
four days In May, 1n the June, 1977 contract. In each of the periods, the 
futures rates were below the lower arbitrage Hmit. Poole's article was one 
of the first to 1nvest1gate the efficiency of the Treasury b111 futures 
market. The stx contracts ava11able for study at the t1me of Poole's paper 
d1d not show the decrease In the futures rate relative to the lmp11c1t 
forward rate that has been observed tn some of the more recent stud1es. 
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Cornell ( 1983) Investigated the efficiency of the Treasury bill 
futures market with regard to the tax advantage that long futures positions 
enjoyed relative to holding b111s for the IndiVIdual Investor. The pertod or 
study was September, 1976 to March, 1980. Cornell does not name hts data 
source. Contrary to what would be expected If tax considerations mattered, 
he found that the bl11 futures market did not exhibit anoma11es at six 
months to maturity- the time that a contract could no longer be held for six 
months and thus qualify as a capital asset. According to Cornell, marginal 
Investors are dealers, whose trading profits and losses are taxed as 
ordinary Income. Thus the market, wh11e efficient, offers Individual 
portro11o managers opportunities ror Increased returns rrom futures 
strategies relative to bills-only strategies. 
Rendleman and Carablnl < 1979) used last-dally-trade price data on 
futures contracts, provided by the CME, and the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York's Composite Closing Quotations for U.S. Government Securities (CCQ) 
for bid and asked bl11 discount yields. The period of study was January 6, 
1976 through March 3 I, 1978. When the actua 1 de llverab 1 e b 111 for a 
particular contract had yet to be auctioned by the Treasury, the authors used 
the existing bl11 nearest In maturity to the de11verabte bill. once again, the 
study Is not directly comparable to others. They found that potent tal 
arbitrage profits existed for Investors who did not have to pay short fees 
(50 basts points per year), but not when those fees were taken Into account. 
According to the authors, the Inefficiencies present are not profitable 
enough to attract portfolio managers. They also recognize the risk 
differences In strategies: " ... recent default on the Maine potato contract ... 
may cast doubt on the Exchange members· guarantee. Thus, a portion or the 
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apparent quasi-arbitrage opportunities that we observe may actually reflect 
a premium for default rtsk." (p. 913, note} 
Dale and Workman ( 1980) test various moving average trading rules In 
the Treasury b111s futures market. None of them is profitable. The market 
appears to be a random walk. 
Dale c 1981 > tests ror levels or resistance and support In the Treasury 
bills futures market, and finds no price congestion or reflecting barriers. 
He also finds the same volume behavior associated with the markets for 
shares. 
Lang and Rasche ( 1978) selected thirty quote dates at random In the 
periods or March 1 to November 30, 1976; December 1 to July 3 1, 1977; and 
August 1, 1977 to March 31, 1978. Data on futures was collected from the 
Dally Information Bulletin or the IMM; spot bill rates rrom the New York 
Federal Reserve Bank's cca. When the actual deltvery bill had not yet been 
auct1oned, a 11near 1nterpolat1on was calculated between the two bills 
nearest to the maturity of the de11very bill. Lang and Rasche observed the 
pattern mentioned above: that ror longer maturities, when the deltverable 
bill had not yet been auctioned, futures rates exceeded Implicit forward 
rates; for shorter maturttles, just the opposite. The Increase In the 
divergence or futures rates over tmp11ctt forward rates with time was 
explained by the Increased cost of default at longer maturities. The authors 
d1d not explain why futures rates would tend to be lower than Implicit 
forward rates near contract expiration, other than to tentatively accept 
Poole's Idea of lower transaction costs for contracted b111s than spot 
purchases. 
VIgnola and Dale ( 1979) verified the Inefficiency that Pugltsl 
reported; however, they found that the market has not become more 
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efficient with t1me, as Pugl1s1 concluded, but has remained 1nefficient. 
They found that using only b1d yield-discounts 1n calculations produced 
greatly different conclusions, In four of the eight contracts studied, than 
using only asked yield-discounts. Their charts show that yields from bills-
futures strategies increase w1th time relative to b111s-only yields. Once 
again, the arbitrage Is artificial; If an actual arbltragable bill d1d not exist, 
the authors substitute the one-year b111 nearest 1n maturity to the non-
existent instrument. They show that bills-futures strategies offer greater 
return than bills-only strategies; a few days before expiration, on the order 
of 1 oo basts points or more, Indicating unexploited arbitrage opportunities 
and market Inefficiency. 
Monroe and Cohn< 1986) used the following procedure to test for 
efficiency In the Treasury bill futures market. First, the Implied forward 
rate of return Is calculated for any two contracts from the formula 
Ft,f = Ft,n< 1 + IRn,f), 
where IRn,f Is the Implicit unannua11zed forward rate, Ft,f Is the longer term 
futures price and Ft,n Is the near term contract price. Normal 
backwardlzatlon w111 usually result In a higher price for Ft,f than for Ft,n due 
to storage costs and the foregone yield of employed capital, less any 
convenience yield from ownership of the commodity Itself. In efficient 
markets, the researchers argue, IRn,f should be no greater than the 
opportunity cost of capital employed at 11ke risk. For the gold futures 
market, they argue that the proper alternative rate Is the Bankers· 
Acceptance [BA] rate, since a BA Is created when a trader borrows to 
finance the gold purchase. 
Suppose IRn,f were to be assumed to norma11y eQual to the BA rate. If 
two futures contracts diverged In price more than that Indicated 
53 
appropriate by the formula above, a trader could buy the underpriced 
contract and sell the overpriced contract, earntng prof1t when and tf thetr 
prtces agatn were near the approprtate divergence. But the simultaneous 
purchase and sale of equal numbers of contracts of dtfferent maturtttes ts a 
spread, and Is vulnerable to a change In the price of the commodity Itself. 
In fact, that Is probably the major reason for most positions In spreads. 
However, tf a trader bought and sold uneQual numbers of near and far 
contracts. a "tatr could be created whtch leaves the posttton exposed only 
to a change tn the lmp11clt forward rate IRn,f. The proper rat to Is given by 
qn = qf( 1 + IRn,f), 
where qn 1s the number or near term contracts to buy <sell> and qf the 
number or far term contracts to sell (buy). 
For example, suppose It ts November. and the December gold contract 
settles at $500 per ounce, while the March contract settles at $525. The BA 
rate ts 12" per year. or 3" per quarter. The tmplted forward rate for gold 
futures ts 5" per quarter. A trader bel1evtng tt will fall to 3" buys 1.05 
December contracts for each March contract that ts sold. In thts way, the 
posttton ts made Invulnerable to a narrowtng tn the spread due to a change tn 
anythtng other than the tmpltctt forward rate ttself. 
The same analysts 1s applted to Treasury bill futures, expect that the 
costs of carry are argued to be lower for b111s than for gold. Consequently. 
the tmp11c1t forward rate for Treasury bflls (IRa] should be lower than the 
1mp11c1t forward rate for gold [IRe]. Indeed, there should be some "normal" 
ratio between the IRe and IRa such that 
IRe- IRa= N 
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which is maintained by efficient market forces. If IRe or IRs dtverge from 
thetr normal relattonshtp, an errtctent market wtll Qutckly brtng them back. 
Thts ts the basts for the efftctency tests of the researchers. 
Each basts potnt change tn the CME Treasury btll dtscount results tn a 
contract value change of $25, wht1e each basts potnt change tn the 
annualized IRe causes an approximate gold contract value change of 
1 OOFt,nNeC.O 1 )/ 4, 
where Nets the number of gold contracts per b111 contract posit toned. The 
proper Quantities of Treasury btll futures contracts and gold contracts can 
be cross-hedged for profit, whenever IRe- IRs .eN. by employtng the 
following hedge rat to: 
Ne = ( 100)/.0lft,n. 
For example, If Ft,n Is $500, then Ne Is 20, so that about 20 gold contracts 
should be bought for each btll contract. 
The researchers used the Chicago Mercant lie Exchange computer 
tapes, with data from March 1976 through July 1982. Two trading 
strategies were stmulated. Ftrst. whenever IRe- IRs < 0, the cross-
commodity hedge was posit toned, and was closed out the following day. 
This stmulatlon resulted In positive but small gross profit, covertng Jess 
than half the estimated $20 per contract positioning cost. 
The second strategy consisted of two tactics. A sixty day movtng 
average or IRe- IRs was formed. A take-posttlon signal was gtven when, on 
a given day, IRe- IRs was more than one standard devtatton above or below 
the moving average. The assumption was that 1t would return to the movtng 
average. Tactic one called for closing out the cross hedge on the fo11owtng 
day. Results: postttve profit, but averaging only about S 16 per contract. 
Tacttc two called for holding the cross hedge unt11 a "reversar occurred, 
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and taktng an opposite cross hedge only on the opposite signal. The 
researchers did not make It clear whether a reversal was Indicated when 
the da11y value of IRa- IRa came w1thln one standard deviation of the 
moving average, became equal to the moving average, or moved past one 
standard deviation beyond the moving average in the opposite direction. At 
any rate, one of the methods produced qu1te large simulated profits, 
averaging some $80 per contract. Although the settle-tomorrow tactic 
produced simulated profits that averaged S 16 per contract, the hold-unttl-
reversal tact1c resulted In profits that were large enough to more than 
cover estimated transactions costs. According to the researchers, this test 
1nd1cates an lneff1c1ent market, and Is not a joint test, since no market 
model Is jointly tested, but only the existence of lnformattona11y generated 
trading profit opportunities. But the researchers note that profitable 
opportun1tles are fairly quickly eliminated, and that almost all the profit is 
generated by the gold contracts. There is therefore some question as to 
whether or not the btll futures market Is efficient- a quest ton that ts 
perhaps not addressed at all by this methodology. 
The search for the perfect slmulat1on was undertaken by Elton, Gruber 
and Rentzler ( 1984). Two "trading rules" were promulgated by the 
researchers. Investors may choose between holding a real btll to maturity, 
or creat1ng a pseudo bill of a comb1natlon of futures contract sale and 
del1very bill purchase. In determining potential "prof1t" from holding the 
lower priced secur1ty to maturity, the price of the futures contract trading 
just prior to the cash bill quote is used. Immediate execution is said to 
occur when a cash pos1tlon 1s taken at a pr1ce equal to that used In 
calculating potential profit, wh11e a futures posltton 1s executed at a price 
equal to that of the following trade. Delayed execution Is satd to occur 
when the cash bill is traded at the pr1ce subsequent to the price used in 
calculating profit, and the futures position is taken at the pr1ce of the 
following trade. 
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The researchers believe that, although previous studies have been 
"s1multaneous test(s) of eff1c1ency and the appropriateness of a pre-
spec1fied valuation model," their study 1s not, since no valuat1on model at 
all 1s spec1f1ed. The1r cla1m 1s that only eff1ciency 1s exam1ned. But the 
reader may wonder ff any discuss ton of d1fferentfal "prof1t" fs not made 
mean1ngless, s1nce any observed difference 1n potent1al or actual return may 
be due to d1fferences 1n 11qu1d1ty, pr1ce r1sk, or default r1sk. If no valuation 
mode11s spec1f1ed, we cannot know. The researchers do 1n fact 1moly by 
the1r non-spec1f1cat1on of a market model that the cash b1ll and pseudo b111 
are exact equ1valents and perfect substitutes. Otherw1se, why not use real 
estate returns less cash bill y1elds as the measure of d1fferent1al "prof1t?" 
But enough ... let us seek the comfort of the data. 
The period of the test was January 6, 1976 through December 22, 
1982. Transacttons costs are neglected 1n the tables presented by the 
researchers. In general the data show that the pseudo b111 offered greater 
return than the cash b111. Whether the trade was - us1ng the researchers· 
term1nology- 1mmed1ate or delayed made 11ttle d1fference, for actual and 
potent tal excess return were qu1te close. on any g1ven day, an tnvestor 
could have reasonably expected that h1s actual return from a given 
investment would be with1n a few dollars of the ant1c1pated return- at 
matur1ty. Much 1s made of thfs by the researchers. But the result follows 
naturally from the fact that discounted b111s, whether cash or pseudo, 
always pay certa1n return at matur1ty, and d1d not default dur1ng the per1od 
in question. 
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However, having the futures contract gains or losses marked-to-
market on a da11y basts Induces vartatlon 1n the realized return. The 
researchers report that, under tmmedtate execution, marking-to-market 
effects range from -$45 to $35 more than 80 percent of the ttme, while 
under delayed execution, only 32 percent of the time, wtth some losses as 
high as $2,152 and ga1ns as large as $1,797. The researchers make 11ght of 
this rlsk.3 But since these gains and/or losses can be greater than the 
margin requirement or $1,500 Itself, and do not occur In the case or the 
cash bll1 strategy, one may wonder again at the use or the non-mode11ed 
equivalency assumption. 
The researchers present tables whtch show that owners or cash bills 
could have swapped them ror pseudo bills and gained- on average- positive 
returns. The use or sma11 f11ters to trigger such swaps results In an 
increase tn average "profit" from swaps, at least, unt11 the filter size 
exceeds $800 In expected "proftt." The same Is true for an arbitrage 
strategy, where the hlgher-prtced Instrument Is shorted or repoed out to 
finance the purchase of the lower-priced instrument. But the use of mean 
"profit" averaged over many contracts tends to obscure the fact, not noted 
by the researchers, that the differential return tends to be e11mtnated as 
the maturity date approaches; a fact whtch Is responsible for the existence 
of the researchers· "prortt." 
3 See Elton, Gruber and Rentzler (1984; 135). 
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Interest Rates and Money Supply Growth Rates 
Studies of forecasting of interest rates have yielded mixed results, 
sim11ar to shares research with regard to EMH. The evidence with regard to 
long rates is more indicative of market efficiency than short term 
instruments. Long term interest rates seem to follow a random walk 
process, while short term rates do not. 
However, Pesando ( 1979) has maintained that, wh11e long rates must 
exhibit the random walk characteristic if term premiums are constant 
across time and EMH holds, "by contrast, the proposition that short-term 
rates follow a random walk in an efficient market can be obtained only by 
direct assumption: In a further important caveat to EMH students, Pesando 
shows that autocorrelation in long term levels is not necessarily indicative 
of inefficiency; and that the .appropriate variables in testing for EMH are 
changes in interest rates. 
In a later paper Pesando ( 1981) examines the accuracy of three 
widely disseminated forecasts of long and short term Canadian and U.S. 
interest rates. For long term instruments, a random walk (non)predtction 
was not signif1cantly worse, in terms of root mean square error (RMSE) than 
forecasts of Data Resources of Canada, the conference board of Canada, or 
the Mcleod, Young, Wetr and Company, Ltd. surveys of 35-40 financial 
market participants. However, the same cannot be said for forecasts of 90-
day Treasury bills or finance paper. 
According to Pesando, both results are consistent with the joint 
hypotheses of the equi ltbrium market model and EMH. One thing, however, 
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1s puzz11ng. Accord1ng to Pesando, EMH does not reQutre that "the short-
term rate follow a martingale, nor does empirical evidence suggest that 
this Is the case. There Is no arbitrage opportuntty through whtch agents 
could e11mlnate any sertal dependence tn the short-term rate ... " (1981, p. 
307, bottom.> Is Pesando then denytng the arbitrage opportunfttes ava11able 
tn strtpp1ng out y1elds v1a futures contracts? 
Mishkin< 1982) employs the EMH, the theory or rational expectations, 
and the hypothesis or exogenous money supply determination to conclude 
that unanticipated Increases In money growth are associated with 
unanticipated Increases In short term Interest rates. The hypotheses are 
jotntly conf1rmed. Interestingly, Mlshktn round that the rtsk premium based 
on a measure or variability or six month Treasury bill yields did not affect 
the results when eliminated- as It was In much of the present study. 
In an ear11er paper, Mlshkfn < 1980 had shown that long term Treasury 
bond rates also responded positively to unanttctpated Increases In M1 and 
M2 growth rates when those variables were not seasonally adjusted, 
although not when seasonally adjusted values were used 1n expectations 
mode111ng. In the case of seasonally adjusted values, ne1ther M1 nor M2 
Innovations were associated wtth changes In long term ytelds. 
Ur1ch and Wachtel < 1984) also report a postttve Influence or 
contemporary unanttctpated monetary tnnovattons on short term rates. 
Us1ng 1'115 survey data to model anticipated changes 1n the money stock, and 
concentrating on 11'1'1 Treasury b111 futures rates from three through twelve 
months maturtty, as well as Federal Funds rates (FFR), they round that 
anticipated changes 1n'e1ther the Ml growth rate or tnflatton rate had no 
stgntftcant effect on FFR or futures rates prtor to October, 1979. However, 
they report the "anomalous coefficient" whereby, 1n the reserve targeting 
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reg1me, ant1c1pated changes 1n M 1 had a signif1cant (negative) effect on the 
nearby futures contract rate. If EMH ts correct, anticipated Information is 
not capable of affect1ng asset pr1ces. Therefore the results of urtch and 
Wachtel cast some doubt on EMH. However, they mentton two factors that 
may have b1ased th1s coefflctent. F1rst, MMS data reports survey medians 
rather than means. Second, MMS data ts collected on Tuesday, and reported 
on Thursday, while actual Ml changes are reported on Friday. It is possible 
that anticipations change somewhat tn three days. In fact, Urich and 
Wachtel report that a correction for this learning reduces the size of the 
anticipated money growth coefficient, but does not e11minate Its 
s1gn1f1cance. 
Laffer and Ranson ( 1978) report on the efficiency or various markets, 
and maintain that efficiency exists In markets ror Treasury bills, roretgn 
currencies, and capital assets (common stock). According to Laffer and 
Ranson, only contemporaneous monetary shocks are capable of affecting 
GNP, since "Increases in money supply that lead to delayed Increases tn GNP 
would Imply exceptional expected profit opportunities." In addttton, real 
GNP should show no periodicity other than the pseudo-cycles generated by 
random processes. 
Markets for Foreign Exchange 
Evidence for semi-strong form market efficiency is presented by 
Caves and Feige ( 1980). In addition, the monetary approach to exchange rate 
determination is tested and found wanting. Using changes in the 
Canadian/U.S. exchange rate, and growth rates of the two national money 
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suppl1es, the researchers f1rst showed that the fore1gn exchange market 
was weak-form efficient, In that the Box-Pierce a-statistic for 
autocorrelation through lag twenty five was not stgntftcantly nonzero. The 
canadian price of u.s. money was essentially a random wall< during the two 
data periods, 1953.1 - 1962.4 and 1970.7- 1975.8. Including past monetary 
changes through lag six did not substantially alter the expectation of the 
exchange rate, and neither did relative (U.S. minus Canadian> monetary 
changes. Hence, the hypothesis of semi-strong form foretgn exchange 
market efficiency was not rejected. The researchers also present evidence 
that the money supplies are not exogenous, at least In the ear11er period. 
Future values of exchange rates "cause" monetary changes. 
However, as the researchers show, the fact of acceptance of the 
Incremental efficiency of exchange rates lmp11es lacK of causa11ty of 
exchange rates by lagged monetary values, tn the Granger-Sims sense. 
Hence semi-strong form eff1c1ency precludes acceptance of any past 
monetary Influence on exchange rates, so that It Is not possible to 
distinguish between marKet efficiency and the Invalidity or the monetary 
approach. The only method of ascertaining the possible validity of the 
monetary approach left to researchers, tn the presence or marKet efftctency, 
Is the Influence or contemporaneous monetary changes on exchange rates, 
assuming at least part of any present period monetary change ts unexpected. 
The researchers point out that, although only one of the zero lag monetary 
coefficients was significant, all four had the expected signs. An Increase In 
the growth rate of Canadian money was contemporaneously associated with 
Its depreciation, but not significantly so, In general. However, since the 
researchers do not attempt to differentiate expected monetary changes 
from 1nnovat1ons, the1r content ton that the s1mple monetary approach 1s 
1nva11d 1s less than conv1nc1ng. 
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In add1t1on, Ste1n ( 1980) shows that tests of fore1gn exchange market 
eff1c1ency wh1ch rely on lack of ser1al autocorrelat1on for acceptance of the 
hypothes1s may suffer a problem of false reject ton. The reason 1s because 
the spot exchange rate follows a process wh1ch 1n genera11s not a 
mart1ngale; so exchange rate changes are not 1n general rat tonally expected 
to be zero. The spot rate p(t) 1s proposed by Ste1n to equ111brate the stock 
of short term cla1ms, wh11e the long term equ111brtum exchange rate y(t) 
serves to s1multaneously equ111brate the stock demand and supply of money 
and ru1r111 the doctrtne or purchastng power partty. The d1fference p(t)-
y<t> ts a determ1nant or baste balance, and thus affects the change tn the 
stock or short term clatms. Stnce there ts feedback from p(t) to p(t+ j), the 
spot rate cannot be a mart1ngale, and E[( 1-B)p(t)], where B 1s the backsh1ft 
operator, cannot be zero. 
The same concluston would seem to apply to forward rates, to the 
extent that they reflect rat1ona11y der1ved pr1ces of current spot currency 
purchases carr1ed forward- the process known as normal backward1zat1on. 
Thus the market efftctency found by caves and Fe1ge C 1980) 1s seen to be 
qu1te remarkable evtdence of the sem1-un1ty of the u.s. and canad1an 
economtes rather than vertrtcatton or exchange market err1c1ency. 
The market stud1es affected by the feedback problem are not l1m1ted 
to exchange rates, although problems there have been most recogntzed. 
Ste1n dtscusses ftve studtes marred by the feedback problem.4 But the 
precedtng appltes w1th equal force to any market where there ts feedback to 
4 Dooley and Shafer (1976), Cummins, et. al. (1976),levich (1976),Kaserman (1973) and Frenkel 
(1977). 
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a causal variable from other, endogenous variables. To paraphrase Stein's 
Proposttton 2 (page 577), "an examtnatton or the ttme-sertes per se or 
market prtces whtch incorporate feedback cannot reveal whether or not the 
market 1s efftctent." 
Even though examtnatton of the ttme sertes 1s purported to be 
valueless for efftclency tests of foreign exchange markets, other tests 
remain. For example, Huang ( 1984) has examined the variance of spot 
exchange rates wtth the atm of testtng the monetary approach and EMH. 
Huang writes the baste monetary approach to exchange rate determination 
under rational expectations <or what amounts to the same thing, EMH) tn 
logarithmic form as 
St = (m - m*)t - J3(y - y*)t + a[Et(St+ 1) - St1, 
where s, m, and y are the logarithms of the spot exchange rate, money stock, 
and real income. In this equation, the asterisk(*) indicates a foreign value; 
J3 ts the Income elasticity of money demand; a ts the <nomtnan Interest 
elasticity of money demand; and E Is the expectations operator. Today·s 
expect at ton of tomorrow's spot rate [EtCSt+ 1 >1 1s assumed to depend on 
expectations of future changes tn domestic and foreign money stocks and 
realtncomes. Let x = Cm - m*)- JJ(y - y*), and let At be a properly weighted 
movtng average of an future changes tn domestic and foreign money stocks 
and real Incomes, At= !w1(0Xt+t>, summed from 1= 1 to tnftnlty. The wt are 
the weights [w = a/C 1-a)] and D ts the difference operator. Huang ts able to 
wrt te the monetary mode I as 
(St - Xt) = At - llt, 
where llt ts the real forecast error lilt= At- EtCAt>1 and Is not correlated 
with any currently obtainable relevant Information. Therefore 
Var<At> = Var<JJ.t> + VarCst - xt> ~ Var<st - xt>. 
By the smoothing properties of moving average filters, 
VarCAt) ~ (w/( 1-w))2VarCDxt>. 
so that by assumtng probable values for a and 13, the magnitude of the 
vartances, 
Var<st- xt> { (w/( 1-w)}2Var<Dxt>. 
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becomes a testable hypothests. Huang found that, using monthly data for 
Germany, Brttatn, and the u.s. from March, 1973, to March, 1979, the 
hypothests was refuted qutte soundly. Spot exchange rates were 
stgn1f1cantly more vartable than a rational and eff1c1ent marl<et would 
a11ow, gtven the correctness of the researcher's mode111ng of the monetary 
approach. 
The methodology employed by Huang has been used by others, and tn 
contexts of both stocl< and bond price varlances.s But the methodology has 
not displaced the practtce of examlnatton of residuals for autocorrelation. 
For example, Murftn < 1984), using sixteen monthly u.s. Do11ar exchange rates 
from September 1978 through September 1983, employs evidence of 
residual autocorrelation In the estimated equation 
lnSt = a + 131nt-1 Ft + Ut 
to "undermtne the jotnt assumptton of rat tonal expectations and risl< 
neutral tty which under11es the simplest model of exchange marl<et 
efficiency." Durbin-Watson statistics Indicate slgn1f1cant Cpos1tlve) f1rst 
order autocorrelation for all save three of the exchange rate ser1es us1ng 
OLS regressions, and for all sixteen using the Zellner regression technique. 
The researcher then models spot rates ustng the autocorrelation information 
tn forward rates, est1mat1ng 
5 See Huang (1981), Shiller (1979b), Shiller (1979a),leroy and Porter (1979) and Singleton (1979). 
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lnSt - lnt-1 Ft = a + B[lnSt-1 - lnt-2Ft-1] + Ut 
over the twenty most recent months for each one-period-ahead forecast, 
and f1nd1ng B to be s1gn1f1cant and pos1t1ve ror all currenc1es. Accord1ng to 
the researcher, ..... th1s s1mple forecasting mode11mp11c1tly represents a 
stronger test of the eff1cfency of the foreign exchange market than the 
unb1asedness of the forward rate ... The statement 1s true 1f prof1table 
speculatton 1s thereby poss1ble. But the researcher's monthly data are 
averages of da11y rates, so that in order to reap the forecast1ng model's 
speculat1ve harvest, the trader must be able to purchase (or sell) currency 
forward and s1multaneously sell <or buy) currency spot after the end of a 
month at prectsely the average of the dally pr1ces observed over the 
prevtous month. Th1s w111 not tn general be possible. Stnce the sertes are 
not martingales, by the ttme go-long stgnals are observed, prtces have 
already moved out of profitable range, 1f the market ts efffctent. 
The Rotterdam Spot 
011 Market 
A sfmflar problem exists fn the .. profitable" simulation performed by 
G jelberg ( 1985). In examining the Rotterdam spot market for crude of 1, 
Gjelberg first employed runs tests and regressions in finding that the 
market was weak-form inefficient. The series of daily price changes from 
1978 through 1983 showed significantly fewer runs than 99 of 100 random 
series drawn from a white noise generator, or a larger than expected number 
of reversals. The same result holds for weekly and monthly price changes 
overall, but not for every year in the test interval. In addition, in the 
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regression of da11y and weekly percentage change 1n spot price on 1ts lagged 
values, by year, 
Pt = ao + a 1 Pt-1 + a2Pt-2 + aJPt-3 + et, 
at was for all six years significantly greater than zero when the series or 
da11y price changes was examined, but only so for 1980 and 1982 when 
weekly price changes were examined. The value of at seems to have 
declined after 1981, the year In which International Petroleum Exchange 
futures contracts on gas oil began trading, Indicating that the market 
perhaps became more efficient as a result. Gjelberg reports the values of 
the Durbin-Watson statistic <DW) In his regresston results, although It 
Imparts 11ttle Information when lagged dependent variables are used as 
predictors, as Is here the case. The researcher then formulates a trading 
rule, and tests Its performance over the six remaining months of the test 
period, January through June, 1984. The trading rule allows only long 
positions, as follows: buy (or hold) 1,000 tons of crude If today·s price 
exceeds yesterday's; 1f not, sell. Accord1ng to the s1mulat1on, after 
deduction of 11ne-of-credlt capital costs of 10% per year and neglecting any 
other possible Insurance, transportation, transactions, brokerage, or storage 
fees, a tidy profit of some $20,000 remains arter eleven round turn trades, 
thus Implicating the price series as a process of an Inefficient market of 
the weak kind. However, It Is problematic to suppose that rational risk-
averse Investors would- or could- employ such a trading method, for the 
f o 11 owIng reasons: 
First, the purchase or 1 ,ooo tons or crude would have reQuired the 
payment, In 1984, of some one-quarter m1lllon do11ars. The sum would have 
had to remain at risk until receipt of a like sum from the sale of the asset. 
All sorts or scenarios can be Imagined that would have prevented delivery 
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and/or payment, but these aside, the commodity trader was undertaking an 
investment of a rtsky nature, to be compared with the returns from 
s1m1larly r1sky ventures, not that of rtsk-free capttal costs. The existence 
of pos1t1ve stmulated returns from trad1ng ventures reQu1r1ng the r1sk of 
capita11s to be expected, tf capital market theory 1s correct and markets 
are efficient processors of 1nformation. The existence of returns 
significantly exceeding those from investments of 11ke risk is the proper 
measure of inefficient markets. 
Second, this simulation, along with almost an of its counterparts, 
assumes the ab111ty of purchasing the commodity at the price that has just 
given the signal to buy, and se11ing at the price giving the signal to sell. The 
impossib11ity of se11ing for more than the bid price and purchasing at Jess 
than the asked pr1ce is wen known, but is sim11ar in nature to the avoidance 
of transactions costs, and so is neglected here. But it is in general not 
possible to buy and/or se11 at yesterday's price. It is more likely to be 
possfble the more nearly the price process approaches a martingale- but 
then, of course, no one would want to. There is a paradox involved in the 
testing or sma11 prtce-change f11ter trading rules or this sort. The 
simulated profit largely exists by virtue of being able to buy and se11 today 
at yesterday's price, which by being greater than the previous closing, has 
signaled a buy. If today·s prtce ts hfgher st111, a future "profft" accrues. If 
the same, the trader fs out with no Joss. If lower, the trader ts out wtth a 
Joss - but fn general a sma11 one. In order to Jose simulated profits, a 
reversal of a speciffc kfnd must occur. A run must be fo11owed by such a 
powerful reversal that a11 previously accrued gatns are more than erased. 
But ff the vartance of the process ts reasonably constant, such an 
occurrence fs qutte un11ke1y. Thus such fflters amount to hardly more 
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sophisticated adVice than te. "Cut your losses and let your profits run," the 
w1sdom of wh1ch has tong been recognized. 
Summary 
In this sample of the 11terature many hours of research by serious 
students of financial futures markets have been summarized. Much thought 
entered into the performance and presentation of that research, and the 
considered opinions of dlligent scholars is always valuable. Yet there is no 
consensus. 
Many students be11eve that their research has shown financial futures 
markets to be less than perfectly efficient. Many others, employing the 
same assumptions and methodology, disagree. There is no clearly defined 
dominance of views. It is ironic that the very question of market efficiency 
is answered efficiently. 
To some, because of uncaptured arbitrage profits, the market is 
inefficient. To others, because the time path of price or returns are not 
markedly different from random walks, the market is efficient. To still 
others, because the variability of prices or returns are inconsistent with 
those implied by random walk rea11zations, the market is inefficient. It 
cannot be both. As a pendulum in a randomly moving elevator sometimes 
does- and sometimes does not- indicate the gravitational constant, 
something important is missing. Something is overlooked. The experiment 
is flawed. 
The flaw In the researches surveyed ts common to all. The a priori 
assumption that assets are perfect substitutes because they have identical 
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costs and 1dent1ca1 returns 1s not necessar11y va11d. The d1str1but1ons of the 
returns may be d1fferent enough to render the assumpt1on 1ncorrect. At 
t1mes. 1n the exam1nat1on of some markets, the assumpt1on may be 
just1f1ed, and the researcher may perhaps conclude that the market 1s 
eff1c1ent. At other t1mes, or 1n other markets, the assumption may not be 
va11d, and the researcher may conclude the oppos1te. It 1s conce1vable, 
though the occurrence must be rare fndeed, that the 1ncorrect assumptfon of 
perfect subst1tut1on would be suff1c1ently offset by an 1neff1c1ent market 
so that the conclus1on of eff1c1ency would result. 
In summary, therefore, 1t 1s not poss1b1e to judge from the hlstor1ca1 
record or past research whether or not rtnanc1a1 futures markets are 
eff1c1ent. Past research has not accounted ror the d1fference In var1ab111ty 
or the futures-based instruments, and 1s commonly nawed. In a catho11c 
sense, the present study reconc11es the d1sparate results of past research. 
For the f1rst t1me, the quest1on of the eff1cfency of f1nanc1al futures 
markets 1s adequately addressed. 
CHAPTER IV 
EMPIRICAL TESTS OF FINANCIAL 
FUTURES MARKETS 
Treasury Bond Futures 
Un11ke that of the Treasury bills futures market, adequate testing for 
efficiency in the bond futures market is not possible, since in the bond 
futures market, no unique instrument exists for deHvery. However, the 
performance of the market may be examined in some detail. In general, the 
market assures that yields from maturing a Treasury bond, versus 
purchasing a Treasury bi II and accepting a bond through a long futures 
settlement, are virtually identical. In the following performance analysis, 
the bond in quest ion is the August 15, 200 1 Treasury bond of 8~ coupon 
yield, callable in 1996. The period of analysis begins in January, 1978- at 
which time the Chicago Board of Trade opened trading in the Treasury bond 
futures contract. The test period ends with the June, 1981 contract. After 
that time the bond had less than 15 years untll earliest call, and therefore 
was no longer deliverable. The particular bond was chosen for use in the 
data set because, being an 8% bond, no conversion factor calculations were 
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necessary.' In all of what follows, however, yields are strtctly 
approxtmate, since there 1s no way to guarantee that th1s parttcular bond 
wtll be in fact del1vered 1n settlement. 
Treasury bill data were collected from da1ly editions of the Ylal.l. 
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Street Journal. Treasury bond future contract sett11ng pr1ces were provided 
by the Chicago Board of Trade. B1d and Asked prtces for the 8% August 15 
2001-2006 Treasury bond was downloaded from the Micro Quote database, a 
part or the Compuserve lnformatton servtces database collection. 
In the calculations of descriptive statistics that are presented In this 
chapter, the SAS application MEANS procedure was used. Regression 
coefficients were obtained by using the SAS SYSREG procedure as well as 
the SPSS-X REGRESSION command. Regressions reQuiring corrections for 
serial correlation were performed using the SAS AUTOREG procedure and the 
SPSS-X AREG command. 
The extreme var1abl11ty of actual annual yields from Strategy lA 
settled early may be seen In the box plots of Appendix D, and for each bill 
and bond contract, Appendix G. In Table 4 below, summary statistics are 
presented for each business day that It was possible to make observations 
on two prospective yields: the yield to maturity from outright purchase or a 
particular Treasury bond (YIIB), and the yield to maturity from the purchase 
and maturation of a Treasury bill and the 8% August 2001 Treasury bond 
delivered In fulf111ment of a bond future contract (YIIAB). The naming 
convention w111 be obvious upon referral to Table 2 1n Sect1on II above. The 
variable named (LONGPREM> Is the difference In yields, YIIAB- VII B. Notice 
1 In actual fact, a slight correction Is needed in alternate quarters. However, since the conversion factor 
Is either 1.0000 or .9998, and results In a converted price difference of approximately half a tick ( 112 
of 1/32), It Is Ignored In the calculations. See Chicago Board of Trlde Conversion Factors. Publication No. 
765, Revised (1985, pp. 17-19). 
that the values in the table are based on an assumption, since there is no 
actual reason that this particular Treasury bond w111 be delivered. Yields 
are approximate, and are calculated us1ng St1gum·s method [see St1gum 
< 1981; 136-139)1, whtch ts. for the former yteld, 
y1 = (cY + 1 - P)/[Y- ( 1 - P)(2Y + 1)/41, 
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where y 1 Is the approxtmate yield to maturtty, c ts the coupon yield, Y 1s the 
number of years to maturity, and P 1s the pr1ce of the bond. In calculattng 
yield YIIB, cis 8%, and PIs the asked price of the bond purchased. 
In calculating yield YIIAB. we assume payment of round turn futures 
contract commtsslon ($60) and subtraction of the opportunity cost of 
margin posted to the account <S 1 ,500) wh1le the contract ts tn force. A 
Treasury b111 Is purchased and held ror the number or days unt11 contract 
expiration, at which time the bond Is delivered to the long by the short. The 
formula used to calculate the approximate yield to maturity Is therefore 
weighted by the relative length or time each Instrument Is held. The 
calculation of approximate yield YIIAB is given by the formula 
y2 = [X/(X+Y)][( 1 - Pb)/Pb] + [Y /(X+Y)][(cY + 1 - F)/[Y - { 1 - f){2Y + 1 )/ 41, 
where y2 Is the approximate yield to maturity, X Is the number of years the 
Treasury bill Is held, Pb Is the asked price of the bill, Y Is the number or 
years the bond will have to maturtty upon Its delivery, and F ts the futures 
contract price. 
The two yields are equivalent to the yields from Strategy II and 
Strategy II A, assuming that the bond delivered In contract fulfillment Is the 
same bond to be held outright. In general, the deltvered bond, and thus the 
Strategy IIA yield, w111 not be the same, even If 1t Is cheapest-to-deliver, 
and therefore the yields are only approximately comparable. However, to 
the extent the ytelds are satisfactory proxies ror what might actually 
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occur, the Strategy IIA yteld appears to be sl1ghtly more vartable than 1ts 
counterpart. It also appears to yteld sl1ghtly more than y1eld from Strategy 
II, as would be expected. But perhaps the most str1k1ng 1ndtcat1on from the 
table 1s the near equivalence of the two ytelds. 
TABLE 4 
AVERAGE YIELD TO MATURITY OF 
BOND BOUGHT OUTRIGHT AND 
BOND BOUGHT THROUGH 
BOND FUTURES 
CONTRACT 
VARIABLE 
" 
t'Eflt STfltlARD tiiHII'Ut IIU:II'Ut STD ERROR 
DEUIATIOtf Ufl..lE Ufl..lE (F t'Eflt 
YIIB sao 9.741026 1.2541752 8.035840 12.553994 0.0422782 
Yllfm 880 0.808000 1.2671826 8.060554 12.587870 0.04271&7 
LONOPREM sao 0.007004 O.OS1&021 -o.130098 0.378100 0.001741~ 
The reader can verify that the yields to maturity are close and highly 
correlated be referring to the charts in Appendix C. Usually, but not always, 
the Strategy IIA yield is a few basts points higher than that of Strategy II. 
The two tend to move together, but the spread does widen and narrow at 
times, indicating less than perfect correlation. Care is advisable in 
1nterprettng the yields, however. It is unknown how much of the apparent 
premium in the Strategy IIA yield is due to the greater variability, and how 
much is an arithmetic artifact, due to the calculation of yield from the 
assumed purchase of a bond which will not actually be delivered in futures 
contract settlement. Since the actual bond to be delivered w1111n all 
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probabllity be a different, cheaper bond than the 8% of August 2001, the 
yield to maturity w111 probably be less than it appears tn the data. A proper 
test would mandate the collect ton or data on the actual de11very bond at 
contract expiration. However, except for investors who are perfectly 
prescient, the tdenttty of the de11very bond remains unknown, ex ante 
Another possib11ity would be to collect da11y data on all existing deltvery 
bonds, ftnd the cheapest-to-deliver bond, and assume that the bond would 
still be the cheapest-to-de11ver bond that would actually be delivered on 
contract expiration. 
Even wtth the problems 1n interpretation, one may eas11y tnrer that 
the ytelds to maturities are highly correlated. The regression results in 
Tables indicate the h1gh degree of correlation or the yield of the 
combination bill-bond futures w1th the yield of the bond alone. The t-
statistic for the null hypothesis that the regression parameter on YIIB is 
untty ls 7.3; thus the null hypothesis can be rejected at the 1% significance 
level, tndtcattng that the yield of Strategy IIA exceeds that of Strategy II. 
The root mean squared error 1s only s basts po1nts. The res1duals are h1ghly 
correlated, however, as can be seen from the Durbin-Watson statistic, 
wh1ch may b1as the standard error or the parameter est1mates, but enough 
robustness certainly remains to lndtcate the high degree of tracking of the 
bond by the bond futures contract. 
The variable named DAYTOEXP 1s the number of days remaining before 
contract expiration. The variable's influence is negative, and stgntftcant at 
the 10%, though not the 5% level; but it has only a very small influence on 
the yield to maturity of the combination instrument. Even 90 days from 
contract exptratton, the influence on the yield of Strategy IIA would be only 
-.008 percent per year. 
UMifiLE 
EJl.YIIB 
EFLYIIRB 
H 
TABLE 8 
AVERAGE DAILY YIELD OF BILL-BOND 
FUTURES COMBINATION AND 
BOND BOUGHT OUTRIGHT 
AFTER 21 DAY HOLDING 
PERIOD 
STAtllARD 
DEVIRTIOH 
t11Hitll1 
l..ft.lE 
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30S -1.71310073 50.36466501 -177.8438289 241.0635054 2. 08606046 
~ 2. 42171507 48. 1()()()()309 -135.8145044 183. 1384083 2. 42017384 
Both ytelds are h1ghly var1able. The standard dev1at1on of the y1eld 
from the combtnat1on of the b111 and futures contract settled early 1s 
sltghtly less than that of the bond held alone. due to the stable pos1t1ve 
earntngs of the b111 at ttmes offsett1ng some of the loss on the futures 
contract. and contr1but1ng a smaller 1ncrement to total prof1t. In thts 
per1od of generally rtstng 1nterest rates, netther of the tnvestment 
strateg1es dtd particularly well. The average annual yteld from holding the 
bond for 21 days 1s tn fact negat1ve, and the average y1eld from holdtng the 
comb1nat1on 1s less than that of the b111 alone. Th1s 1s due to the part1cular 
rea11zat1on of 1nterest rates 1n the approx1mately 3 1/2 years of the test. 
In a per1od of generally fa111ng tnterest rates. the bond strategy w111 
average h1gher annual y1elds. However, due to the extreme var1ab111ty of 
y1elds from both strategtes settled early, ne1ther 1s advtsable 1f there 1s an 
apprectable probab111ty of early need for cash.2 
2 They may be good speculative vehicles, for those participants with tastes for the distributions they 
offer. and constraints that do no prohibit their exercise. This can be seen In the range of the annual 
yields. A speculator with the right Liming could have earned 241 percent per year, at least for 21 days, 
from Strategy II and 163 percent per year from Strategy IIA. Speculators with poor timing could have 
lost 178 ( 136) percent per year over 21 days from Strategy II (I lA). 
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In Table 9, the results from regress1ng the early settlement y1eld 
from Strategy IIA on the early settlement y1eld from Strategy II CERLYIIB) 
and the number of days to contract exp1rat1on CDAYTOEXP). Correct ton for 
ser1al correlat1on 1n the res1duals 1s v1a the Cochrane-orcutt method. A 
large port1on of the var1at1on 1n the early settlement y1eld of Strategy IIA 
1s accounted for by the var1at1on 1n the Strategy II early settlement y1eld, 
and the autoregress1ve error process. The results are not un11ke those from 
the prev1ous regress1on, except for two th1ngs: the large mean squared 
error, and the s1gn1f1cance of the DAYTOEXP var1able. The f1rst 1s a natural 
result of the extreme var1at1on tn the rea11zed yteld from owntng bonds or 
bond futures that are settled only 21 bus1ness days after 1ncept1on. The 
second 1s most 11kely a stat1st1cal art1fact- the parameter est1mate, 
although s1gn1f1cantly negat1ve, 1s st111 qu1te small. 
FifO 
R-SORED 
TABLE 9 
REGRESSION OF DAILY YIELD OF BILL -BOND 
FUTURES COMBINATION ON BOND 
BOUGHT OUTRIGHT AFTER 
21 DAY HOLDING PERIOD 
.43697474 STflllARD EfRJR (F RHO 
.Q5885178 STFKfiRD ERFOI 
Dlfm I H-~TS(If 2.2775016 
DF Sl.l1 OF SQUARES t£Att SQUARE 
REOAESS I ott 2 31194:S.09 1:s:s972. 84 
RESIDlR.S 390 13386.86 34.33 
B SEB BETA T 
ERLYIIB .7033621 .00837510 .0756Q502 04.728724 
DAYTOEXP -.0972234 • ()2652g() 1 -.03774701 -3.664795 
CCJtSTAtiT 6.6744382 .94150226 7.089137 
.04:548834 
5.8587772 
SIG T 
.00000000 
.00028203 
.00000000 
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Table 10 presents the results from regresstng the change 1n the early 
settlement yteld from Strategy IIA <DEYIIAB) on the early settlement y1eld 
from Strategy II CDEYIIB) and the number of days to contract exp1ratton 
(DAYTOEXP). The early settlement y1elds, although not tted as closely 
together as the ytelds to maturtty (see Table 4), are closely related. 
TABLE 10 
REGRESSION OF DAILY YIELD OF BILL -BOND 
FUTURES COMBINATION ON YIELD OF 
BOND BOUGHT OUTRIGHT AFTER 
21 DAY HOLDING PERIOD: 
FIRST DIFFERENCES 
tiODEL: tiODELO 1 SSE 18281. 10 
DFE 391 
DEP UAR: DEY II AB t1SE 46.754991 
OURBIH-UATSOH 0 STATISTIC • 2.9369 
FIRST ORDER AUToca:fiELAT I tit • -o. 46Q8 
F'ffA'E I ER STfKifiiD 
UAR I ABLE DF EST I MTE ERRtfC 
INTERCEPT 
DEYIIB 
OOYTOEXP 
1 -o.014840 
1 0.739775 
1 0. 0007103723 
0.~ 
0.019988 
0.020401 
F RATIO 
PROB>F 
R-~ 
T RATIO 
-o.0214 
37.0112 
0.0348 
OSQ.42 
0.0001 
0.1791 
PROB>ITI 
0.9830 
0.0001 
0.9722 
Even though the results are contaminated by the fact that the test 
instrument may not be at all t1mes cheapest-to-deliver, and therefore not 
the bond actually delivered, one may easily infer that the yields to 
maturities are highly correlated. The regression results in Tables 4-10 
indicate the high degree of correlation of the expected yield of the 
combination bill-bond futures with the yield of the bond alone. The results 
also indicate the close associat1on of the simulated early settlement yields 
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note futures comb1nat1on 1s more variable than the real-note equivalent, and 
to a greater degree of d1fference than that of the bond contracts. some of 
the difference In varlab111ty Is due to the different test Interval, but how 
much Is not clear. 
TABLE 11 
AVERAGE YIELD TO MATURITY OF 
NOTE BOUGHT OUTRIGHT AND 
NOTE BOUGHT THROUGH 
NOTE FUTURES 
CONTRACT 
UARIABLE 
" 
t£Att STFKIAFID t11Hitu1 t1AXItu1 STD ERfUS 
IEVIRTiott URL.l£ Ufl.l£ OF t£Rt 
YIIH ns 11.~ 1.~ 9.~1 14.~ 0.~ 
Yllflt 735 12.598'N 1.0992306 10.631SS 15.21567 0.0405457 
LotiOPREtl 735 0.63314 0.4452687 -o.15875 1.42272 0.0164240 
This note and the futures settlfng price are quite closely related, as 
can be seen from Table 12. The root mean squared error Is 45 basis points, 
much higher than that of the bond contracts- but then the term to maturity 
is shorter for the note than for the bond. The note futures market clearly 
tracks the test note less accurately than the bond contract tracked the test 
bond (see Table 5). That this is so can also be seen by referring to Appendix 
B (Treasury note contracts) and Appendix C (bond contracts) together. The 
regression results fn Table 12 are not corrected for autocorrelation of the 
residuals. 
TABLE 12 
REGRESSION OF YIELD TO MATURITY OF 
BILL -NOTE FUTURES COMBINATION 
ON Yl ELD OF NOTE BOUGHT 
OUTRIGHT 
MOOEL: m:JEL01 SSE 145.018348 
rFE 732 
DEP t.Wl: Yllflf t1SE 0. 198112 
DURBIN-WATSON D STATISTIC = 0.0178 
FIRST ORDER IIJTOCORREL.AT I (It • · 0. 0807 
·. PfiW£TER STFIIlfR) 
t.Wll ABLE DF EST lttATE ERFOl 
INIERCEPt 
YIIN 
OAYTOEXP 
1 0. 90784~ 0. 194201 
1 0.070451 0.015006 
1 -o. 000656869 0. 0007018878 
F RATIO 
PFOl>F 
R-sw:IE 
T RATIO 
4.0748 
01.1043 
-o.~ 
1872.37 
0.0001 
0.8365 
PID>ITI 
0.0001 
0.0001 
0.3407 
83 
After correction for serially correlated residuals, the results 
reported in Table 13 are obtained. The serial correlation correction 
procedure lowers the R2 statistic slightly, and makes the estimate of the 
effect of the actual note's yield (YIIN) higher, although slightly less 
significant. Approximately 80 percent of the variation in the prospective 
Strategy IIA yield to maturity is captured by the concurrent note yield (and 
the autocorrelation in YIIAN itself). However, most of the reduction in the 
mean squared error fs seen to be due to the autocorrelation term; the value 
of RHO is very high, although the hypothesis the VII AN is a random walk, 
with RHO= 1, can be rejected at the 10%, although not at the 5% level of 
significance. Clearly much of the predictive power of the model ts due to 
the autoregressive process. It is evtdent, however, that there remains a 
close connection between the yields, and that the number of days prior to 
contract expiration is of no significant influence on the bt11-note future 
yteld. 
fH) 
R-S(QIE) 
TABLE 13 
REGRESSION OF YIELD TO MATURITY OF 
BILL -NOTE FUTURES COMBINATION 
ON Yl ELD OF NOTE BOUGHT 
OUTRIGHT, CORRECTED 
FOR RESIDUAL AUTO-
CORRELATION 
.9916953 STFttlfR) ERR(Il (F fHl 
.7972975 FIUJSTED R-SQlH£0 
STAtDRJ EMOR .~177 DlfiB I rHflT&tl 
DF stlt (F SQlRES t£flt SQtWE 
REGRESS I Ott 2 8.8768998 4.4384499 
RESIIX.R..S 730 2.2568361 .0030016 
B SEB BETA T 
YIIH 1. 1809700 .02203970 .89286711 53.581666 
DRYTOEXP .0001~ .00019037 .0127&\89 .7e&J31 
COOSTAHT -1.2663224 .35200138 -3.506573 
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.0047568 
• 79646447 
2.~ 
SIG T 
.00000000 
.44~ 
.00034439 
Taking first differences of the yield variables does not change the 
results appreciably. In Table 14, the value of the autoregressive coefficient 
is smaller, but the root mean square error is about the same. The dependent 
variable is the first difference of the yield to maturity of the Treasury bill 
and the test note pur~hased via contract ownership, DYIIN 1s the first 
difference of the yield to maturity of the test note, and DAYTOEXP is the 
number of days until contract expiration. DAYTOEXP remains insignificant, 
and DYIIN significantly positive. The implication again is the close 
connection of the futures price and the price of the test note. 
TABLE 14 
REGRESSION OF YIELD TO MATURITY OF 
BILL -NOTE FUTURES COMBINATION 
ON YIELD OF NOTE BOUGHT 
OUTRIGHT: FIRST 
DIFFERENCES 
EST I tllTES c:F Tt£ AUTOREGAESSI UE PffWETERS 
LAG ctEFF I C I Em STD ERROR T RAT I 0 
1 0.34299254 0.03476646 9.865615 
SSE 1.QQ6362 IFE 730 
t1SE 0. 002734743 ROOT I1SE 0.0522947? 
SBC -2226.35 AIC -2244.74 
REG RSQ 0.8457 TOTR.. RSQ 0.8213 
WIRIFB.E I:F B Wl.lE STD ERROR T RAT 10 APPROX PFD 
INIEfU>f 1 0.~ 0.0031~ o.m 0.4~ 
DYIIM 1 1.20187044 0.01g()3g654 &3.1~ O.OO:l1 
DAYTOEXP 1 5. 07943E-o7 0.0000628212 0.008 0.9936 
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In the event of early settlement, the yields from the note posltions, 
as in the case of bonds, are qulte variable, although slightly less variable 
than for the bond futures market. The artif1cial note yield, settled early, is 
presented in Table 15 as ERLYIIAN, and 1s more variable than the early-
settlement yield from the test note, ERLYIIN. This is not true of the bond 
futures market wfth early settlement. Unlike the bond futures market, the 
mean early-settlement yield of the note exceeds -s11ghtly- that of the bill-
futures combination. However, the pooled standard error of the mean, for 
the note futures market, is approximately 1.75. The hypothesis that the two 
means are equal cannot be rejected. The same is true in the bond futures 
market, where the pooled standard error of means is 2.7. The insignificant 
differences in yields may be due to the different interest rate environments 
in the two test periods. 
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TABLE 15 
AVERAGE EARLY SETTLEMENT YIELD OF NOTE 
BOUGHT OUTRIGHT AND BILL-NOTE 
FUTURES COMBINATION AFTER 
21 DAY HOLDING PERIOD 
UflliRBLE 
" 
rEfit STfiUfiO 111HUUI tm:ltu1 STD ERROR 
DEUIATUit UfLlE UfLlE (F tEfft 
EFLYIIH 430 16.337 31.19810 -49.853 104.732 1.50451 
EFd...YIIAH 430 16.042 41.23412 -68.416 127.400 1.08045 
The test note ts connected QU1te closely to the futures contract, as 
may be seen from Table 16. The vartables are as deftned tn Table 15, and 
the regresston correct ton, by the Cochrane-Orcutt gr1d method or the SPSS-
X AREG procedure, corrects for s1gn1f1cant sertal autocorrelatton. The y1eld 
from early note sale 1s pos1t1vely and s1gn1f1cantly related to the y1eld from 
early b111 sale and closure or the note contract. The root mean sQuared error 
1s large, at 477 basts potnts, although smaller than that or the bond 
contract test. The DAYTOEXP vartable ts s1gntf1cantly and postttvely related 
to ERL YIIAN, 1ndtcat1ng that, dur1ng the test per1od, as the exp1rat1on date or 
a part1cular contract approached, and DAYTOEXP decltned, the early 
settlement yteld tended to decltne, at the rate or about 11 basts potnts per 
day,± 5 basts po1nts. Thts 1s so much smaller than the root mean sQuared 
error value, however, that the effect does not 1nd1cate a prof1table 
opportun1ty. The oppostte ts the case ror the bond contracts. There, as 
DAYTOEXP decl1ned, the early settlement yteld tended to tncrease. Th1s 
leads to the conclus1on that the relat1onsh1p 1n both cases 1s spur1ous. 
s1gn1T1cant only because or the part1cular 1nterest rate env1ronment. 
TABLE 16 
REGRESSION OF EARLY SETTLEMENT YIELD 
OF BILL -NOTE FUTURES COMBINATION 
ON ACTUAL NOTE VI ELD AFTER 
21 DAY HOLDING PERIOD 
EST ll'fiTES OF 11£ MOREGRESS I UE PfR 1'E I ERS 
LAG ctEFF I C I EHT STD ERFD T RAT I 0 
1 -o. 67890623 0. 03551332 -19.084704 
SSE 0700.40 DFE 426 
t1SE 22.7711 ROOT t1SE 4.771908 
SBC 2585.103 RIC 2568.848 
REG RSQ 0.9319 TOTR.. RSQ 0.9967 
UARIRBLE tF B '-R.lE STD ERFD T RAT I 0 RPPROX PROO 
IHTERCPT 1 -8.46446045 1.06214419 -7.969 0.0001 
ER.YIItt 1 1.31233050 0.01779303 73.703 0.0001 
DAYTOEXP 1 0.10711007 0.02741692 3.907 0.0001 
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In Table 17, the dependent var1able 1s the f1rst d1fference of the early 
settlement y1eld of the art1f1c1a11nstrument composed of a Treasury b111 
and a long Treasury note futures pos1t1on. The regress1on results are 
corrected for rtrst-order ser1a11y correlated res1duals. The regress1on 1s 
s1gn1f1cant. and the concurrent early settlement y1eld of the note 1s a 
s1gn1f1cant and pos1t1ve 1nfluence. 1n the f1rst d1fferences, on the art1f1c1al 
1nstrument y1eld. The number of days that rema1n before contract 
exp1rat1on (DAYTOEXP) rema1ns a s1gn1f1cant pred1ctor. but w1th an even 
smaller coeff1c1ent. The unexpla1ned var1at1on 1s qu1te large, even though 
70% of the total var1at1on 1s accounted for by the regress1on- the root mean 
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squared error 1s 695 basts potnts. In the case of Treasury notes, 1t seems, 
the Treasury btll, so1d before matur1ty, 1s 1nfluenced 1n the same manner as 
the Treasury note contract, but tn an oppos1te manner 1n the case of the bond 
contracts. Th1s ts one way to account for the h1gher vartatton of the 
arttf1cta1 note pos1tton versus the rea1 note posit ton, and the regresston 
coefftctent 1arger than one, whereas the oppostte ts the case for the 
Treasury bond market. However, at 1east some of the d1fferent1a1 vartatton 
ts due to the dtfferent tnterest rate envtronment. 
TABLE 17 
REGRESSION OF EARLY SETTLEMENT YIELD 
OF BILL-NOTE FUTURES COMBINATION 
ON ACTUAL NOTE YIELD AFTER 
21 DAY HOLDING PERIOD: 
FIRST DIFFERENCES 
EST IMTES (F n£ AUTOOEGRESS IUE PfRft IERS 
LAG COEFF I C I EHT STD EfRfl T RAT I 0 
1 0. 13613710 0. 04805552 2. 832913 
SSE 20548.18 DFE 42S 
t1SE 48.34865 ROOT t1SE 6.953319 
sec 2901.54S RIC 298S.299 
REG RSQ 0.701~ TOTfl.. RSQ 0.~ 
VARIABLE DF B UFI..lE STD EfRfl T RAT I 0 ffiPROX PR08 
IHTERCPT 1 -1 . 1300602S 0. 6S7707030 -1.710 0.0863 
IH..YIIH 1 1.32283249 0. 042153523 31.381 0.0001 
DRYTOEXP 1 0.00541466 0. 020190001 3.240 0.0013 
Bond Futures and Note Futures: 
A Summary 
89 
As ts the case in the bond complex, the particular note used as the 
test instrument may not be at all times Cor even momentarily) cheapest-to-
deliver, and therefore not the note actually delivered. However, the results 
do 1ndicate that the yields to maturity are highly correlated. The regression 
results 1n Tables 12-17 indicate the high degree of correlation of the 
expected yield of the combination instrument (long Treasury bill -short 
Treasury note futures) with the yield of the note alone. The results also 
indicate the close association of the simulated early settlement yield 
levels of the two note instruments; though clearly the association is not as 
close as in the case of Treasury bonds (compare Tables 5 and 6 with Tables 
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9 and 1 0). The correlation of first-differenced yields 1s h1gh in both cases, 
but h1gher 1n the case or notes than bonds, as may be seen by compar1ng 
Tables 7 and 14. Compared to bonds, the mean yields on the real note and 
the arttftctal note are qutte stgntflcantly different. In the bond complex, 
the ex ante ytelds are only 5 basts points apart, and the difference 1s not 
significant. In the case of notes, the yield on the art1f1c1a11nstrument 
exceeds the yield on the real note by 63 basts potnts, or approximately 16 
standard deviations (compare Table 4 wtth Table 11 ). What can account for 
these sim11arities and differences? 
Short term Interest rates are often seen to change In Isolation from 
long term rates. Thus early settlement of the artif1ctal bond Instrument, 
composed of a b111 and a bond futures position, contains a degree of 
unsystematic risk, vts-a-vts the real bond. However, Treasury notes, being 
shorter-term ob11gations, are 1nfluenced by the same information that 
tnfluences Treasury btlls. Yields on notes are less often observed to 
fluctuate randomly with respect to b111s than are yields on bonds. The 
degree of unsystematic variation Is lower tn the case of the arttrlclal note 
Instrument than tn the case of bonds. 
That thts ts so ts evident tn the data. A comparison or Table 8 wtth 
Table 15 shows that, upon simulated early settlement, the stattsttcs of 
variation for the actual bond yteld CERLYIIB) are higher than those of the 
arttflclal bond (ERLYIIAB). The standard deviation of ERLYIIB Is 23 percent 
htgher than that of ERLYIIAB. The range, or tnterval between maximum and 
minimum values, 1s 31 percent higher, and the standard error of the mean 1s 
24 percent higher. The opposite is true 1n the case of notes. For the note 
complex, the variation of the simulated early settlement yield of the 
art1ftc1a1 note <ERLYIIAN) exceeds that of the real note <ERLYIIN). The 
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standard deviation of ERLYIIAN is 32 percent higher than that of ERLYIIN. 
The range, or Interval between maximum and minimum values, 1s 26 percent 
h1gher, and the standard error of the mean 1s 33 percent h1gher. 
By the theory developed In Chapter II, we are lead to expect that an 
asset that is more variable than its functional counterpart w111, if the 
market 1s efficient, offer a higher yield to investors. The existence of a 
different distribution of returns makes the assets Imperfectly 
substitutable. This Is what ts observed tn the data. 
The data also offer the inference of a corollary: the more the 
d1str1but1on of returns of an art1f1c1al asset differs from that of 1ts 
functional counterpart, the greater the difference 1n ex ante yields, If the 
market is efficient. Recognizing that the instruments are Imperfect 
substitutes, therefore, the data are consistent wtth the hypothesis that the 
Treasury note and Treasury bond futures markets are eff1cient. 
Treasury Bill Futures 
Treasury bill and Treasury bill futures data were collected from the 
Wall Street Journa 1. The data begins on January 6, 1976, when contract 
trading began, and extends through December, 1985. All existing 
arbitragable opportunities are included. 
Table 18 displays the date and number of days until contract 
expiration that the last profitable arbitrage could have been entered, for 
each contract. An H indicates the futures discount is above the upper 
arbitrage limit; an L, that 1t is below the lower arbitrage limit. Since an L 
indicates that a contract's discount is too low, or that its price is too dear 
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to prevent profitable arbttrage, the capture of proftt 1mp11es the purchase 
of Strategy lA financed by the sale of Strategy 1. If the contract discount is 
above the upper 11m1t ror successful arb1trage, an H 1s d1splayed, 1nd1cat1ng 
the profitable purchase of Strategy IIA financed by the sale of Strategy II. 
Of the 40 contracts displayed, 27 involve the former arbitrage, while 13 
involve the latter. lnterest1ngly, 8 of the latter arbitrage opportunities 
occurred 1n the october, 1979 -1982 period of nonborrowed reserve 
management. 
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TABLE 18 
NUMBER OF DAYS PRIOR TO CONTRACT 
EXPIRATION OF LAST PROFITABLE 
FUTURES CONTRACT ARBITRAGE 
em Expdate tto.date H.i.LI.2 l'lma 
1 19t'fiR76 oelmR76 L 48 
2 ~ 23-.Um L 34 
3 23SEP76 22SEP76 L 83 
4 23DEC76 22DEC76 L 23 
5 24tm17 23t'Rl17 H 72 
6 23..Ut77 22..ut77 L 34 
7 22SEP17 21SEP17 L 24 
8 22DEC17 200EC17 L 16 
g 23tiAR79 2211AR79 L 17 
10 22..DI78 21..ut78 L 1 
11 21SEP78 10SEP78 L 24 
12 21DEC79 19DEC79 H 6 
13 22tm79 21tm79 L 34 
14 21~ 1o..ut70 H 2 
1~ 20SEP79 19SEPN H 1 
16 200EC79 191EC79 H 1 
17 20ttAR90 19t'INO L 1 
18 1~ 17~ H 8 
10 18SEP80 16SEPSO H 10 
20 18DEC80 16DEC80 H 2 
21 1911AR81 17mR81 H 2 
22 1~1 1M.It81 H 2 
23 24SEP81 22SEP81 L 6 
24 24DEC81 14tE81 H 13 
25 1~ 16mR82 L 13 
~ 17~ 1~ L 10 
27 16SEP82 14SEP82 H 2 
28 16DEC82 14DEC82 L 7 
29 17mR83 15t1RR83 L 20 
30 1e...ut83 ~ L 23 
31 1SSEP83 31Alm3 L 1:5 
32 151EC83 13DEC83 L 2 
33 1511AR94 13t'fl&f L 7 
34 14..ut84 oe...ut84 L 8 
35 13SEP84 11SEP84 L 2 
36 13DEC94 11DEC84 L 3 
37 1411AR85 12mR85 L 6 
38 13..Ui85 05..Mm H 8 
39 12SEP8:5 1~ L 2 
40 12JEC85 27tOJ85 L 15 
In Table 19, the mean futures discount (Mean-C) ts compared to the 
mean upper (Mean-U) and lower (Mean-L) arbitrage limits, for each contract. 
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The reader w111 notice that the f1rst seven contracts and the March and June, 
1979 and September, 1980 contracts g1ve ev1dence of eff1c1ency, but for 
others, the mean futures d1scount 1s outs1de - and lower than - the mean 
arbitrage 11m1ts. 
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TABLE 19 
MEAN UPPER AND LOWER ARBITRAGE 
LIMITS AND MEAN BILL FUTURES 
CONTRACT DISCOUNT -YIELD 
DBl £xpdate t1ecn-U t1aqri. l1ean-C H. 
1 181'1AR7G ~.~ ~.0300 ~. 1100 43 
2 2Yif76 ~.6027 5.3'NS 5.4814 64 
3 23SEP76 5.5915 5.3529 5.4387 63 
4 23DEC76 5.0555 4.8369 4.8435 62 
5 24tllm 4.Q521 4.7287 4.8070 63 
0 2MJf77 ~.2303 4.9873 5.0484 04 
7 22SEP77 5.767G 5.5366 5.5835 63 
8 22DEC77 6.6157 6.3818 6.2771 63 
g 23mR78 0.~ 0.0240 0.~ 02 
10 22Jlli78 7.02Q6 6.7680 6.7575 64 
11 21SEP78 7.6Q62 7.4071 7.3311 62 
12 21DEC78 Q. 1381 8.7331 8.6853 62 
13 22t1AR'N 0.6735 0.3600 0.4110 62 
14 21Jltl70 0.0099 Q.3144 0.3784 63 
15 20SEP79 9.7106 9.4109 0.3775 M 
16 200EC79 12.0225 11.5555 11.4172 61 
17 2(J1AR80 13.3282 12.gogQ 12.0400 01 
18 1~ 10.8446 10.2663 10.2156 61 
1Q 18SEP80 8.9878 8.5609 8.7487 63 
20 180EC80 13.5624 13.0902 12.8198 61 
21 1011AR81 13.0075 13.2794 12.8040 120 
22 1&.Ut81 14.4683 14.0311 13.9730 63 
23 24SEP81 15.4261 15.0219 14.3922 63 
24 24DEC81 14.2802 13.7204 13.0755 118 
~ 1amRS2 13.~1 13.1098 12.0:S02 122 
26 17.lli82 12.0195 12.5058 12.2538 63 
27 16SEP82 11.3883 10.994Q 10.0386 63 
28 16DEC82 Q.0768 8.7635 8.2428 61 
20 1711AR83 8.3303 8.0431 7.0575 63 
30 1CU.ti83 8.~40 8.3401 8.3422 ~ 
31 15SEP83 0.5981 9.3697 9.3542 55 
32 15DEC83 Q. 1921 8.CJ817 8.9578 60 
33 1:51"R184 0.4024 0.2188 Q. 1711 01 
34 14.lli84 10.2018 10.1035 10.0502 s 
3S 13SEP84 10.9092 10.7m 10.5652 62 
36 130EC84 0.8481 0.6699 9.3446 61 
37 14MAR8S 8.S010 8.3747 8.2622 60 
38 13..Jll'm 8.3830 8.2m 8.0070 ~ 
30 12SEP85 7.3628 7.2226 7.1002 63 
40 12DEC85 7.5513 7.4054 7.1330 53 
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TABLE 20 
NUMBER OF DAYS CONTRACT DISCOUNT 
IS OUTSIDE LIMITS OF PROFIT ABLE 
ARBITRAGE 
Of§. EXPOBTE tlllit IUIJl tU1TOTtJ. 
1 18mR76 0 7 43 
2 24..l.lf16 0 8 64 
3 23SEP76 0 3 63 
4 23lEC76 0 29 62 
5 24t1AR77 1 8 63 
0 2M.tl77 1 12 64 
7 22SEP77 0 12 63 
8 2ZEC77 0 53 63 
g 23tffl78 0 4~ 02 
10 22.DI78 0 37 64 
11 21SEP78 0 38 62 
12 21~C78 5 36 62 
13 22t1AR70 0 14 62 
14 21.J.ti'N 2 14 63 
15 20SEP79 1 35 64 
16 200EC7Q 2 42 61 
17 20tlfi80 3 44 01 
18 1~ 2 38 61 
19 18SEP80 9 8 63 
20 1~C80 1 49 61 
21 1otiN1 2 go 120 
22 1EU.tt81 10 :r7 03 
23 24SEP81 0 61 63 
24 241EC81 2 101 118 
2S 18mR82 1 101 122 
26 17..ut82 0 47 63 
27 16SEP82 18 36 63 
28 160EC82 0 53 61 
20 17MAR83 0 43 63 
30 1~ 1 34 s 
31 15SEP83 0 29 55 
32 15[EC83 0 34 60 
33 1MRM 0 48 01 
34 14..Ui84 1 47 so 
35 13SEP&f 1 55 62 
36 13DEC84 0 60 61 
:r7 14t1ARS5 0 51 60 
38 1~ 3 ~ ~ 
39 12SEP85 0 59 63 
40 12DEC85 0 53 53 
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TABLE 21 
MEAN DIVERGENCE OF FUTURES 
DISCOUNT FROM IMPLICIT 
FORWARD RATE 
OBS EXPOOTE DIUt£Att DIUSID T H 
1 18MAR76 -o.08173 0.0129258 -6.323 43 
2 24Jllt76 -o.05468 0.0091710 -5.962 64 
3 23SEP76 -o.03349 0.0055807 -6.001 63 
4 23DEC~ -o. 10203 0.0092079 -11. 14~ G2 
5 24ttfll71 -o.03343 0.0084525 -3.954 63 
6 nom -o.06039 0.0107172 -5.634 64 
7 22SEP77 -o.06860 0.0078258 -8.765 63 
8 22DEC77 -o.22160 0.0120246 -17. 145 63 
9 231'11R78 -o.16969 0.0120800 -14.047 G2 
10 22'-'lt78 -o. 14175 0.0160805 -8.815 64 
11 21SEP78 -o.22048 0.0252463 -8.733 62 
12 211EC78 -o.~ 0.03~1 -e.rm fa 
13 22t'IAR70 -o.10577 0.0146055 -7.242 62 
14 21~ -o.08373 0.0122920 -6.812 63 
15 20SEP79 -o.18326 0.0267643 -6.847 64 
16 200EC70 -o.37181 0.0370681 -o.703 61 
17 201M80 -o.47247 O.<m2499 -e.~ 01 
18 1Uit80 -o.33988 0.0393096 -8.646 61 
19 18SEP80 -o.02563 0.022551? -1. 136 63 
20 18DEC80 -o.~ 0.0381090 -13.270 01 
21 1QI1AR81 -o.60885 0.0515867 -13.547 120 
22 1~1 -o.27669 0.045198& -6. 122 63 
23 24SEP81 -o.83177 0.0443761 -18.744 63 
24 24DEC81 -o.02480 0.0521686 -17.727 118 
~ 1emR82 -o.72023 0.0449041 -10. 1~1 122 
26 17~ -o.45881 0.0399605 -11.482 63 
27 16SEP82 -o.25306 0.0655882 -3.858 63 
28 101EC82 -o.0773:5 0.0822rJ31 -8.234 a1 
2Q 1711AR83 -o.23388 0.0102823 -12. 120 63 
30 1~ -o. 11831 0.0132719 -8.915 59 
31 15SEP83 -o.12974 0.0127521 -10. 174 55 
32 15DEC83 -o.12006 0.0112528 -11.460 60 
33 1:511AR84 -o.1394~ .0.0094078 -14.823 01 
34 1YJIM -o.13847 0.0105049 -13. 181 59 
35 13SEP94 -o.25407 0.0209572 -12. 123 62 
30 13DEC84 -o.41437 0.01~ -21.519 61 
37 14t1AR85 -o. 17610 0.0161852 -10.880 60 
38 13-..U185 -o.24107 0.0242486 -9.942 59 
39 12SEP85 -o. 19254 0.0095985 -20.059 63 
40 12EEC85 -o.~ 0.0080907 -39.737 53 
It ts clear that the contract dtscount ts usually below the lower 11mtt 
for arbitrage. In Table 22 the reader may ascertain the stgntftcance of that 
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occurrence. The mean divergence of each contract's discount below the 
lower arb1trage 11m1t CDI VLOWJ1), the standard error of each CDI VLOWSE) 
and the Student's t-stattsttc for each CDIVLOW_T) under the hypothesis that 
each 1s zero are presented. Only those dates where the futures discount ts 
lower than the lower arbitrage limit are Included. For all contracts, the 
mean divergence of the contract discount Is significantly lower than the 
lower arbitrage 11m1t. 
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TABLE 22 
MEAN 01 VERGENCE OF FUTURES 
DISCOUNT BELOW LOWER 
ARBITRAGE LIMIT 
(liS ~TE DIUI..(ILJ'I DIUL.(JISE DIUL.a.LT H 
1 18MAR70 -o.OOM6 O.OOQ2427 -3.~ 7 
2 2Y.Ii76 -o.01685 0.0054172 -3.111 8 
3 23SEP76 -o.02302 0.0042293 -5.442 3 
4 23DEC70 -o.04020 0.~738 -7.733 29 
5 241'm77 -o.06650 0.0141661 -4.694 8 
·t; aum -o.04132 0.0092295 -4.477 12 
7 22SEP77 -o.04849 0.0082407 -5.884 12 
8 22DEC77 -o.13138 0.0075618 -17.374 33 
9 23tlfl=l78 -o.08970 0.0100636 -8.913 4~ 
10 22..ut78 -o.08908 0.0102346 -8.703 37 
11 21SEP78 -o.20978 0.0196940 -10.652 38 
12 21DEC78 -o.~ O.m7003 -9.984 ~ 
13 22t'lm70 -o.10705 0.0411()2C;a -2.626 14 
14 21~ -o.05238 0.0086811 -6.034 14 
15 20SEP79 -o.17542 0.0285746 -6.139 35 
16 20DEC70 -o.30572 0.0317770 -9.621 42 
17 2(J1AR80 -o.46019 0.0454316 -10.201 44 
18 1~ -o.21308 0.0301056 -7.057 38 
19 18SEP90 -o.11961 0.0315173 -3.795 8 
20 18DEC80 -o.~ 0.0322014 -11.487 49 
21 1ot'IM81 -o.62012 0.0401577 -13.435 go 
22 1&.Ut81 -o.28330 0.0337094 -8.389 37 
23 24SEP81 -o.65351 0.0371695 -17.582 61 
24 24DEC91 -o.78351 0.0421200 -18.601 101 
~ 18MAR82 -o.~ 0.0375560 -1~.283 101 
20 17~ -o.38202 0.0299402 -12.759 47 
27 16SEP82 -o.41623 0.0391413 -10.634 36 
28 10DEC82 -o.~ 0.082054~ -7.338 33 
~ 1711AR83 -o. 16273 0.0131248 -12.3QO 43 
30 1M.ltt83 -o.06850 0.0105379 -6.501 34 
31 15SEP83 -o.08568 0.0154895 -5.532 29 
32 15DEC83 -o.07518 0.0003867 -8.000 34 
33 1511AR84 -o.071:s9 0.00:59983 -11.~ 48 
34 1~ -o.06827 0.0081982 -8.327 47 
35 13SEP84 -o. 1995:5 0.0147057 -13.S70 55 
~ 130EC84 -o.33109 0.0179388 -18.430 60 
37 14mR85 -o. 13305 0.0313707 -4.260 ~1 
38 1~ -o.20429 0.0151125 -13.518 53 
39 12SEP85 -o. 13294 0.0077182 -17.224 59 
40 12DEC85 -o.27243 0.0091152 -29.887 53 
Although the rutures d1scount appears s1gn1rtcantly d1fferent rrom 
the 1mp11c1t forward rate, 1t 1s not 1ndependent or that rate. In a regress1on 
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of the Treasury bill futures discount (F) on the 1mp11c1t forward rate 
(IMPLICIT) and the number of days unt11 contract expiration (N), the 
parameter esttmates shown below were obta1ned. All predictors are 
stgntf1cantly nonzero and are shown after correction for autocorrelation. 
Standard errors of the regression parameters are In parentheses below the1r 
respective values. 
F = .85 + .841MPLICIT - .003N 
{.40) (.08) (.0005) 
R2 = .77 RMSE = .06 
Arbitrage may be occurring, but since the arbitrage is asymmetric 
with regard to the r1sk of default and costs of early settlement, the 
implicit forward rate overstates the equ111brium futures discount by the 
amount of the compensation for this d1fferent1alin risk. 
To see the effects of different monetary regimes on the divergence of 
futures discounts from the implic1t rateJ the data are divided into three 
sub-periods corresponding to the different regimes: pr1or to October 1979; 
October 1979 to December 1982; and post-1982; and assume that the 
divergence depends, among other things, on the current inflation rate and 
the expected and unexpected changes tn the money stock. The regression 
equation assumed is 
D = ao + aP + bMe + eMu + e. 
where D ts the divergence of the futures discount from the implicit rate, P 
is the actualtnf1atton rate, Me Is the expected change in the money stock 
(the MMS median), Mu is the unexpected change in the money stock (the 
actual change in M 1 minus Me)J and e is an error term. The actual inflation 
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rate variable (P) ts formed as an annualtzed three-month moving average of 
the growth rate of the Consumer Prtce Index. Regresston results are 
reported 1n Table 23. 
TABLE 23 
REGRESSION OF DIVERGENCE OF FUTURES DISCOUNT 
FROM IMPLICIT FORWARD RATE ON ACTUAL 
INFLATION, EXPECTED MONEY GROWTH 
Period 
Pre -1979 
1979-1982 
Post-1982 
AND UNEXPECTED MONEY GROWTH. 
Rt1SE 
.08 
.26 
.08 
R2 
.003 
.012 
.015 
Inflation 
.006 
-.02** 
.009 
tt1S 
.002 -.~ 
-.01 -.02* 
.010 .001 
Expected changes in the money stock, as 1mp11ed in the MMS median 
forecasts, seem to have no impact on the divergence of the futures 
discounts from the imp11cit rate, in any of the sub-periods. However, during 
the period when the Federal Reserve was using nonborrowed reserves as 1ts 
response variable, both unexpected money increases and inflation rate 
increases were associated with a larger divergence of contract discounts 
from the imp11c1t forward rate. It is possible that, during this period, 
increases in inflation rates could have prompted expectations of monetary 
tightening, decreasing the slope of the yield curve and making futures 
strategies more attractive. Also, if unexpected monetary increases 
promised compensatory tightening by the Federal Reserve during the middle 
period, similar processes could have depressed contract discounts further 
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below 1mp11c1t forward rates.3 However, the effects are not powerful; only 
a small part of the total variation of the divergence 1s explained by current 
1nflat1on rates and monetary surpr1ses. If the hypothes1zed relattonshtps do 
in fact ex 1st, they are not well captured 1n contemporaneous values of the 
variables 1n question. 
Table 24 presents the results of Individual regressions for each 
contract, for periods when both Treasury bill data and 1"115 data are 
available. Lag l(L) is the lower arbitrage 11m1t, lagged one day. UNEX 
represents the unexpected component of the weekly change In the money 
stock, Interpolated to yield datly changes. DAYTOEXP Is the number of days 
unt11 contract expiration, and INT Is the Intercept term. An asterisk 
Indicates at least the .OS confidence JeveJ. 
3 It is also possible that the observed relationships between inflation and the divergence, and/or 
unexpected monetary changes and the divergence are simply spurious. The middle period saw Inflation 
rates peak and then decline, and both interest rates and monetary growth rates become much more 
volatile. The problem of spurious relationships in lime series cannot be ruled out, but also is not unique to 
the present study. 
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TABLE 24 
REGRESSION OF DIVERGENCE OF FUTURES DISCOUNT 
BELOW IMPLICIT FORWARD RATE ON LAGGED 
LOWER ARBITRAGE LIMIT, UNEXPECTED 
MONEY GROWTH AND NUMBER OF 
DAYS UNTIL CONTRACT 
EXPIRATION 
OBS EXPDATE ST.DEU Lag1(L) lJ£X DAYTOEXP IHT 
1 22DEC77 0.042460 -o.36228* -o.001326 -o.000916* 2. 1304* 
2 231'M78 0.03~ -o.18199* 0.00011:5 -o. 00 17:53* 1.1200* 
3 22"'-'i78 0.()83915 -o.60404* -o.000930 -o.000342* 3.9640* 
4 21SEP78 0.094607 -o.08324* 0.036316* -o.006081* 0.6996* 
:5 21DEC78 0.162763 -o.614:58* -o.006008 -o. OOQ9()9* ~.:5679* 
6 ~'N 0.081065 -o. 18158* -o.022154* -o.001331* 1.62®* 
7 21~ 0.067355 -o.03891 -0.024~ -o.002243* 0.3882 
8 20SEP79 0.073203 -o.22300* 0.001113 -o.010738* 2.4104* 
g 20DEC70 0.278'N4 0.01108 0. 112020* -o.002322 -o.4225 
10 20t1fR)() 0.226040 -o.02768 -o.01~~ -o.o1~184' 0.5798 
11 19J..tl80 0.220659 -o.06469 0.057426* 0.002968 0.2429 
12 19SEP80 0.143052 0. 10038 -o.0270Q7* -o.000229 -o.o1oo 
13 181EC80 0.243930 0.278884' -o.018807 0.019242* -:5.04?.5* 
14 1otiN1 0.528629 -o.20553* -o.082548* -o.003655* 2.37S2* 
15 18..ltl81 0.259741 -o. 10561* -o.027454 -o.012206* 1.7695* 
16 24SEP81 0.155478 -o.21379* 0.013953 -o.013477* 3.0101* 
17 241EC81 0.282408 -o.23982* -o.020000 -o.002443* 2.6114* 
18 1smR82 0.1gggss -o.~171* -o.~ -o.008021* 0.7013* 
19 17~ 0.259495 -o.29624* -o.012910 -o.000844 3.1683* 
20 16SEP82 0.196245 -o.23522* -o.003469 0.000708 2.3176* 
21 1fiDEC82 0.367MS -o.27372* -o.OOJ513 -o.009977* 2.2029* 
22 17tlfll83 0.090473 0.03010 0.006877 -o.004265* -o.3568 
23 1~ 0.()8g392 0.1~ 0.007274 -o.002327* -1.0982 
24 15SEP83 0.084734 -o.01083 -o.024394* 0.002292* -o. 1563 
25 1&1EC83 0.066002 -o.06532 0.006340 -o.002023* 0.5580 
In Table 24, of the thtrteen contracts of the mtddle pertod, whtch 
tncludes December 1979 through December 1982, ten of the unexpected 
money-change coefftctents are negattve. However, only two are 
stgn1f1cantly so. In the same per1od, three coeff1c1ents are positive; two 
are stgntftcantly greater than zero. But the regress tons are not corrected 
for autocorrelatton, whtch ts of s1gntf1cant concern, and do not tnclude the 
effects of 1nflatton. 
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In Table 25, correct1on 1s performed for autocorrelat1on, and an 
1nflat1on rate regressor (INFLP) 1s 1ncluded. INFLP 1s formed by smooth1ng 
the monthly Consumer Pr1ce Index changes, so that the latest monthly rate 
1s expected to cont1nue for the ent1re year. 
TABLE 25 
REGRESSION OF DIVERGENCE OF FUTURES DISCOUNT 
FROM IMPLICIT FORWARD RATE ON ACTUAL 
INFLATION, EXPECTED MONEY GROWTH 
AND UNEXPECTED MONEY GROWTH: 
CORRECTED FOR RESIDUAL 
AUTOCORRELATION 
OBS ltFLP ti1SP ti£XP EXPDATE 
1 0.00406 -o.012557 0.005329 22DEC77 
2 0.10~ -o.001034 0.031208* 23mR78 
3 -o.01800 -o.026770* 0.012295 22~ 
4 0.01291 -o.029456 0.021526 21SEP79 
5 -o.00206 0.00~ -o.029525 21DEC78 
6 0.05171* 0.046650* -o.014080 22MAR70 
7 -o. 03199'1' 0.006979 -o.~ 21~ 
8 -o.12529* 0.038935 -o.018713 20SEP79 
0 -o.04743* 0.040432 0.071810 200EC70 
10 -o.011QO 0.117407 -o.071384 2tmR80 
11 -o.02677* 0.060317 0.075616* 19...Ut80 
12 0.05031* 0.094126* -o.047156* 18SEP80 
13 0.~9 0.~ -o.0281:58 181EC80 
14 -o.05233 0.054073 -o.066416 1QHAR81 
15 0.10509* -o.044542 -o.024597 1&.Ut81 
16 -o.04415* -o.048317 -o.010297 24SEP81 
17 -o.04086* -o.075075 0.036853 24DEC81 
18 -o.00912 -o.~2711 0.000811 1amR82 
19 0.00544 0.042014 0.015102 17..ut82 
20 -o.20928* 0.021939 -o.009680 16SEP82 
21 -o.08627* 0.009340 -o.022209 160EC82 
22 0.02161 0.047110 -o.005281 17t1AR83 
23 -o.05108* -o.017591 -o.006699 16..Ui83 
24 -o.10688* 0.003279 -o.016091 15SEP83 
25 -o.00435 -o.000611 . 0.007571 15DEC83 
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After correct ton for autocorrelatton and tncludtng the tnflatton 
regressor, 15 of the 25 estimated monetary innovation coefficients are 
negattve. Only two are s1gn1f1cantly so, however, and an equal number are 
s1gn1f1cant1y positive. The evidence presented 1n Table 25 1nd1cates that 
the unexpected monetary change regressor 1s of 11tt1e help in predtcting the 
contemporaneous divergence of the futures discounts from the tmpltcit 
forward rates. 
Table 26 presents the results of regresstons for each contract of the 
divergence when a past proftt regressor (MAVSUMPU ts 1ncluded. 
MAVSUMPL 1s formed as the f1ve day mov1ng average of prof1t earned from 
the appropriate arbttrage taken as early as poss1ble and settled durtng the 
preceding f1ve days. It 1s 1ncluded as a proxy for the expected outcome of an 
unobservable d1str1but1on or potent tal early settlements. It ts a stgntftcant 
regressor and 1s of the expected s1gn.4 In 11 of the 25 contracts the 
unexpected money change regressor 1s s1gn1f1cant. 
4 The higher the expected profit on the artificial bill, given early settlement, the more the contract 
discount rises toward the implicit forward rate. 
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TABLE 26 
REGRESSION OF DIVERGENCE OF FUTURES DISCOUNT 
FROM IMPLICIT FORWARD RATE ON ACTUAL 
INFLATION, EXPECTED MONEY GROWTH, 
UNEXPECTED MONEY GROWTH, AND 
LAGGED ARBITRAGE PROFIT 
OBS ~TE ltFL ti1SI tJ£X tRJSlJ'R. 
1 22DEC77 0.013008* 0.01208 -o.006897 0. ()()()()80539* 
2 23t1AR78 0.~1* 0.00130 0.015444 0. OOOOt568S3* 
3 22.J.Ii78 -o.~ -o.0034g 0.~· 0. 000051213* 
4 21SEP78 -o.017887 0.03824* 0.0017N 0. 000088035* 
5 21DEC78 -o.025007* -o.01217 -o.Qg3437* 0. 000076863* 
~ 22tfft?g 0.035l00* O.a5020* -o.01110S 0. 000022()gg* 
7 21~ -o.028336* 0.00637 -o.031474* 0. 000032743* 
8 20SEf?g -o.0501g7* 0.03466* -o. 041)442* 0.~185* 
g 2QDEC?g 0.006664 0.07416 0.061471* 0.000063741* 
10 20tiAR80 -o.000003 0.06991 -o.005350 0.000074091* 
11 1gJt)t8Q -o.027710* 0.07453 0.1~10S* -o. 0000320M 
12 18SEP80 0.061g11* 0. 11?g2* -o.051737* -o. ()()()()2()3g2 
13 19DECSO -o.()38g57 0.00180 -o.072717* 0.()()0054146* 
14 1!1'1R31 -0.027&23 0.07933 -o.04~ 0. 000044982* 
15 18.lli81 0.088780* -o.04263 -o.010428 0.0000103?.5 
16 24SEP81 O.OQ3g28 o.oeogo -o.~1 0.000115156* 
17 24DEC81 -o.053084* -o. 16108* 0.088330* 0. 000076615* 
19 19HAR92 -0.032119 -o.05125* 0.040674* 0.000111116* 
1g 17..ut82 0.01434~ -o.008384' 0.01~7 0.000110011* 
20 16SEP92 -o.060705 -o.01569 0.043330 0. 000076977* 
21 16DEC82 -o.006637 -o.00540 0.000570 0. 000063620* 
22 1711AR93 -o.0051~ 0.03232* -o.011~ 0. 000092304* 
23 16..l.tl93 -o.03901Q* -o.01442 -o.000404 0.000044422* 
24 15SEP83 -o.055747 0.0Qg16 -o.023541* 0. ()()()()2g966* 
25 15[£C83 -o.015395 -o.00259 0.002333 0. 0()006g556* 
In Table 27, which presents the results of the previous regression 
after correction for residual autocorrelation, only 8 are significantly 
nonzero. The difference in significance may be due to autocorrelation, or to 
the methodology employed in forming the regressors. Since data for 
inflation and the unexpected monetary innovations are only available on a 
monthly and weekly basis respectively, while Treasury bfll data exists for 
every non-holiday business day, the regressors have been formed by 
1nterpolat1on heretofore. 
TABLE 27 
REGRESSION OF DIVERGENCE OF FUTURES DISCOUNT 
FROM IMPLICIT FORWARD RATE ON ACTUAL 
INFLATION, EXPECTED MONEY GROWTH, 
UNEXPECTED MONEY GROWTH, AND 
LAGGED ARBITRAGE PROFIT: 
CORRECTED FOR RES I DUAL 
AUTOCORRELATION 
OBS ltFLP ti1SP li£XP I'RJSltP EXPmTE 
1 0.01~ 0.00827 0.001994 0.~~ 22DEC77 
2 0.06905* 0.00108 0.022355* 0. 000058868* 23tRr18 
3 -o.02058 -o.02279 0.014524 0. 000035716* 22"'--f78 
4 -o.00183 0.~ 0.003499 o.~N&7* 21SEP78 
5 -o.02302 0.03173 -o.070186* 0. OC004Q400* 211EC78 
6 0.03767* 0.04~ -o.011903 0.000000001• ~
7 -o.03194• 0.00868 -o.030827* 0. 000000000 21~ 
9 -o.~ 0.03476* -o.040629* 0.~ 20SEP70 
9 -o.~ 0.00314 0.~ 0. ()()005221~ 20CEC79 
10 0.00155 0.09140 -o.019025 0. 000059919* 2CmR90 
11 -o.0291~ 0.07521 0.104649* -o. 000039992 1M.tf90 
12 0.~74• 0.1~ -o.~1~ -o. 000029708 19SEP90 
13 -o.02564 0.01020 -o.064667* O.OC004~ 19tEC90 
14 -o.03729 0.()g723 -o.067904 0.0000274~ 19fiR31 
15 0.09254• -o.04368 -o.021293 0. 000014323 1Uii91 
16 -o.01145 0.03760 -o.019460 0.000089061• 24SEP91 
17 -o.04941• -o.1401~ 0.~· 0.00006434~ 24DEC91 
19 -0.03126 -o.05775 0.029990 0.0000830 1~ 1emA92 
19 0.01076 -o.02715 0.023077 0. 000086317* 17~ 
20 -o.~ -o.01212 0.040D91 0. 0000'1392&' 10SEP82 
21 -0.01163 -o.01270 0.004660 0. 000061909* 1&1EC92 
22 -0.00351 0.03117 -o.010097 0.~ 17tm83 
23 -o.0514~ -o.01934 -o.005341 0. 000000000 1tult83 
24 -o.1034~ 0.00630 -o.021350 0. 000000000 15SEP93 
~ -o.00400 -o.01077 0.~ 0. 000000000 1:5DEC93 
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In an effort to discover the 1nf1uence of the 1nterpolat1on 
methodology, further regressions were performed wherein the unexpected 
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monetary change regressor was not interpolated. The results are presented 
in Table 28. The results lack robustness, since only about one-f1rth of each 
contracrs data coinc1de, but the effect or 1nterpolat1on ts apparent. In 
Table 28, eight of the inflation rate coefficients are signif1cant, and six 
have the expected sign. Only four unexpected monetary change regressors 
are significant; however, all carry the sign expected if greater-than-
forecast monetary innovation is indtcat1ve of future monetary correction by 
the F edera I Reserve. 
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TABLE 28 
REGRESSION OF DIVERGENCE OF FUTURES DISCOUNT 
FROM IMPLICIT FORWARD RATE ON ACTUAL 
INFLATION, UNEXPECTED MONEY GROWTH, 
AND TIME REMAINING TO CONTRACT 
EXPIRATION 
OBS EXPDATE ltt=L ti£X DAYTOEXP MSE 
1 22DEC77 -o.09877* 0.00441 -o.01121* .0005 
2 23tlll78 -0.1~294* -o.02352* -o.01oe6* .0011 
3 22..ut78 -o.07127 0.01603 -o.00506 .0127 
4 21SEP78 0.03297 0.02466 -o.00845* .0101 
5 2UEC78 -o.03784 -0.03823 -o.00742 .0499 
6 22t'Rl70 -o.06020* -o.00514 -o.00644* .0031 
7 21-..ul79 -o.02043 -o.02089* -o.00311* .0048 
8 20SEP79 0.01107 0.01063 -o.00886* .0062 
9 201EC79 O.Z1747 0.01135 -o.00105 .0653 
10 20I'm80 0.~1 -o.01294 -o.01239* .04~ 
11 1'1UJt80 0.08075 0.04783 -o.00961 .0810 
12 18SEP80 0.02046 -o.01920 -o.00335 .0198 
13 18DEC80 0.70100 -o.16723* -o.00522 . 1019 
14 1ottAR81 0.60006* -o.08258* -o.00166 .2300 
15 1&Ui81 o. 142Ua -o.03673 -o.00664* .0259 
16 24SEP81 -o.50581 0.00216 0.01089 .0321 
17 24DEC81 -0.23579* 0.05670 0.01013 .2566 
18 18tffl82 -o.~ 0.01304 -o.oo~ .tm4 
10 17..ut82 0.04376 0.01232 0.00142 .0864 
20 16SEP82 -o.07591 0.02212 -0.01194 .0706 
21 16DEC82 1.07682* -o.11234 -o. 11934* .1733 
22 17MAR83 -o.06800* 0.00437 -o.00786* .0035 
23 1M.tl83 -o.~ 0.00528 -o.00380* .0064 
24 15SEP83 0.12039 -o.00418 0.00109 .0063 
25 15DEC83 -o.29041* 0.01248 0.00946 .0021 
2& 1:5MAR84 0. 1~171 0.02481 0.00987 .002& 
It is lfkely that market participants' expectation of future Federal 
Reserve behavior depends not only on the most recent monetary outcome, but 
on some perceived trend in outcomes. In an effort to capture these 
expectations, we form an unexpected monetary innovation regressor as a 
forward weighted moving average of the three most recent errors in the 
MMS median forecasts. In the equation and tables below, UNEXP is the 
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unexpected monetary innovation regressor. It is filtered, or smoothed, by a 
weighted moving average process given by the equation 
UNEXPt = [5Met + Met-1 + Met-21/7, 
where UNEXPt is the smoothed regressor, and Met, Met-1, and Met-2 are the 
present, one-, and two-period lagged unexpected money growth respectively. 
Me is the actual money growth minus the MMS median forecast. The 
regression results are presented In Tables 29 and 30. 
Of the 25 contracts examined, six past-inflation regressors (INFLP) 
were significant; four were negative, as we would expect If the prospect of 
monetary tightening is made more 11kely by the same factors which lead to 
Increased Inflationary expectations. Nine of the coefficients on the 
unexpected monetary growth regressors (UNEXP) are significant; six have 
the expected negative sign. The remaining three, which have positive signs, 
all occur In contracts which expired in the period before monetary aggregate 
targeting was Initiated by the Federal Reserve. Sixteen or the coefficients 
on the time remaining until contract expiration regressors (DAYSP) are 
significantly negative, and nine coefficients on the past early settlement 
profit regressors CMAVSUMP) are significantly positive. overall, the 
regression model accounts for a good deal of the variation In the futures 
contract divergence, with an average RMSE of thirteen basis points and 
average R2 or .52. 
113 
TABLE 29 
REGRESSION OF DIVERGENCE OF FUTURES DISCOUNT 
FROM IMPLICIT FORWARD RATE ON SMOOTHED 
INFLATION, EXPECTED MONEY GROWTH, 
UNEXPECTED MONEY GROWTH, DAYS 
REMAINING TO CONTRACT 
EXPIRATION, AND LAGGED 
ARBITRAGE PROFIT 
OBS EXPDATE ltFLP tt1SP ltEXP DAYSP tfliJSlJil' 
1 221EC77 -o.00218 -o.01226 0.02642* -o.004702* o.oc:oooo 
2 2311AR78 0.02240 0.01586* 0.03873* -o.003188* 0.000000 
3 22..ut78 -o.05199* 0.00735 0.02914* -o.002646* 0.020799 
4 21SEP78 -0.00488 -o.00860 0.03380 -o.005/12* 0.005803 
~ 211EC78 -o.01117 -o.~ -0.11~ -o.~1· 0.020008 
6 22tllm 0.04330 0.07883* -0.03086* -o.000187 0.000001* 
7 21~ -o.00356 0.00795 -o.04843* -o.002943* 0.000000 
8 20SEP79 -o.04~ 0.01~ -o.02314 -o.004017* 0.000000 
g 200EC7Q 0.03023 0.22412* 0.04388 -o. Q()()7QS 0.070Q07* 
10 20tiV\80 -0.01596 0.03153 0.01192 -o.013635* 0.009299 
11 1Mii80 -o.02142 0. 18014* 0.03285 -o.00/520* -o.oooooo 
12 18SEP80 0.06056* 0.03359 -o.04432* 0.003324 -o.003062 
13 181EC80 -Q.()2goo -o.1~9* -o.0771~ -o.~ 0.059347* 
14 1~1 0.00436 0.08370 -o.01750 -o.001934 0.043030* 
15 1Mii81 0.1Q301• -o.04436 0.01573 -o.000431 -o.015042 
10 24SEP81 -0.01022 0.07421• -o.00020 -o.010207* 0.0338Q7* 
17 241EC81 -o.01458 -o.05872 0.04861 -o.004514• 0.065811• 
18 18tiAR82 -o.01190 -o.02309 0.02032 -o.oo7483* 0.000000 
19 17~ 0.00315 -o.04505* -o.00302 -o.003894 0.078142* 
20 16SEP82 -o.12087 -o.02342 -o.01412 -o.005757 0.041506* 
21 101EC82 -o.01407 0.01~ o.reaoa -o.oo?OM• 0.037708* 
22 17t'fl\83 -o.00155 0.02052 -o.00644 -o.004835* 0.000000 
23 16.Ui83 -o.08580* -o.01969 0.00320 0.001599 0.000000 
24 1~ -o.Z142* 0.00378 -o.04920* -o.001737 0.000000 
25 151EC83 -0.00936 -o.02090 0.01073 -o.002888* o.ocmoo 
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TABLE 30 
REMAINING ERROR AND R-SOUARE FOR 
REGRESSIONS IN TABLE 29 
Date [FE fi1SE ~ 
DEC17 44 0.03 0.17 
t1AR78 50 0.03 0.64 
..ut78 S1 0.04 o.so 
SEP78 49 0.00 0.39 
DEC78 49 0.13 0.53 
~79 50 0.04 0.43 
~ S1 0.06 0.64 
SEP70 S2 0.0& 0.85 
DEC70 48 0.19 0.47 
tiiR80 48 0.21 0.67 
~ 4g 0.22 0.31 
SEP80 :50 0.14 0.~ 
DEC80 48 0.18 O.S1 
I'IM81 107 0.3S 0.14 
~1 :50 0.27 O.S1 
SEP81 50 0. 16 0.74 
DEC81 10S 0.21 0.57 
t1AR82 110 0.18 0.71 
~ 50 0.12 0.66 
SEP82 50 0.18 0.76 
DEC82 48 0.16 0.79 
tR\83 S1 0.06 0.53 
~ 47 0.00 0.23 
SEP83 43 0.07 0.20 
DEC83 48 o.os 0.26 
fMrage S6 0.13 0.52 
Maxi- 110 0.33 o.ss 
111ni .. 43 0.03 0.14 
Systematic Risk Premium 
In Chapter lilt ts argued that the risks inherent tn the artificial bill 
strategies exceed those of the real b111. Early settlement~ if required by 
exigencies or unforeseen opportunities~ may require conversion of bl11s Into 
cash. Even if early settlement is not requtred1 during the holding period the 
value of the artificial bill will vary more than value of the real bilL The 
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real bill is less variable in price than the artificial b111 and therefore, given 
equallnter-b111 covariances, the covariance of the art1f1cial b111 w1th the 
market portfolio exceeds that of the real b11L The efficient marl<et thus 
compensates Investors who bear the Increased <systematic) rlsl< of 
including the artificial b1ll in their portfolios by Increasing the expected 
yield to maturity, or decreasing the discount of the futures contract so that 
1t may be sold at what has appeared to previous students to afford an 
unjustifiable profit. 
In this section the differential risk hypothesis Is examined directly, 
by two methods. In the first method, a simulation is performed of the 
effect on the ex post annua11zed rate of return if settlement or portfolio 
revaluation occurs prior to the maturity of the instrument(s). If market 
participants are rational, then a measure of the mean historical difference 
In actual rea11zed returns should affect ex ante yields. The effect of the 
differential yields on the divergence of the contract discount from its 
perfectly efficient transaction less expected value Is then evaluated. 
In the second method, the value of the additional covariance of the 
artificial b1ll (with respect to the market portfolio) over and above that of 
the real bill is estimated. Using th1s Information, the effect on the 
divergence of the contract discount from Its perfectly efrtcient 
transaction less expected value Is evaluated. 
In the first methodology, for each day of trading, the difference in the 
mean annualized yield for the real bill and Its artificial counterpart, 
DIFMt-1 = JlA- JlR, 
ts simulated, where URIs the mean annualized yield from owning the real 
<near> bill for the past seven business days, and JlA Is the mean annualized 
yield for the artificial b11l- the combination of the short futures position 
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TABLE 31 
EARLY SETTLEMENT YIELD DIFFERENTIALS 
AFTER 7 DAY HOLDING PERIOD 
ms EXPDATE RI1SE A B 
1 1~76 0.054320 -o.04419 0.005836 
2 0.074348 -o.04110 0.0121S1* 
3 23SEP76 0.~ -o.01DM 0.008447 
4 23IEC76 0.072077 -o.0818S 0.013121 
s 24tM77 0.041073 0.01150 0.028526* 
0 2&Ut77 0.004986 -o.06633 0.022731* 
7 22SEP77 0.048112 -o.03S48 0.034802* 
8 220EC77 0.074973 -o.1S382 0.100388* 
g 23tM78 0.084076 -o.14000 0.032017* 
10 22~ 0.114742 -o.10723 O.OSSOOO* 
11 21SEP78 0. 16111~ -o.1~ 0.028339* 
12 21DEC78 0.~ -o.20932 0.021889* 
13 22tRl79 0.054136 -0.01989 0.04S244* 
14 21...ut"N 0.096982 -o.03496 0.~ 
15 20SEP70 0.154100 -o. 10017 0.012078* 
16 20DEC79 0.245971 -o.27066 0.~ 
17 20t1fla) 0.413838 -o.39464 -o.026429* 
18 1o.ut80 0.311165 -o.31108 0.00012S 
19 18SEP80 0.163078 0.~1 0.022410* 
20 18[£C80 0.218081 -o.41887 0.048767* 
21 19mR81 0.44S694 -o.70380 0.035008• 
22 1~1 0.3585S2 -o.21723 0.030358* 
23 24SEP81 0.352754 -o.76146 0.007447* 
24 24DEC81 0.537848 -o.91040 0.034802* 
2S 1smR82 0.425257 -o.70769 -o.039461* 
26 17"-1182 0.238154 -o.33S63 0.068175* 
27 16SEP82 0.4~ -o.07637 0.~· 
28 1fa:C82 0.3S6596 -o.46922 0.031783* 
29 1711AA83 0.141160 -o.21476 0.000334 
30 1MJ183 0.09164:S -o.08347 0.0343:s3* 
31 1~ 0.070516 -o.0842Q 0.034068* 
32 15DEC83 0.092039 -o.12469 -o.002096 
33 15tffl84 0.039739 -o.16328 -o.016181* 
34 1.uHM 0.08S038 -o. 14231 -o.007606 
3:S 13SEP84 0.14~0 -o. 18912 0.02691~ 
36 130EC84 0.156807 -o.40230 0.002246 
37 14tFtR85 0. 131719 -o.1784S -o.002295 
38 1~ 0. 171739 -o.21797 -o.044939* 
3Q 12SEP85 0.068700 -o.14267 0.047030* 
40 120EC85 0.054842 -o.3474S 0.00943S 
• Significant at . 10 level or better. 
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TABLE 32 
REGRESSION OF EARLY SETTLEMENT YIELD 
DIFFERENTIALS AFTER 7 DAY HOLDING 
PERIOD ON DIFM AND DAYTOEXP 
OBS EXPDATE Rt1SE A B 
1 1811AR70 0.049497 0.06343 0.010173 
2 24J.It76 0.074237 -o.01988 0.014029* 
3 23SEP76 0.040371 -o.03194 0.006394 
4 230EC70 0.04~ 0.01409 0.0189W 
s 24mR77 0.041280 0.02100 0.031370* 
6 23..UI17 0.064902 -o.OS07? 0.021~ 
7 22SEPn 0.043642 0.00164 0.036133* 
8 22[£C77 0.0427S1 -o.02086 -o.OS173S* 
9 23mR78 0.038300 -o.01219 0.034804• 
10 22.JJ178 0.073749 0.04082 0.~ 
11 21SEP78 0.101470 0.07392 0.010031• 
12 21DEC78 0.21~ 0. 1W4:5 0.01142G 
13 22tm70 0.048932 0.01050 0.044~ 
14 21..uf19 0.070010 0.09137 0.0344984' 
15 20SEP7Q 0.065353 0. 12851 -o.001082 
16 20DEC70 0.2474SO -o.30700 0.040~ 
17 20t1AR80 0.21M:50 0.23193 0.010382 
18 1MI180 0.235932 0.08202 0.013~ 
19 18SEP80 0.1S2SOS 0.1S697 0.017314• 
20 180EC80 0.218803 -o.374~ 0.0491~ 
21 10MR81 0.4452S8 -o.02371 0.034814• 
22 18J.It81 0.27S076 0.18906 0.0442~ 
23 24SEP81 0.155049 -o.15933 -o.012408* 
24 24DEC81 0.33868S -o.08707 0.~ 
~ 18t1AR82 0. 191800 0.04898 0.01S113 
26 17~ 0.211315 -o.13743 0.05391~ 
27 16SEP82 0.224668 0.66712 0.000364 
28 1&1EC82 0.173944 0.0841:5 0.019334• 
20 1~ 0.0602S2 0.0301S 0.021~ 
30 1~ 0.062266 O.OS49S 0.0327S1• 
31 15SEP83 0.080410 -o.08694 0.0338P 
32 15DEC83 0.064850 0.01230 0.012238* 
33 1:5t'IRM 0.040497 -o.07087 -o. 009:59()41 
34 14~ 0.083254 -o.07726 0.000983 
35 13SEP94 0.140700 -o.24299 0.02704~ 
36 130EC84 0.147045 -o.29157 0.000091• 
37 14n:R35 0. 132920 -o.16738 -o.001889 
38 13...UI85 0. 1:54568 -o.03894 -o.020590 
39 12SEP85 0.062618 -0.10307 0.018296 
40 12DEC85 O.OSS472 -o.34365 0.000720 
• Signifi~t at .10 level or better. 
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The next empirical test involves the following methodology. First, 
the covariance of the artificial bill's rate of return with that of the real 
b111, 
CA,R = cov[RA,RR], 
is estimated, where RA is the annualized return of the artificial bill 
(composed of the short futures posltion and the ownership of the delivery 
b11D, and Rs is the annualized return of the real b111 which matures at the 
time of expiration of the futures contract, when both are assumed to have 
been settled early. The covar1ation in returns declines as the time of 
expiration (or maturity ln the case of the real b11D approaches. Therefore 
the ex ante, or expected covartatton tn returns ts postulated as follows: 
ctA,R = f<Nt), 
where N ts the number or calendar days unt11 contract exp1ratton at ttme t, 
ctA,R is the expected covariance of actual return of artif1c1al bfll with the 
real bill if both are converted to cash at timet, and where timet ts seven 
days after the purchase of the instruments. Assuming a linear form, the 
following equation is estimated by OLS regression: 
ctA,R = a + b(Nt> + et. 
once the values of the ex ante relattve different tal variances are 
estimated, statistical tests of the effect of the relative riskiness of the 
art trtctal bill on tts a priori return <as a result or the operation or efficient 
market forces) can be performed. In the equation 
Dt = - [Ft - (Ut + Lt)/21, 
where Ft is the contract discount at time t, and Ut and Lt are Poole's ( 1978) 
upper and lower arbitrage limlts respectively at timet, the annualized 
premium that the artificial bi II enjoys is approximated by 
Pt ~ {[Dt(Nt/360)]/[ 1 - Dt(Nt/360)]}[365/Ntl, 
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TABLE 33 
REGRESSION OF ANNUALIZED YIELD 
DIFFERENCE (A-R) ON 
etA R (COV_HAT) 
I 
OBS EXPOATE RI1SE INTERCEPT COIJ~T 
1 18MAR76 0.05687 0.01884 0. 00000587* 
2 24JUN76 0.07952 0.05059 0.00008220 
3 23SEP76 0.04087 0.03512 -o.00014801 
4 230EC76 0.05014 0.04774 0. 00099004* 
~ 24MAR77 0.04079 0.02241 -o.00014784 
6 23JJH77 0.07243 0.06890 0.00028283 
7 22SEP77 0.05393 0.04001 0. 00036535* 
8 22DEC77 0.04801 0.1334~ 0.00192380* 
0 23t1AR78 0.04552 0.08006 0.00142613* 
10 22..l.IN78 0.09537 0.04579 0.00194127"' 
11 21SEP78 0. 11138 0.03893 0.00288161* 
12 21DEC78 0.23275 0.02474 0.00444156* 
13 22MAR79 0.07098 0.00300 0. 00050775* 
14 21~ 0.08193 0.01528 0.00122183* 
15 20SEP79 0.06842 -o.00596 0.00283051* 
10 200EC79 0.~ 0.38004 -o. 00040214 
17 20I1AR80 0.26751 0.09456 0. 00820063* 
18 1~ 0.27330 0.13765 0. 00428934• 
19 18SEP80 0.16408 -o.06923 0.00147343* 
20 18DEC80 0.35090 0.57457 0.00052271 
21 19MAR81 0.90082 0.84301 0. 00 100087"' 
22 18J.JH81 0.32976 0.03673 0.00472481* 
23 24SEP81 0.24678 0.53230 0.00795501* 
24 24DEC81 1.29530 0.18087 0. 00926849* 
25 18t1AR82 0.82810 -o.15930 0. 00804625* 
26 17JUN82 0.31635 0.27894 0.00421461• 
27 16SEP82 0.24679 -o.28112 0.00981234* 
28 16DEC82 0.40401 0.13091 0. 00000762* 
29 17mR83 0.08117 0.10422 0.00241047* 
30 1~ 0.08568 0.04020 0.00146113* 
31 15SEP83 0.09600 0.17908 -o.00042154 
32 1:5DEC83 0.071~ 0.00308 0.00119e07* 
33 15mR84 0.04527 0.10420 0. 00006155* 
34 14Jltl&f 0.08583 0.10688 0. 00057677* 
35 13SEP84 0.15576 0.26037 -o. 00046187 
36 13DEC84 0.16590 0.37656 0.00100261* 
37 14~ 0.15049 0.17023 0.00029650 
38 1~ 0.15258 0.09806 0. 00218858* 
39 12SEP85 0.06714 0.14755 0. 00095293* 
40 12DE~ 0.00114 0.3M39 0.00020843 
* Sign I flcant at .10 level or better. 
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summary 
These results indicate quite clearly that at least one specHication of 
the expected differential risk of the two investment alternatives has a 
significant impact on the yields and prices of the alternatives. These 
results are consistent with the dual hypotheses that the cash bill is an 
imperfect substitute for the hedged dellverable bill, due to the difference in 
the returns distribution, and that the Treasury bi11 futures market is 
efficient. 
The cash bi11 is an asset owned by an investor. The deliverable, 
longer-term bi11 is also an asset owned by an investor. However, the 
deJiverable bi11 is hedged with an offsetting short futures contract position, 
in order to create an artificial asset with the same expiration date as the 
cash bill. Unexpected information affects the values of both assets; but the 
change in the value of the real bill is not necessarily equal to the change in 
the value of the artificial blll. Perhaps this accounts for the difference in 
the returns distribution. 
Also, the change in value of the real asset is only a paper profit or 
loss, unless the investor liquidates the position by selling the asset. The 
investor is not required to Jiquidate. However, the artificial bill contains a 
futures contract. Provisions of both IMM and CBT contracts call for daily 
marking-to-market. The investor owning the artificial asset has no choice 
in this matter. The mark-to-market requirement means that the daily 
change in the value of the artificial asset is not a paper profit or loss, but 
is in fact an actual profit or Joss, posted each day to the investor's account. 
Perhaps this accounts for the difference in the returns distribution. 
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Perhaps the reason for the difference in the returns distribution are 
Immaterial. The data examined In Chaper IV Indicate that the real asset 
possesses a different returns d1strtbut1on than that of the art1ffctal asset. 
The real asset Is observed to be, on average, less variable than the artificial 
asset. This observation Is neither difficult nor costly for market 
participants to make, and is useful information concerning the expected 
future values of the assets. Rational investors would not ignore such 
information. Thus the assumption that the assets are treated as perfect 
substitutes, in view of the observed differences in the var1ab1l1ty of their 
returns, is an assumption that investors are irrational. 
The data examined in Chapter IV show that the prices of the real 
assets and their artificial counterparts are related to the predictable 
portion of their differential variabilities. This is consistent with the 
efficient market hypothesis. Since expected differential variation is 
significantly related to ex ante yields and prices of the derivative 
instruments, it follows that statistical tests which do not in some way 
include a specification of the expected differential risk are incomplete. 
Their results are therefore suspect, and can lead to an incorrect acceptance 
or (more 1 ike ly> reject ion of the efficient market hypothesis. Since no 
examination of the efficiency of financial futures markets has heretofore 
included a specification of the expected differential risk, previous 
empirical examinations of financial futures markets should be regarded 
with suspicion. 
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND 
CONCLUSION 
It 1s Important to know whether or not financial futures markets 
result In efficient derivative Instrument pricing. The social purpose of 
financial futures markets Is to reduce the cost of shifting rtsk from one 
Investor to another. A reduction In a country's cost of risk transfer, by 
Increasing the net return per unit of risk, Increases the rate of capital 
formation In that country, from both domestic and foreign sources, and may 
affect domestic relative prices, exchange rates, trade patterns, and 
productivity growth rates. However, 1f financial futures markets are 
inefficient pricing mechanisms, a country may be quite adversely affected. 
Thus the question of the efficiency of financial futures markets 
encompasses more than the probable proftts or losses or traders, and has 
generated extensive <and Intensive) research In proper proportion to Its 
Importance. 
In a sense, empirical testing of the efficiency of financial futures 
markets Is not difficult. A long futures position at expiration results In the 
purchase of the underlying Instrument. An artlftclallnstrument Is created 
by the combination of a long futures position and the short-term Investment 
of sufficient funds to purchase the underlying Instrument at contract 
expiration. The prtce or volat111ty of the underlying Instrument Is compared 
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to that of the art1f1c1a11nstrument. If they are significantly different, the 
hypothes1s of market efficiency Is rejected. 
The unstated assumption that accounts for the relative ease of 
empirical tests Is the assumption that the underlying Instrument Is a 
perfect substitute for the arttf1claltnstrument. If that assumption ts 
abandoned, empirical testing Is more difficult; so Is the rejection of the 
hyp,othesls of efficient markets. One major result of the present study Is 
that the assumption of perfect asset substitution ts Invalid, and should be 
abandoned. The empirical work In Chapter IV shows that the returns 
distribution of the artlf1clal Instrument Is quite different from that of the 
underlying Instrument. 
The studies summarized In Chapter Ill are based on the assumptIon of 
perfect substitutability of real for artificial Instruments. Some of the 
studies find markets to be efficient; others do not. But since all are based 
on a questionable assumption, their conclusions are themselves 
questionable. Thus a second result of the present study Is to indicate the 
present degree of certainty concerning the efficiency of f1nanclal futures 
markets. It Is smalL 
If Investors are aware of a probability distribution or likely gains or 
losses from early settlement, they will Incorporate these expectations Into 
Investment decisions. Similarly, If Investors value the option of getting 
cash before contract expiration with greater certainty of return, the market 
should make yields adjust so that the option has a positive price. One 
cannot measure Investors· expectations; they can only be estimated, using 
an expectat tons hypothesis. Furthermore, any test of market efficiency 
must simultaneously test both the expectations hypothesis and the 
hypothesis of efftctency. 
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In the present study it Is assumed that Investors are aware of the 
potential gains and losses from Investments that are converted to cash 
prior to settlement, and that the distribution of those gains and losses 
matters to them. Perhaps they use the process of past early settlement 
gains and losses to forecast those of the future. If expectations are formed 
In this manner, and If expectations of future early settlement outcomes 
matter to Investors, then the time series of past early settlement outcomes 
affects futures prices and future contract discounts. However, those past 
outcomes do not enable Investors to earn more than normal rates of return, 
given the added riskiness of their investment In the artificial instruments, 
If the market Is efficient. 
This hypothes1s - and that of market efficiency - has been tested by 
calculating the settlement profit that an investor or arbitrageur would have 
realized on each market day, assuming a position was taken on the first day 
that arbitrage was potent1ally profitable, and after accounting for the 
differential variability of the arttftctal Instrument. Since almost all of the 
t1me the lower arbitrage ltm1t Is above the futures contract discount, the 
assumed arbttrage consists of the following: short a near-term Treasury 
bill, buy the Instrument for delivery, and sell a futures contract. If previous 
early settlement has been profitable, arbitrages are more likely to occur, 
and therefore It Is expected that a smaller divergence of the contract 
discount below the lmpltclt forward rate to be associated with higher early 
settlement profttab111ty. This ts supported by the data. 
Furthermore, if the variance of the actual rate of return from early 
settlement of the arttflctaltnstrument ts not expected to be stgntftcantly 
greater than that of tts real counterpart, the divergence of the contract 
discount below the tmpltc1t forward rate ts expected to be smaller. The 
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data indicate that this is true as welL Whether or not early settlement or 
default results in loss or lower yield should depend, 1n addition, on the 
actions or the Federal Reserve In the interval between positioning and 
unwinding. If monetary tightening occurs, short term interest rates will be 
driven up relative to longer term rates, resulting in losses or lower yields 
for arbitrageurs. But if a more expansionary monetary policy is followed, 
arbitrageurs need not fear loss from early settlement, since prices of the 
assets they own are more likely to rise than falL The present study 
attempts to capture the expectations of lenders with regard to Federal 
Reserve intent ions by smoothing the unexpected component of weekly 
monetary changes. Although not completely satisfactory, indications that 
the phenomenon occurs are evident in the data. This, too, lends credence to 
the dual conclusion that the assets are imperfect substitutes, and that 
f1nancial futures markets are efficient. 
The results may properly be viewed as preltminary. Further testing of 
the hypothesis- that early settlement returns matter to investors -should 
be performed, using different markets and methods than those done In the 
present study. Different models of the expectation forming process should 
be examined. The distribution of early settlement probab111t1es should be 
ascertained. Different Intervals for the holding period will result In 
different estimates of the covar1ances of actual and artificial Instrument 
yields, some of which may result in more adequate models. 
With regard to the Treasury bond and note futures markets, some 
method must be found of connecting a particular instrument to the futures 
contract, or of predicting the identity of the cheapest-to-deliver 
instrument. One possible method might be to collect data on all existing 
deliverable bonds and notes, ascertain the cheapest-to-del1ver, and assume 
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that cost less transactions allow the arbitrager to always trade the owned 
instrument for the new cheapest-to-deliver. Another arbitrage that this 
study suggests might be to find the dearest-to-denver Instrument, short it 
on the assumption that It will be the last to be delivered, and go long a 
futures contract. These are interesting ltnes for further research. 
The evidence examined in the present study indicates the correctness 
of the hypothesis that f1nancial futures markets are efficient processors of 
even quite subtle information; that the distribution of returns given early 
settlement are Important to Investors; that this is particularly the case for 
Investments having short term maturities, and that tests of market 
efflctency whtch do not Incorporate them are tncomplete, and likely to be 
erroneous. 
Emptrtcal methodology cannot prove null hypotheses; It can only 
reject or fa11 to reject them. Financial futures markets can be shown by 
empirical methods to be less than perfectly efficient; they cannot be proven 
efficient. The efficient market ts but one of two nested null hypotheses 
that every empirical test of markets jointly rejects or fans to reject. 
Additionally, the required data are not sufficiently deta11ed to allow precise 
stattsttcal testing. However, the present study has shown that the 
rejection of the efficient market hypothesis is premature, unless account is 
taken of the different distribution of returns of the underlytng instrument 
and its derivative. Certainly 11ttle va11d evidence remains of the gross 
inefficiency of financial futures markets. 
A careful consideration of the data examined and evidence presented 
in the present study leads to the following conclusion: After properly 
accounting for the differential riskiness of futures-based Instruments, 
pricing mechanisms 1n f1nanclal futures markets are eff1c1ent. 
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APPENDIX A 
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY MARKET (IMM) 
TREASURY BILL FUTURES 
CONTRACTS 
Contract index upper (Upper Limit) and lower (Lower Limit) arbitrage limits, 
assuming $1,500 margin and $60 round-turn commission, and actual 
settlement indices (Contract>. 
Sampling Interval: Daily. 
Sample Duratton: March, 1976 contract through December, 1985 contract. 
Source of Data: Futures Contract: Wall Street Journal. 
Treasury Bi 11: Wall Street Journal. 
Description: Each chart in this appendix shows three values for each 
business day- the upper arbitrage 11m1t (Upper L1m10, lower arbitrage 11m1t 
(Lower Limit), and the contract settlement (Contract>. The lower arbitrage 
limit is calculated by finding the contract settlement that would result in 
identical yield from Strategy II and Strategy II A, after payment of required 
commission ($60) and subtraction of the opportunity cost of margin posted 
to the account ($1 ,500). The upper arbitrage ltmit is calculated by finding 
the contract settlement that would result in identical yield from Strategy I 
and Strategy lA, after payment of required commission ($60) and 
subtraction of the opportunity cost of margin posted to the account 
($1,500). For descriptions of these investment strategies, see Section II, 
Table 1. 
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APPENDIX 8 
YIELD TO MATURITY USING CHICAGO BOARD 
OF TRADE (CBT) TREASURY 
NOTE CONTRACTS 
Prospective yield to maturity from outright purchase of a Treasury note 
(Treasury Note) versus prospective yield to maturity from purchase of a 
Treasury bill and Treasury note contract, with acceptance of de11vered note 
at contract expiration (Treasury Bill/Note Combination). 
Sam ole Interval: Daily. 
Sample Duration: June, 1982 contract through September, 1985 contract. 
Source of Data: Futures Contract: Wall Street Journal. 
Treasury Bill: Wall Street Journal. 
Treasury Note: Wall Street Journal. 
Description: Each chart in this appendix shows two values for each 
business day- the yield to maturity from outright purchase of a particular 
Treasury note (Treasury Note), and the yield to maturity from the purchase 
and maturation of a Treasury b111 and delivery of a note via settlement of a 
Treasury note futures contract (Treasury Bi 11/Note Combination). Yields are 
approximate, and are calculated using Stlgum·s method [see Stigum ( 1981; 
136-139)]. The latter yield assumes payment of required commission ($60) 
and subtract ion of the opportunity cost of margin posted to the account 
($1 ,500) while the contract is in force. The two yields are equivalent to the 
yields from Strategy II and Strategy II A, assuming that the note delivered in 
contract fulfillment is the same note to be held outright. In general, the 
delivered note, and thus the Strategy IIA yield, will not be the same, since 
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it is not cheapest-to-deliver (See Table 3, sect1on II). Therefore the y1elds 
are only approximately comparable. In a11 cases, the Treasury note used to 
create the charts is the February, 1992 14 5/8% note. 
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APPENDIX C 
YIELD TO MATURITY USING CHICAGO BOARD 
OF TRADE (CST) TREASURY 
BOND CONTRACTS 
Prospective yield to maturity from outright purchase of a Treasury bond 
(Treasury Bond) versus purchase of a Treasury bi 11 and Treasury bond 
contract, with acceptance of delivered bond at contract expiration (Treasury 
Bill/Bond Combination). 
Sample Interval: Daily. 
Sample Duration: March, 1978 contract through June, 1981 contract. 
Source of Data: Futures Contract: Chicago Board of Trade. 
Treasury Bill: Wall Street Journal. 
Treasury Bond: Compuserve Information Services. 
Descriot ion: Each chart In this appendix shows two values for each 
business day- the yield to maturity from outright purchase of a particular 
Treasury bond (Treasury Bond), and the yield to maturity from the purchase 
and maturation of a Treasury bill and a Treasury bond delivered in 
fulfillment of a bond future contract (Treasury Bill/Bond Combination). 
Yields are approximate, and are calculated using Stigum·s method [see 
Stigum ( 1981; 136-139)]. The latter yield assumes payment of required 
commission ($60) and subtraction of the opportunity cost of margin posted 
to the account ($1,500) whlle the contract is in force. The two yields are 
equivalent to the yields from Strategy II and Strategy II A, assuming that the 
bond delivered in contract fulfillment is the same bond to be held outright. 
In general, the delivered bond, and thus the Strategy I lA yield, will not be 
the same, even if it is cheapest-to-deliver, and therefore the yields are only 
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approximately comparable (See Table 2, Section II). In all cases, the 
Treasury bond used to create the charts is the August, 1996-2001 8% bond. 
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APPENDIX D 
BOX CHARTS: YIELDS FROM STRATEGIES I AND lA 
SETTLED EARLY: TREASURY BILL, NOTE 
AND BOND CONTRACTS. 
Actual yield, with settlement occurring after 21-day holding periods, from 
outright purchase of a Treasury bill (Bill Rate) versus purchase of a 
Treasury Instrument and short Treasury instrument contract position 
(Treasury Note Position and Bond Rate). 
Sample Interval: Daily. 
Sam ole Durat1on: June, 1982 contract through September, I 985 contract 
(note). 
March, 1978 contract through June, 1981 contract (bond). 
Source of Data: Futures Contracts: Chicago Board of Trade and Wall 
Street Journal. 
Treasury Bill: Wall Street Journal. 
Treasury Note: Wall Street Journal 
Treasury Bond: Compuserve Information Services. 
Description: The upper chart in this appendix shows summary data for 
actual annualized yield from two investment strategies: purchase of a 
deliverable Treasury bill and bill futures contract sale <Treasury Bill 
Position), and the simultaneous purchase of a Treasury note and sale of a 
matching futures contract <Treasury Note Pos1t1on). The lower chart shows 
summary data from hedged purchase of a Treasury bill (Blll Rate), and the 
simultaneous purchase of a Treasury bond and sale of a matching futures 
contract (Bond Rate). The positions are assumed to be settled after holding 
periods of 21 days. In both charts, the current Treasury bi I 1 yield is a I so 
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presented (Short Term Rate). Yields are calculated by dividing the actual 
dollar prof1t by the actual dollar cost. and annua11z1ng by multiplying by the 
ratio of the number of days per year (365) to the number of days in the 
holding period. The holding period is 21 business days- approximately one 
calendar month. Costs include payment of commission ($60) and margin 
($1 ,500) while the contract is in force. Margin is returned at settlement. 
The two yields are equivalent to the yields from Strategy I and Strategy lA, 
assuming early settlement (see Section II, Tables 1-3 in the text). The 
Treasury bond that is assumed to be purchased and held until settlement is 
the August, 1996-2001 8% bond. The Treasury note purchased is the 
February, 1992 14 5/8% note. Both instruments met the delivery 
requirements during the test periods. Neither instrument was cheapest-to-
dellver. The Treasury bill purchased, however, was the unique instrument 
to be de 1 ivered in contract fulfillment. 
In these box and whisker charts, the horizontal line in the center of 
the box represents the median, or 50th percentile. The top and bottom of 
the box represent the 75th and 25th percent11e, so that 112 or all yields are 
w1th1n the box. The horizontal marKs above and below the box- the 
whisKers- represent the 90th and 1Oth percentiles. 
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APPENDIX E 
YIELDS FROM STRATEGIES I AND lA 
SETTLED EARLY: TREASURY 
BILL CONTRACTS 
Prospective annual yield from outright purchase of a short term Treasury 
b111 (Short-Term Rate), versus actual annual yield, with settlement 
occurring after 21-day holding periods, from purchase of a longer term 
Treasury bill and short Treasury bill contract position (Long Bill- Short 
Future Position). 
Sample Interval: Da11y. 
Sample Duration: March, 1976 contract through December, 1985 contract 
Source of Data: Futures Contracts: Wall Street Journal. 
Treasury Bill: Wall Street Journal. 
Description: Th1s append1x shows the annua11zed y1eld from two 
investment strategies: outright purchase and maturation of a Treasury bill 
(Short-Term Rate), and the simultaneous purchase of a deliverable Treasury 
bill and sale of a matching futures contract, settled after a holding period 
of 21 business days (Long Bill- Short Future Position). Yields are 
calculated by dividing the actual dollar proflt by the actual dollar cost, and 
annualized by multiplying by the ratio of the number of days per year (365) 
to the number of days in the holding period. The holding period is 21 
business days- approximately one calendar month. Costs include payment 
of commission ($60) and margin ($1,500) wh11e the contract is in force. 
Margin is returned at settlement. The two yields are equivalent to the 
yields from Strategy I and Strategy lA, assuming early settlement of the 
futures position (see Section II, Tables 1-3 in the text). The Treasury bill 
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that is assumed to be purchased and held until settlement is the bill that is 
deliverable at contract expiration. 
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Early-Settlement Yield: September 1976 Treasury 8111 Contract 
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hrly-Setllement Yield: March 1978 Treasury 8111 Contract 
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E8rly-Setllement Yield: September 1976 Tre•sury Bill Contr•ct 
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Early-Settlement Yield: narch 1979 Treasury Bill Contract 
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E•rly-Settlement Yield: September 1979 Tre•sury Bill Contnct 
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E•rly-Settlement Yield: M•rch 1980 Tre•sury Bill Contnct 
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Early-Settlement Yield: September 1980 Treasury Bill Contract 
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E•rly-Settlement Yield: l"'•rch 1981 Tre•sury 8111 Contnct 
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hrly-Settlement Yield: September 1981 Trusury Bill Contnct 
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hrly-Settlement Yield: M1rch 1982 Tre1sury Bill Contnct 
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E8rly-Setl1ement Yield: September 1982 Tre•sury Bill Contr•ct 
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Early-Settlement Yield: M•rch 1983 Tre•sury 8111 Contnct 
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E8rly-Settlement Yield: September 1983 Treasury 8111 Contract 
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Early-Settlement Yield: December 1983 Treasury Bill Contract 
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Early-Settlement Yield: March 1984 Treasury 6111 Contract 
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E•rly-Settlement Yield: September 1984 Tre•sury Bill Contnct 
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E8rly-Settlement Yield: l'larch 1985 Treasury Bill Contract 
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E•rly-Settlement Yield: September 1985 Tre•sury 8111 Contnct 
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APPENDIX F 
YIELDS FROM STRATEGIES I AND lA SETTLED EARLY: 
TREASURY BILL AND TREASURY 
NOTE CONTRACTS. 
Prospective annual yield from outright purchase of a short term Treasury 
bill (Short-Term Rate), versus actual annual yield, with settlement 
occurring after 21-day holding periods, from purchase of a longer term 
Treasury bill and short Treasury bill contract position (Treasury Bill 
Position), and purchase of a Treasury note and short Treasury note contract 
position <Treasury Note Position). 
Sample Interval: Daily. 
Sample Duration: June, 1982 contract through September, 1985 contract 
Source of Data: Futures Contracts: Chicago Board of Trade and 
Wall Street Journal. 
Treasury Bill: Wall Street JournaL 
Treasury Note: Wall Street Journal 
Description: This appendix shows the annualized yield from three 
investment strategies: outright purchase and maturation of a Treasury bill 
(Short-Term Rate), the simultaneous purchase of a deliverable Treasury bill 
and sale of a matching futures contract (Treasury Bill Position), and the 
simultaneous purchase of a deliverable Treasury note and sale of a matching 
futures contract <Treasury Note Pos1tion). Yields are calculated by dividing 
the actual dollar profit by the actual dollar cost, and annualizing by 
multiplying by the ratio of the number of days per year (365) to the number 
of days in the holding period. The holding period is 21 business days. Costs 
include payment of commission ($60) and margin ($1 ,500) while the 
201 
202 
contract is in force. Margin is returned at settlement. The two yields are 
equivalent to the yields from Strategy I and Strategy lA. assuming early 
settlement of the position (see Section II, Tables 1-3 in the text). The 
Treasury bill that is assumed to be purchased and held until settlement is 
the bill that is deliverable at contract expiration. The Treasury I')Ote is the 
February, 1992 14 5/8% note. 
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21-D•y hrly Settlement Yields: June 1982 Contncts 
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21-Day Early Settlement Yields: June 1983 Contracts 
OShort-Term Rate OTreasury Bill Position !:!. Treasury Note Position 
25~--~~--~--~~--~--~----~--~----~--~----~---t 
20 
15 
10 
5 
0 
-5+-~~~~~-r~--~~~--~~-r~--~~~--~~~~--~4 
5 
20 
16 
16 
14 
12 
10 
8 
6 
4 
2 
0 
10 
10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 
Days To Expiration (Bill Contract) 50 55 
21-Day Early Settlement Yields: September 1983 Contracts 
OShort-Term Rate OTreasury Bill Position !:!. Treasury Note Position 
15 20 25 30 35 40 
Days To Expiration (Bill Contract) 45 
50 
60 
55 
24 
22 
20 
..... 18 c 
8 
L 
:. 16 
-"CC 
.... 
• 14 
-)-
.... 
"' ~ 12 E 
c 
10 
6 
6 
0 
22 
20 
18 
16 
..... 
i 
0 14 ~ 
CL 
-
., 12 
i 
)-
10 .... 
"' ~ 
c 6 c 
6 
4 
2 
0 
21-Day Early Settlement Yields: December 1983 Contracts 
OShort-Term Rate OTreasury Bill Position ll. Treasury Note Position 
10 20 30 40 
Days To Expiration (Bill Contract) 50 
21-Day Early Settlement Yields: Harch 19&4 Contracts 
OShort-Term Rate OTreasury Bill Position 6 Treasury Note Position 
10 20 30 40 
Days To Expiration (Bill Contract) 50 
206 
60 
60 
20 
18 
16 
14 
.. 
c 12 3 
.. 
• 10 0.. ...., 
"CC 
.. 8 
-)-
'ii 6 ~ 
E 
-< 4 
2 
0 
-2 
5 
25 
20 
15 
..., 
c 
• 0 
~ 10 0.. 
-"CC 
.. ): 5 
';; 
~ 
c 
-< 0 
-5 
-10 
0 
21-Day Early Settlement Yields: June 1984 Contracts 
OShort-Term Rate OTreasury Bill Position !!. Treasury Note Position 
10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 
Days To Expiration (Bill Contract) 
21-Day Early Settlement Yields: September 1984 Contracts 
OShort-Term Rate DTreasury Bill Position fl Treasury Note Position 
10 20 30 40 
Days To Expiration (Bill Contract) 
50 
207 
55 
60 
22.5 
20 
17.5 
... 15 c 
8 
L 
• 12.5 Q. 
.._, 
"CCI 
-• 10 
-> 
";i 
:::J 7.5 c c 
-c 
5 
2.5 
0 
25 
22.5 
20 
17.5 
... 
i 
0 15 ~ 
0.. 
.._, 
"CCI 12.5 
.. 
> 10 
... 
2 
c 7.5 
-c 
5 
2.5 
0 
0 
0 
21-Day Early Settlement Yields: December 1984 Contracts 
OShort-Term Rate OTreasury Bill Position 6 Treasury Note Position 
10 20 30 40 
Days To Expiration (Bfll Contract) 
so 
21-D•y Early Settlement Yields: Harch 1985 Contracts 
OShort-Term Rate OTreasury Bill Position 6 Treasury Note Position 
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 
Days To Expiration (Bill Contract) 
208 
60 
55 
12.5 
10 
7.5 
5 
.... 
c 
! 2.5 
'" :. 
-.J 
"0 0 
.. 
... 
>-
-2.5 
.. ;:, 
~ 
-5 
-< 
-7.5 
-10 
-12.5 
5 
18 
16 
14 
.... 
i 12 0 
~ 
0.. 
-..J 
'0 10 
:i 
>-
- 8 .. 2 
c 
-c: 
6 
4 
2 
25 
21-Day Early Settlement Yields: June 1985 Contracts 
OShorl-Term Rate DTreasury Bill Position 6 Treasury Note Position 
10 \5 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 
Days To Expiration (Bill Contract) 
21-Day Early Settlement Yields: September 1985 Contracts 
OShort-Term Rate DTreasury Bill Position 6 Treasury Note Position 
30 35 40 45 
Days To Expiration (Bill Contract) 50 
209 
55 
55 
APPENDIX G 
YIELDS FROM STRATEGIES I AND lA SETTLED EARLY: 
TREASURY Bl LL AND TREASURY 
BOND CONTRACTS. 
Prospective annual yield from outright purchase of a short term Treasury 
bill (Short Term Rate); actual annual yield from purchase of a Treasury bill 
and short Treasury bill contract position (Bill Rate); and actual annual yield 
from purchase of a Treasury bond and short Treasury bond contract position 
(Bond Rate). · 
sample Interval: Daily. 
Sample Duration: March, 1978 contract through June, 1981 contract. 
Source of Data: Futures Contracts: Chicago Board of Trade, and 
Wall Street Journal. 
Treasury Bill: Wall Street Journal. 
Treasury Bond: Compuserve Information Services 
Description: This appendix shows the annuallzed yield from three 
investment strategies: outright purchase and maturation of a Treasury blll 
(Short Term Rate), the simultaneous purchase of a deliverable Treasury bill 
and sale of a matching futures contract (Bill Rate), and the simultaneous 
purchase of a deliverable Treasury bond and sale of a matching futures 
contract (Bond Rate). Yields are calculated by dividing the actual dollar 
profit by the actual dollar cost, and annualizing by multiplying by the ratio 
of the number of days per year (365) to the number of days in the holding 
period. The holding period is 21 business days. Costs include payment of 
commission ($60) and margin ($1 ,500) while the contract is in force. 
Margin is returned at settlement. The two yields are equivalent .to the 
yields from Strategy I and Strategy lA, assuming early settlement of the 
210 
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position (see Section II, Tables 1-31n the text>. The Treasury bill that is 
assumed to be purchased and held until settlement is the bill that is 
deliverable at contract expiration. The Treasury bond is the August, 1996-
200 1 8% bond. It is not the cheapest-to-de liver against the bond contract, 
but does fulfill the Chicago Board of Trade delivery conditions. 
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Tre.sury Btn and Bond Returns: September 1978 Contracts 
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